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ABSTRACT 
 
 
How has maternal subjectivity historically been understood in Western culture 
and discourse? How does it continue to be understood? In asking these questions, 
this thesis will explore the ways in which the maternal manifests within poetics and 
broader discourses as a separate and particular subject position that is distinct from 
the umbrella term of female subjectivity.  
 
 Taking as its primary focus American society in the Cold War period of the 
1950s and 60s, and then more contemporary discourse of the maternal, this thesis 
analyses the poetry of three major figures in American poetics – Anne Sexton, Sylvia 
Plath and Adrienne Rich, focussing on their depiction of motherhood in their 
respective poetry. Flowing on from this reading of the poetry, this thesis also 
examines the discourses of the maternal that proceeded from this particular point in 
history, surveying the transformative and disruptive effect second wave feminism 
and the associated cultural, social and theoretical challenges had upon attitudes 
towards the maternal.  
 
 Finally this thesis looks at new forms of maternal writing, specifically 
blogging and the potentially transformative impact the digital space has had upon the 
ways in which motherhood is represented in contemporary discourse and popular 
culture. Bringing the discussion into the new textual spaces of the twenty first 
century enables us to measure the “progress” of the maternal subject in cultural 
discourses, both poetic and polemical. What has been the impact of earlier poets and 
theorists in shaping the maternal subject in the contemporary world? 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Fleshing out the Mother 
 
 
Simone de Beauvoir famously proclaimed in The Second Sex (1949) that ‘one 
is not born, but rather becomes woman. No biological, physical or economic destiny 
defines the figure that the human female takes on in society’ (de Beauvoir 2011, 
293).  If we accept that, as de Beauvoir suggests and many other theorists have since 
elaborated on, gender identity is a construct that is influenced by social and cultural 
expectations, it follows that motherhood, which is regarded by many cultures as an 
integral part of female and feminine experience, can be seen as central to the 
discourses and mythologies that societies create around womanhood. This means that 
we must ask further how one ‘becomes mother’, and if the maternal can be seen as 
both a performative and a speaking subject position.  
 
This thesis will explore the ways in which the maternal manifests within poetic 
and broader discourses as a separate and particular subject position that is distinct 
from the umbrella term of female subjectivity. The thesis will analyse the 
permutations of maternal subjectivity in the writing of major figures in poetry, 
feminist theory, and in popular discourses, in order to construct an argument for the 
recognition of maternal subjectivity as a dynamic and heterogeneous subject position 
encompassing the complexity and contradictions inherent in subjectivity as 
multiplicity. This approach recognises maternity as a fluid rather than static 
designation in which the maternal subject and her relationship with other subjects is 
in constant flux. Thus, the thesis will offer new, post-essentialist understandings of 
the maternal, as it seeks to discover the ways in which language – and particularly 
poetic language - can recover “maternity” from those who have often sought to 
patrol it as a fixed or monolithic category, whether idealizing or demonizing it. 
 
Taking as its primary focus American society in the Cold War period of the 
1950s and 60s, and then in contrast, more contemporary and popular discourses of 
the maternal, the thesis will look first at the poetry of three major figures in 
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American poetics – Anne Sexton, Sylvia Plath and Adrienne Rich, focussing on their 
depiction of motherhood in their respective poetry. In conjunction with my analysis 
of Sexton, Plath and Rich’s poetic explorations of motherhood, the thesis will also 
examine the discourses of the maternal that proceeded from this particular point in 
history, surveying the transformative and disruptive effect second wave feminism 
and the associated cultural, social and theoretical challenges had upon attitudes 
towards the maternal. It is the contention of the thesis that this period in American 
history in particular represents a point in recent history when the mythologising of 
maternity as the apogee of female experience was at its most potent socially and 
culturally. In exploring the poetry of Sexton, Plath and Rich, my focus will be on 
how their engagement with maternal subjectivity in their poetry illuminated the 
particular frustrations of women in Cold War America and pushed back against the 
strictures that sought to keep women – particularly white, middle class women – 
confined to the domestic sphere. I will then be testing how – or whether - such work 
continues to inform contemporary, twenty-first century maternal discourses. 
 
Despite the pronounced societal and cultural compulsion towards motherhood 
experienced by these poets as young women, maternal subjectivity manifests in their 
work, it will be argued, as a radical speaking position because of their resistance to 
the dominant paradigms of what was acceptable and desirable for both women and 
mothers during the 1950s and 60s. Which is not to say that these poets rejected or 
denigrated motherhood, but rather that they used their poetry to depict maternal 
subjectivity as a multifaceted, expansive and malleable designation, rich in both 
meaning and symbolism. The notion that poetics offers a unique space in which to 
engage with the ambiguities and ambivalence of motherhood, while still embracing it 
as a powerful speaking position, is crucial to the arguments that will be advanced in 
this thesis. Further, I will make the case that maternal writing represents one of the 
most potent, and therefore significant means culture has for constructing and 
reconstructing maternal subjectivity.  
 
Discussions surrounding gender, identity and sexuality have undergone a 
significant evolution since the 1960s, and in 2017 it is no longer appropriate to view 
the actuality of motherhood through the lens of rigid gender binaries that arguably 
dominated during the Cold War period. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis 
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the focus will be on the relationship of maternal subjectivity to female subjectivity 
and the feminine. In doing so, I do not wish to suggest that motherhood be 
understood as a purely biological designation or status, or as the inescapable fate of 
woman. Nor do I wish to collapse the maternal entirely into the feminine, or to deny 
or denigrate the experiences of those whose navigation of maternal subjectivity does 
not conform to the parameters within which I will be conducting my investigation of 
these aesthetic and discursive responses to motherhood. Rather, the scope of this 
thesis is necessarily defined by focusing on these three poets, and the mid-century 
American milieu that immediately preceded second wave feminism, in which the 
poems that will form the basis of the first half of my analysis were written. To that 
end, I have chosen to retain some of the gendered language, particularly with regard 
to pronouns, that is prevalent in the period. I am aware this might read as jarring to 
contemporary readers for whom the application of gendered pronouns, and the 
understanding of motherhood as an experience fixed within the female half of the 
gender binary has been rendered problematic by current gender theory and discourse.  
 
While the focus will be, in large part, on the particular conditions within which 
Sexton, Plath and Rich were writing during the 1960s, and the various theoretical 
discourses that emerged as disruptive and resistive responses to those social and 
cultural conditions, much of my epistemological concentration will be on the 
arguments and methodologies of feminist theorists who preceded Judith Butler’s 
(1990) ground breaking extension of Beauvoir’s arguments on the dismantling of 
gender paradigms. In short, this thesis will make an argument for maternal 
subjectivity as a distinct and particular subject positioning. However, as will become 
evident in the examination of both the poetry and the pertinent theoretical discourses, 
making the case for maternal subjectivity requires the critic and theorist to confront 
the notion that this remains a gendered designation, even when analysis pushes up 
against the restrictions and limitations of monolithic paradigms of gender which have 
historically been used to subjugate women and degrade their potentialities outside of 
the domestic sphere.  
 
Central to this investigation of the maternal as a distinct and separate subject 
position is the contention that by writing and ‘speaking’ motherhood, these poets 
stake a claim on the cultural conversation surrounding maternity and therefore have 
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shifted both the terms of this conversation and our understanding of it. In their 
poetry, I will argue, Sexton, Plath and Rich enact the particularity of maternal 
subjectivity in ways which illuminate the cultural conditions in which these poems 
were produced, and give us an expressive insight into the actuality of maternal 
experience. I read the maternal poetry of Sexton, Plath and Rich as embodying both 
the monolithic generality of the maternal as a symbolic construct, and the socio-
historical specificity of their particular experiences. Indeed, the often paradoxical 
interplay of personal, political, historical, symbolic, general and particular that makes 
up our understanding of motherhood is the common thread woven through my 
analysis of the aesthetic and discursive responses to the maternal. This conundrum, 
of what is an intensely personal, lived experience as expressed so lucidly in the 
poetry, but which is also a phenomenon placed on a collision course with the 
seemingly unassailable, overarching symbolic construct of maternity which seeks to 
reduce this complex, often contradictory and ambivalent subject position to a static 
designation constrained by reductive patriarchal definitions, is analysed throughout 
this thesis.  
 
 
Maternal Confessions and the Worst of Anyone 
 
 
In an interview given just before her death, Plath spoke of the transformation 
her writing process was undergoing, in which her poems had become more lucid, as 
her interviewer, Peter Orr observed. Attributing this to the more vocal cadences of 
what were to become the Ariel poems, Plath commented that ‘I speak them to 
myself, and I think that this in my own writing development is quite a new thing with 
me, and whatever lucidity they may have comes from the fact that I say them to 
myself, I say them aloud’ (Plath 1962). In identifying the vocalness of her new work 
as the key to its resonance, Plath situates poetry as a cultural conversation, saying, ‘I 
do feel that now and I feel that this development of recording poems, of speaking 
poems at readings, of having records of poets, I think this is a wonderful thing. I'm 
very excited by it. In a sense, there's a return, isn't there, to the old role of the poet, 
which was to speak to a group of people, to come across’ (1962). If we are to read 
the poetry of Sexton, Plath and Rich as conducting a conversation about motherhood, 
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what do their poems have to tell us about the psychic and structural barriers erected 
against the broader recognition of maternal subjectivity as a multifaceted, active, and 
relational designation? Further, what light does a reading of the various discourses 
that grapple with these barriers faced by the maternal subject in her quest to represent 
her multiplicity shed on our reading of the poetry? 
 
 While American women in the early post war/Cold War period were likely not 
the primary intended audience of the original French language edition of The Second 
Sex, de Beauvoir’s thesis regarding the constructed nature of gender, has since taken 
on a powerful resonance when considering motherhood and the socialisation of 
women1. Women’s activism in America in the 1960s, I will argue, was born from a 
similar frustration with the prescriptive and often rigid gender roles assigned to 
women in the aftermath of World War Two. In the years following the birth of the 
women’s movement, known as second wave of feminism, in the late 60s and 70s, 
and the consequent establishment of feminist literary criticism as an influential 
critical reading position, the subject of motherhood has occupied a somewhat uneasy 
space within both critical discourse and women’s poetry. The idea of motherhood, 
despite the many means contemporary women have at their disposal to manage their 
fertility, to delay or forgo childbearing entirely, remains deeply rooted within female 
consciousness and female experience. As evidence of this, we might turn to the large 
and diverse body of work, both creative and critical, concentrating on it. The work of 
these three, now canonical, poets clearly demonstrates the influence that motherhood 
– as idea and experience - has exerted over women’s creative consciousness. As 
such, their work affords an ideal place in which to begin an exploration of the ways 
in which maternal subjectivity manifested in the consciousness of American and 
broader society and culture during the Cold War period. And further, to extrapolate 
how the contributions of these poets have shaped ongoing attitudes and discourses of 
the maternal.  
 
Motherhood has been mythologised, canonised, lionised and demonised 
throughout the ages in Western thought, but regardless of the ways in which it is 
written about, theorised and codified into cultural practice, it remains an arena of 
                                                
1 Some feminist theorists, most notably Margaret Simons in 1983, have argued that Howard M 
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experience that is expected to be actively performed. One performs motherhood in 
language and in action, symbolically, physically and materially. Which brings us to 
the crux of the epistemological impetus informing my analysis – the contemplation 
of the seemingly irreconcilable gap between the personal actualities of motherhood 
and the cultural and symbolic edifice of the maternal. Is motherhood seen as an 
essentially personal and private experience, and/or is it a cultural institution, subject 
as Adrienne Rich argued in Of Woman Born, to patriarchal definition and restriction? 
(Rich, 1995, 14) What are the political and social implications of the veneration of 
motherhood as a desirable category for women? The interaction of the personal and 
the political both aesthetically in the poetry and discursively in other texts will be a 
key area of analysis in this thesis. Early second wave feminists took as their defining 
slogan ‘the personal is political’, but how was the concept of ‘personal’ defined in 
Cold War America, and more broadly, during the years that preceded this 
politicisation of woman’s issues? Were these concepts themselves subject to a 
particular kind of ‘restriction and definition’ that limited the representation and 
understanding of maternal subjectivity? (14)  
 
Can we trace the impact of the politicisation of the personal upon the way in 
which motherhood is imagined and represented poetically? Conversely, can it be said 
that the representation of motherhood undertaken by these poets helped redefine and 
reshape cultural assumptions surrounding motherhood? In exploring the influence of 
confessionalism on mid century American poetics, I will argue that it became an 
important mode for the exploration of maternal subjectivity. Further, I contend that it 
opened up space for these poets to push back against social and political dictates that 
sought to contain the feminine within the domestic, while still allowing them to 
engage with motherhood as a personal, particular experience that invokes a full 
gamut of emotional and psychic responses, including indifference and ambivalence. 
While the speaker/narrator of a poem is by definition a fictional construct not 
necessarily analogous to the poet, there is still much to be said about the role of the 
poet as a mediator and commentator of culture and experience.  
 
In regard to maternal subjectivity, poetry, particularly poetry of the personal, 
with its inhabitation of the first person, is an act of self-representation that in and of 
itself is a radical resistance to the patriarchal delineation and containment of 
  7 
motherhood. Thus, the poet is, as Plath said, a speaker engaging with her audience 
while shaping her maternal subjectivity. By ‘coming across and speaking to people’ 
(Plath 1962) explicitly about motherhood, by engaging with the personal in ways 
previously considered taboo, or lacking in literary merit, these poets tell us 
something about the particularity of maternal subjectivity. They give us access to 
visceral, potentially transgressive, representations of maternal experience that might 
otherwise have remained unspoken. In light of the enduring literary stature of 
Sexton, Plath and Rich it can also be argued that their work shifted, and continues to 
shift, cultural and social attitudes towards the personal, and the depiction and 
perception of motherhood. To this end, their poems are read here as significant 
depictions of maternal subjectivity that expand our understanding of motherhood, 
and that redefine the cultural conversation surrounding maternity.   
 
 In interrogating the impact of both the poetry and other cultural discourses, 
from the 1960s to the present, on the shaping and/or dismantling of the pervasive 
myths of mothering, this thesis will focus on second wave feminism and confessional 
poetry and their relationship to the depiction and reception of maternal subjectivity. 
In terms of gender relations and sexual politics, second wave feminism was arguably 
one of the most important cultural and political disruptions of recent history, not least 
of all because of the transformation it instigated in the ways in which motherhood 
and the maternal are regarded. Confessional poetry had a similarly transformative 
impact upon poetry and literary criticism in the mid twentieth century. In her essay 
‘Confessing the body, Plath, Sexton, Berryman, Lowell, Ginsberg and the Gendered 
Poetics of the ‘Real’’, Elizabeth Gregory notes that while confessionalism has been 
‘disparaged as too feminine’ and as a result ‘condemned as trivial and self- 
indulgent’ (Gregory in Gill (ed.) 2006, 33) its significance as a poetic mode lies in 
the way in which it ‘offered poets new ways in which poetry can effect change’ in 
how ‘the world imagines authority’ (34). Gregory’s assertion that confessionalism 
was disparaged because of its association with supposedly feminine modes of 
thought and expression is troubling, not least of all considering some of the more 
notable confessional poets, including those she includes in her essay, were in fact 
male, but also because it suggests a level of critical contempt for both the poetry and 
the subject matter that was deemed ‘feminine’. It is also indicative of a 
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marginalization and denigration of the personal and the domestic as ‘female’ 
concerns not worthy of serious artistic exploration.  
 
Gregory’s other claim that confessionalism was an important moment in 
poetics because it opened up issues of gender, allowing poets to explore ‘alternative 
authority patterns’ and admit ‘new speakers talking about new material’, is of 
particular relevance to the representation of maternal subjectivity, as it indicates that 
despite a lack of critical approbation, confessionalism represented a significant 
creative moment for mid century poets (Gregory in Gill (ed.) 2006, 34). Thus, in 
recognising confessionalism as a significant poetic mode, poems that address 
maternal experience and inhabit the first person speaking position are also afforded a 
greater cultural resonance. It can be argued that, given women of this period were 
largely excluded from the workforce and expected to concern themselves with 
domestic issues once they married and had children, confessionalism offered 
transformative potential for female poets to access the cultural space in which their 
maternal subjectivity might be externalised. However, the association Gregory 
makes between it and the feminine, and the implications this has for poetic 
representations of the maternal, bear further examination.  
 
 Gregory observes that prior to the rise of confessionalism in the 1950s, the 
‘dynamics of the poetic tradition were patterned on a gendered, familial model […] 
which historically has followed a patriarchal model in which authority circulates 
among fathers and sons, and from which mothers and daughters are pointedly 
excluded’ (Gregory in Gill (ed.) 2006, 35). Gregory’s larger contention is that this 
dynamic was as damaging for the male poet who did not fit the rigid strictures of 
gender roles in Cold War America. Confessionalism, she argues, offered these male 
poets an avenue to cast off the oppressive authority of their modernist forebears: 
 
For male poets of the 1950s, this ‘feminine’ position served as a figure for their 
sense of their ‘secondary’ position as heirs of the dauntingly successful 
modernists. Confession’s ordinarily unauthoritative personal pose paradoxically 
offered authority, in its differentiation of confessional work from that of the 
‘impersonal’ modernists. The originality of the new work gave it new value. By 
embracing the ‘feminine’ confessional position, these poets aimed to revalue the 
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secondariness associated with it and by analogy the secondariness of their own 
post-modern position (37).  
 
In drawing the distinction here between the detached, impersonal formality of 
modernism, and the supposedly ‘unauthorative personal pose’ of confessionalism, 
Gregory presses down hard on the disparagement of the feminine within poetics. 
While she writes that for female poets, the ‘segue of ‘feminine’ material into the 
‘masculine’ poetic realm offered […] a pass into the formerly forbidden zone’, 
ultimately this appears to offer little in the way of cultural authority or autonomy to 
the female poet (Gregory in Gill (ed.) 2006, 37).  
 
Although in Gregory’s reckoning the female poet may be granted access to the 
‘formerly forbidden zone’ (and here she arguably overstates the lack of status women 
poets had in the modernist tradition), this access is predicated on the male poet’s 
appropriation of the feminine and the refashioning of it as an acceptable poetic 
choice. In this scenario, the feminine remains marginalised and problematic. Gregory 
writes that each of the poets named in the title of her essay ‘challenge the established 
tradition by confessing themselves ‘feminine’’, but this confession operates  
 
in tension with the long-operative Western view of femininity as a kind of sin in 
itself, calling forth shame. This view underlies the historical representation of 
femininity in poetry as a silent, sanitized body that serves as the topic of 
discussion by and among masculine speakers. For these speakers, femininity 
arouses both excitement and shame (quickly displaced onto the ‘source’ of the 
excitement) at the need the excitement reveals (Gregory in Gill (ed.) 2006, 35). 
 
In this poetic economy, the feminine is repurposed by male poets who are excluded 
from full participation in the masculine tradition, and is therefore expected to contain 
all that masculinity cannot or will not. In my reading, Gregory’s acknowledgment 
that this appropriation of the feminine also opens up some poetic space for the 
female poet provides small comfort because the feminine is still understood only in 
relationship, and as ‘secondary’ to the masculine.  
 
In Gregory’s telling, the blurring of gender lines has little benefit for female 
poets because there is no corresponding access to masculine authority granted to her. 
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Rather, she must watch on as her male counterparts insinuate themselves into her 
space, appropriating whatever equivocal authority her gender identity provides. If we 
are to accept Gregory’s assertion – an assertion also shared by other critics such as 
Paula Bennett (1986) who feature in later discussion - that the personal is negatively 
associated with the feminine, how might the female poet recover this transgressive 
feminine potential of the confessional lyric Gregory sees male poets such as Lowell 
claiming? I propose that in regard to maternal subjectivity, the female poet benefits 
from a solidifying of her identity via an unambiguous (which is not to say 
unambivalent) claiming of and identification with her maternity and the attendant 
gendered implications. Rather than deferring to the claims of the marginalised male 
poet, who in Gregory’s words fashions a kind of dubious ‘secondary’ power by 
appropriating the feminine, the female maternal poet can claim this power and 
resonance – however fraught and problematic - by embodying maternal subjectivity 
in her poetry. 
 
Confessionalism, along with the broader feminist opening up of the personal as 
a legitimate realm of intellectual and ideological inquiry, made new poetic 
explorations of maternal experience possible. As will be explored in the ensuing 
discussion of these poets, such efforts were not always well received at the time, 
particularly when the poems addressed what had previously been taboo subjects such 
as maternal ambivalence and mental illness. However, as I will argue, by invoking 
these previously embargoed subjects, and by explicitly engaging with both the 
physical and emotional manifestations of gender and maternity, these poets fashion a 
new image of maternal subjectivity. Crucially, this new image of maternal 
subjectivity to which I refer is notable for the power of self-representation it grants to 
the maternal poet. The ambiguous power of the confessional lyric that Gregory 
details as resting upon a masculine appropriation of the feminine which allows the 
female poet some reflected authority in the blurring of gender lines, is in this reading 
rendered more potent in the work of these poets because in their work we see them 
enact control of the aesthetic representation of their maternal subjectivity. This is not 
to say that this poetic enactment of the maternal is without its own ambiguities. 
Foregrounding the relationship between the feminine and the maternal requires the 
poet to confront the historical limitations both modes have placed upon the female 
subject.  
  11 
 
Indeed much of Sexton’s immediate and ongoing impact as a poet was 
generated by her seeming willingness to unflinchingly reveal the more painful 
emotions that pursued her, and to explore the impact these emotions had upon her 
experiences of motherhood. Not for Sexton the image of the serene mother 
contentedly tending to her children in her untroubled household. Rather, her poems 
frequently plumb what she herself referred to as the ‘worst of anyone’ (Sexton 1999, 
34). This focus on the destructive impulses occasioned by her experiences as a 
woman in 1950s and 60s America, insofar as it relates to the agonistic performance 
of motherhood, was then, and remains still now, confronting and shocking subject 
matter for many readers and critics. The material point, that poetics, and 
confessionalism in particular, can function as a venue in which the female poet might 
exert some kind of representational control of her maternal subjectivity, remains 
salient. It must be noted, however, that representational control should not be 
equated with authorial control over the reception of said poems. The tension between 
what is represented – or what is said - in these poems, and how it is read and 
received, is an ongoing source of textual and cultural conflict that produces both 
productive and reductive readings of maternal subjectivity.    
 
This tension is perhaps even more pronounced in the ongoing analysis of 
Plath’s body of work than it is with Sexton’s. The circumstances surrounding her 
death, and her relatively small but startling body of poetry, have ensured that the 
interest in both Plath’s work and personal life remains strong over 50 years after her 
suicide. Plath’s frequent use of first person in her poems and her looming physical 
absence have meant that her work is most often read as being purely personal. In 
light of her untimely death, and the portentous nature of some of her later poems, 
some critics, readers and commentators have interpreted Plath’s work as 
irresponsible and ‘risky’. In the foreword to the first edition of Ariel Robert Lowell, a 
poet famous for taking similar ‘risks’ in his own work described the poems as 
‘playing Russian roulette with six cartridges in the cylinder, a game of “chicken,” the 
wheels of both cars locked and unable to swerve’ (Lowell in Plath 1965, viii). It’s an 
evocative, if masculinist, image of creative recklessness that seems to be 
encouraging readers to recoil from the poems. Just as Sexton was chided for 
engaging with the ‘commonplaces of the asylum’ in her poetry (Sexton 1999, 34), so 
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too Plath is reprimanded for poems that in Lowell’s opinion ‘tell that life, even when 
disciplined, is simply not worth it’ (Lowell in Plath 1965, ix).  
 
There is a certain irony in Lowell’s description of the Ariel poems, given his 
most famous publication Life Studies was one of the first collections to introduce 
readers to confessional poetry, exploring similar themes, including mental illness and 
marriage, similar to those in Plath’s Ariel. Is this evidence of the troubling double 
standard noted by Gregory, whereby women poets are simultaneously disparaged for 
their ‘feminine’ concern with personal issues, censured for what they chose to 
confess in their poetry, while their male counterparts are less troubled by such 
criticisms, but rather are celebrated for transgressing social and cultural mores by 
being granted access to an albeit ambiguous ‘secondary’ power. And finally, was the 
idea of women writing with such openness about their lives genuinely more troubling 
to readers and critics because of the poets’ status as mothers whose words might be 
read as detrimental to their children? Might we conclude that during its ascendency, 
confessional poetry by women was expected to carry an extra burden of surveillance 
because female poets were (and are still?) measured in terms of womanliness and 
motherhood? Does a survey of historical critical and readerly responses to the poetry 
of Plath and Sexton and Rich reveal a deep-seated resistance to the notion of the 
maternal writer, or indeed the mother in general, who assumes representational 
control over her maternal subjectivity? 
 
 
Situating Maternal Subjectivity in Discourse 
 
 
While an examination of critical responses to the poetry has much to tell us 
about the interplay of cultural and socio-political factors which shaped contemporary 
attitudes towards these works, a close reading of theoretical mediations on the 
maternal by feminist theorists gives further insight into the psychic barriers erected 
against the recognition of maternity as a complex and multifaceted subject position. 
It is here that the work of Adrienne Rich, as the only one of the three poets to publish 
extensively on motherhood outside of poetry, becomes the focus of the discussion. In 
the third chapter, a close reading of Rich’s poem ‘Snapshots of a Daughter in Law’ 
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provides the locus for the marrying of the two threads of inquiry of this thesis – the 
aesthetic and the discursive representations and negotiations of maternal subjectivity. 
Drawing on the various strands of maternal discourse – cultural, psychoanalytical, 
social and symbolic, enables a more detailed and nuanced view of the complex and 
tangled interactions of the personal and institutional edifices that make up our 
understanding of motherhood.  
 
Starting from the analytical assumption that an understanding of maternal 
subjectivity as a heterogeneous, unsettled designation requires an equally protean 
epistemological approach, my survey of the discourses will encompass the work of 
several different theorists of varying critical and analytical persuasions. This critical 
survey does not claim to be exhaustive, but two dominant assertions emerge from my 
investigation of the intertextual relationship between the aesthetic and discursive 
negotiation of maternal subjectivity. The first of these is that a reading of culturally 
specific poetic representations of motherhood is made more palpable and meaningful 
when read in conjunction with discourses which contextualise the social conditions 
in which the poems were produced. The second is that alongside this situating of the 
poems within their socio-political and historical context, an exploration of maternal 
subjectivity also demands an engagement with psychoanalytic discourse. Or, more 
specifically, with the explications, challenges and disruptions to the Freudian-
Lacanian models of psychosexual development and mother/child relations put 
forward by theorists such as Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray, and expounded upon 
more recently by critics such as Suzanne Juhasz (2003), Lisa Baraitser (2008) and 
Alison Stone (2012). I posit that considering these differing, but not divergent 
theoretical approaches in conversation with the poetry makes possible a more 
fulsome and considered picture of maternal subjectivity that recognises the many 
conflicting cultural, social and personal impulses that beset the mother. And this also 
positions the maternal subject as the maker rather than bearer of meaning in this 
psychic dialogue.   
 
 
Contextualising the ‘Real’ in Maternal Discourse 
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Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique is widely seen as a key origin text of 
second wave feminism in that it was instrumental in instigating the first stirrings of a 
pushback to the pervasive cult of domesticity and femininity in Cold War American 
society. Published in 1963, Friedan famously coined the title ‘feminine mystique’ to 
describe what had previously been ‘the problem that has no name’ faced by many 
women as they struggled to reconcile feelings of discontent in a society that didn’t 
allow for such ambivalence, except punitively. Friedan examined in detail the lives 
of the contemporaries of Sexton, Plath and Rich – many of whom had also been 
high-achieving college students in the 1950s, and found that the responses to this 
extreme veneration of motherhood and domesticity were contradictory: not only 
passive acceptance, but also intense dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement from 
meaningful participation in society. When seen in the context of the dominance of 
Friedan’s feminine mystique, Sexton, Rich, and Plath’s determination to pursue 
poetry as a vocation even while conforming to the domestic and maternal standards 
expected of them becomes all the more significant. Indeed, their refusal to confine 
themselves purely to those roles which contemporary society suggested were 
biologically predetermined, is arguably an act of subversion.  
 
Writing poetry about motherhood can be seen as a way of reinforcing the 
feminine mystique, but this is to overlook dominant Cold War ideology that dictated 
that all things to do with the domestic were not considered worthy of public debate 
or discussion. Motherhood often confined women solely to their homes, and by 
writing poems that focussed on their lives as wives and mothers, these poets elevated 
these experiences from the realm of purely private and thrust them into the cultural 
and aesthetic world, thus opening them up for broader discussion. The poems written 
by these poets in the 1960s, which laid bare the often-painful reality behind the 
feminine mystique of domestic happiness, represent an important first salvo in what 
was to become a cultural discussion of overwhelming importance. 
 
It is interesting to note that Plath’s only completed novel, The Bell Jar, which 
also exposes the underlying dystopia and dysfunction of Cold War gender relations 
and sexual politics, was published in 1963. Largely regarded as a Roman-à-
clef/Bildungsroman, and thus subject to much of the same speculation and censure as 
Plath’s poetry, The Bell Jar also gives voice to many of the frustrations Friedan 
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details in The Feminine Mystique. However, where Friedan focusses on the plight of 
the disaffected housewife, Plath’s protagonist is a young, ambitious, college-
educated woman staring down the looming, socially sanctioned and enforced, 
degradation of her potentiality, which Friedan argued was so ruinous. When taken 
together as contemporaneous social commentaries, we might read these two texts as 
offering an emerging critique not just of Cold War sexual politics, but also of a 
socio-political environment that was fundamentally hostile to female autonomy.  
 
Where Friedan writes of wives and mothers across the country leading quiet 
lives of desperation, Plath’s protagonist, Esther is actually driven mad by the tension 
playing out between her desires and societal expectations. This tension is memorably 
invoked in the famous passage in which she imagines herself sitting at the foot of a 
metaphorical fig tree where all her choices are embodied by the figs branching out 
before her. A dazzling future embodied by each one: ‘a husband and a happy home 
and children […] a famous poet […] a brilliant professor’ but each represents a self-
contained possibility in which ‘choosing one meant losing all the rest’ (Plath 1990, 
80). Although this passage is often critically positioned as a marker of the beginning 
of Esther’s breakdown, it is significant that at this point she still envisages herself as 
having access to the range of high-powered occupations her elite education has 
equipped her for. Her existential angst is initially occasioned by the thought of 
choosing between a multitude of opportunities, not by the understanding that her 
gender might remove all choices from her.  
 
A comparison of these two texts also highlights the ways in which discursive 
and dialogic arguments can work in concert with aesthetic representations to expose 
and push back against regressive social mores. The Feminine Mystique bluntly and 
persuasively lays out its argument using statistics and case studies to draw 
comparisons and make its case. The Bell Jar brings its audience to a similar 
conclusion by leading readers through a nightmarish vision of a 1950s middle-class 
America in which the repressive and deleterious cultural dynamics of the decade 
become gradually more evident as Esther slips further into the mire of depression 
and disassociation. Both texts make explicit the association between oppressive 
gender stereotypes and mental illness, unequivocally suggesting that the cultural 
conditioning of women in Cold War America was psychologically damaging.  
  16 
 
This is a point Pat MacPherson makes in her book Reflecting on the Bell Jar in 
which she argues that the obsession with sex roles during this period that birthed the 
‘monstrous norm of Family’ was pathological. MacPherson writes: 
 
The cruellest assumption, to my mind, was the paradox that one’s role came 
naturally, and failure to be fulfilled was a sign of sickness. So each citizen was set 
self-policing to enact a ‘fulfilled’ conformity convincing to others if always 
fraudulent to oneself (MacPherson 1991, 3). 
 
This expectation of self-policed conformity, MacPherson argues, pathologised any 
expression of discontent, and ironically resembled the cultural authoritarianism 
Americans of the period associated with Communism: 
 
Paranoia proceeds naturally enough from this basic psychic dishonesty, seeking 
only external screens on which to project the denied self and call it the Other. 
This, I would argue, is the real ‘enemy within’ that Hoover called forth as 
Communism. Each citizen, if repression really worked, was self-divided into 
conformist front and denied demon Other (3-4). 
 
 If we take the titular image of the bell jar as a metaphor for the 
oppressiveness of dominant social paradigms in Cold War America, then Plath’s 
(and indeed Sexton’s and Rich’s) poetry can perhaps be read as the ultimate refusal 
to remain passively within its confines. Paradoxically, it is the fictionalising of the 
self and the quicksilver, elusive nature of poetic language that enables these poets to 
cut through the ‘psychic dishonesty’ of cultural mores to ‘project the desired self’ 
(Macpherson 1991, 3-4). While the term ‘desired self’ can also have connotations of 
psychic dishonesty in that it suggests the construction of an idealised self, in this 
context I read it as a resistance to the reductive and damaging social constraints 
placed on women during this period. Therefore, the concept of self as articulated in 
the poems considered in this thesis has both personal and political implications.  
 
 In her essay, Plath, History and Politics’, Deborah Nelson contends that the 
opening up of private experiences for aesthetic inspiration was an act of political 
resistance during the Cold War: 
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Writing personally or writing about private life, which are not precisely the same 
thing, was also political in another sense. Private family life and the ability to 
withdraw from the scrutiny of others most especially the state, were considered 
the bedrock of American freedom in the Cold War. This respect for privacy was 
often used to draw a contrast between the US and its enemy the Soviet Union, a 
totalitarian regime which by definition claimed all human activity for the state. 
The autobiographical and confessional trend in American culture erupted 
simultaneously with this ideological inflation of the value of privacy. Moreover, 
confessional poetry was not merely the personal in public. It was always the 
most secret, violent, damaging and disruptive elements of private life on display. 
Plath and her fellow confessional poets provided a counterdiscourse to the 
official ideology of privacy in the Cold War  (Nelson in Gill (ed.) 2006, 22). 
 
The idealisation of individual privacy suggests that Americans widely saw it as 
emblematic of personal freedom. However, because this idea of ‘personal freedom’ 
was co-opted by the state, it paradoxically had the same potential to restrict 
expression as the totalitarian regimes America sought to distinguish itself from.  
 
 The right to privacy remains an important cornerstone of American 
democracy, but as will be explored in later discussion, the rigorous pursuit of privacy 
as an ideology had the potential to distort this into an altogether more authoritarian 
concept imposed upon the cultural conversation. The move towards confessionalism 
in mid century American poetry was in many respects a rejection of the ‘official 
ideology’ of privacy. Willingly exposing the ‘most secret’ and damaging elements of 
private life (Nelson in Gill (ed.) 2006, 22) can be read as an act of cultural resistance 
that ultimately opened up aesthetic and polemical discourse to encompass gender and 
sexual politics. In regard to the specific focus of this thesis on the representation of 
motherhood, it can be further argued that Sexton, Plath and Rich provide counter 
discourses to prevailing notions of the maternal.  Therefore, we might contend that 
poetic representations of the personal and the maternal had more radical potential for 
female poets of the period when gender roles were exposed and challenged, rather 
than blurred, even if these poetic challenges risked entrenching binary notions of 
gender by positioning it as a fixed, rather than manipulable, obstacle. 
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The One Need Not Eclipse the Other 
 
 
In a posthumous tribute to Adrienne Rich in The New Yorker, Katha Pollitt 
credits Rich’s poetry as having a more lasting emotional impact than Friedan’s work. 
She writes: 
 
This is poetry that is literally unforgettable, that memorizes itself. […] Friedan 
made much the same points, but, because her book was topical journalism, it 
feels dated today: it is hard to use Friedan to convey to students, say, why a 
middle-class educated suburban housewife in the nineteen-fifties might have 
been restless and miserable, because for most young people the specifics of that 
life are too old and musty and alien; you might as well try to convey the world of 
a Roman matron or a medieval nun. But Rich’s poetry from this era still carries 
the shock of recognition, because it is about the deeper truths of consciousness 
behind the period details and interviews and statistics, and those truths don’t 
change so much (Pollitt, March, 2012). 
 
Given my own enduring admiration of Rich, Sexton and Plath’s poetry (as this 
inquiry will attest), I do not disagree with Pollitt’s lauding of Rich’s work as 
‘literally unforgettable’ (2012). I would, however, argue that Pollitt’s words, even as 
I acknowledge they were written to eulogise Rich’s contribution to American poetry, 
do not give sufficient recognition to the enduring impact of The Feminine Mystique, 
which as Stephanie Coontz notes in 2006 was ‘ranked thirty seventh on a list of the 
twentieth centuries best works of journalism on a list compiled by a panel of experts 
assembled by New York University’s journalism department (Coontz 2011, loc. 115 
of 4253). It is a text that remains contentious and polarizing. Coontz goes on to say 
that ‘when the editors of the right-wing magazine Human Events compiled their own 
list of “the ten most harmful books of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” in 
2007, they put The Feminine Mystique at number seven— not far below Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf (loc. 115 of 4253).  
 
 Nor do I agree that the emotional immediacy of the poetry need be privileged 
over the ‘topical journalism’ of The Feminine Mystique. Certainly there can be little 
doubt that Rich’s poetry, which continues to be widely read and studied, is still 
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capable of eliciting a visceral response because of ‘the shock of recognition’ it 
retains, and also because of the thrill one gets from immersing oneself in the 
intricacies of her language, but does it follow that the work of the poets studied in 
this thesis have more to tell us about our cultural relationship to motherhood than the 
contributions of theorists and essayists? That the poetry is ultimately more capable of 
retaining relevance than the extended discourses? Can one form of examination and 
expression be considered superior to the other? It strikes me that Pollitt’s judgement 
also condemns a large portion of Rich’s work, in particular Of Woman Born, which 
also comes under the banner of ‘topical journalism’. Which is all the more reason to 
avoid drawing hard and fast comparisons that favour one mode over the other. I 
would argue that neither the poetry nor the discursive and theoretical responses exist 
in opposition or a vacuum to the other, but that when read in conjunction they 
compliment and support each other to enhance our textual interactions with the 
maternal subject.  
 
 Pollitt’s point about the ability of poetry to express ‘deeper truths’ than can 
be conveyed by the analysis of statistics, seems rather reductive in that it relies on 
subjective, essentialist, and humanist notions such as the vague catchall of ‘deeper 
truth’ to support her contention. The difference between the two modes can be seen 
as linguistic and structural. Poems, by their nature are contained, and in comparison 
to an extended discursive text, brief utterances. They hit us between the eyes because 
that is what they are designed to do. Or, in the words of Plath in the 1962 interview 
quoted above, ‘poetry […] is a tyrannical discipline. You’ve got to go so far so fast 
in such a small space that you’ve just got to burn away all the peripherals.’ (Plath 
1962). The image Plath invokes of burning away the peripherals is an arresting one. 
To go ‘so far so fast’ is an excellent description of the expressive impact poems are 
able to have because of their relative brevity – an impact Pollitt argues does not 
lessen or date with the passage of time. Plath’s reference to poetry being a 
‘tyrannical discipline’ hints at some of the difficulties and structural restrictions of 
the medium in fully encompassing the daily actuality of maternal experience.  
 
 In the course of the interview discussion Plath’s views appear to diverge from 
those of Pollitt regarding the deeper truths of consciousness achieved by poetry. In 
describing the limits she felt writing poetry placed upon her, Plath regretted that her 
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poems did not enable her to include ‘all the paraphernalia that one finds in daily life.’ 
While a humorous reference to having to exclude toothbrushes from her poems 
would perhaps appear to bear out Pollitt’s arguments regarding the quotidian banality 
of prose, Plath’s comments speak to a tension played out in these differing 
representational modes. In the absence of toothbrushes and other daily paraphernalia, 
Plath and her fellow poets instead must ‘go so far so fast’ in order to impress upon 
their audiences the emotional and sensuous reality of motherhood. As I will explore 
in greater detail in subsequent chapters, the result of these efforts were often startling 
and breathtaking, and as Pollitt describes, capable of immediately communicating 
‘deeper truths’ of motherhood, but our understanding of these truths is invariably 
enhanced by the ‘period details’ provided by texts such as The Feminine Mystique. 
Our responses to the emotions we recognise in the poems need not be seen as 
separate from our understanding of the historical, social and cultural context within 
which they were produced.   
 
Plath also recognised the importance of communicating a sense of historical 
and cultural context in her poems, as Sexton and in particular Rich would do later 
when engaging with the activism of the women’s movement. The other key insight 
we gain from Plath’s interview with BBC presenter Peter Orr relates to her views on 
the use of personal experiences in her poetry. When asked about what motivated her 
poetically, Plath answered: 
 
I think my poems come immediately out of the sensuous and emotional 
experiences I have, but I must say, I cannot sympathise with these cries from the 
heart that are informed by nothing except, you know, a needle or a knife. I 
believe that one should be able to control and manipulate experiences, even the 
most terrifying like madness, being tortured, this sort of experience. And one 
should be able to manipulate these experiences with an informed and intelligent 
mind. I think that personal experience is very important, but certainly it 
shouldn’t be a kind of shut box, sort of mirror looking, narcissistic experience. I 
believe it should be relevant, and relevant to the larger things, the bigger things. 
(Plath, 1962) 
 
Plath’s insistence upon the poet’s ability to manipulate her experiences with an 
‘informed and intelligent mind’ and her belief that poems should be ‘relevant to the 
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larger things’ rather than merely inward looking, intimates that she was conscious of 
the need to situate her personal experiences of motherhood within the broader 
debates and discourses of her time.  
 
 Plath’s poetry has largely been retrospectively read as articulating a ‘proto-
feminist’ awareness of the debates and discourses of motherhood that would emerge 
from the women’s movement that followed the publication of The Feminine 
Mystique. This was also the case for Sexton, the other poet of the three who is most 
closely associated with ‘confessionalism’. The impressive breadth and variety of 
Rich’s body of work, stretching over six decades, provides us with a varied and 
evolving, historical and personal view of both aesthetic and discursive mediations of 
the maternal. Plath’s call for poetry of the personal to also situate itself in the larger 
space of public discourse reminds us of the dual pressures of the public and the 
personal the maternal writer faces, navigating, as she must, a subject and speaking 
position that has interpersonal, cultural, political and symbolic implications. 
 
 
Moving Beyond Biographical Readings 
 
 
Historical contextualising of the poetry via discursive responses and debates 
provides a rich cultural and political basis from which to read it. An exploration of 
the complex interplay of poetic language analysed within a framework of feminist 
and deconstructuralist responses to Freudian-Lacanian models of subjectivity can 
uncover further fruitful considerations of maternal subjectivity and the mother’s 
position in culture. As the ensuing discussion will develop, readings of maternal 
writings that draw upon the critical tenants of psychoanalysis provide an even deeper 
evaluation of the confluence of institutional and psychosexual cultural impulses that 
seek to silence the mother and limit her participation in society as a complex, a self-
actualising, heterogeneous subject.  
 
Surveying the body of critical material on Plath and Sexton in particular, it 
becomes evident that the question of biography, and the attendant implications 
regarding the private and public performance of maternity, continues to haunt our 
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responses to their work. Jacqueline Rose’s study of the influence of psychoanalysis 
on the modern world, On Not Being Able to Sleep, pays particular attention to the 
ways in which assumptions of biographical factuality can distort readings of these 
poets: 
 
However much, however far, Plath exposes herself in her writing, there will always be 
someone baying for more […] the woman writer […] who takes the risk of letting the 
reader into part of her body and mind, is likely to find what she does with her 
language disappearing under the weight of her offering. Her poetry – ostensibly the 
only reason for the attention she elicits – will never be quite enough. And however 
closely the critic tries to follow the currents of the writing, she is likely to feel this 
counter-flow, find herself drifting into her writer’s lives (Rose 2003, 5). 
 
Rose sees the exchange between these poets and their readers as one in which the 
fictionalised self of the poems is obscured by their association with confessionalism. 
The idea of the poet’s language, the means by which she constructs these aesthetic 
performances ‘disappearing under the weight of her offering’ is a troubling one. In 
this scenario, these poems (and by extension, poets) are effectively being forced into 
the ‘shut box’ of ‘narcissistic experience’ that Plath warned against (Plath 1962).   
 
The image of the poet ‘disappearing under the weight of her offering’ is a 
disquieting one (Rose 2003, 5). It reminds us that she remains subject to social 
pressures that not only shape the interpretation of her work, but that also threaten to 
subsume them in a discourse in which her participation is limited by expectations of 
femininity and maternity which have been shaped over generations. Rose’s 
observation that critics are also largely powerless to resist the pull towards 
biographical interpretations suggests that confessional representations of motherhood 
have historically been read as being so intensely personal that their broader 
subjectivity is often overlooked. This leaves the poet mired in judgments engendered 
by discourses in which her artistry is effectively overwritten by the reduction of her 
poems to biographical readings stripped of other context.  
 
If, as Jacqueline Rose asserts, biographical readings of confessional poems 
‘deny [their] transformative potential’, then it can be contended that feminist theory 
broadly, and feminist psychoanalytic and deconstructive theory specifically, has 
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given readers the critical framework to explore this potential in ways that profoundly 
liberated how women and society in general might regard and respond to the cultural 
edifice of motherhood (Rose 2003, 52). Rose’s comments suggest it is not Plath and 
Sexton’s poetry that is problematic, but rather that many of the critical responses 
lacked nuance, an awareness of the interconnection between poetic and social, 
political contexts.  
 
Can the unease Plath and Sexton’s male mentors and some of the poets’ critics 
voiced about their poetry be seen as an attempt to silence (consciously or 
unconsciously) their efforts to speak of previously private experiences, to in essence, 
thwart the conversation before it could begin? Rose describes Plath’s poetry as being 
the result of ‘something insufferable at the time, to which the only possible response 
could be an action’ wherein the ‘lived life was the point of departure’ (Rose 2003, 
52-53). Ignoring this point of departure strips the poems of their politics and silences 
the debates that the exploration of these politics would open. Feminist theory, then 
and now, resists attempts to silence the passage of ‘something insufferable’ into 
words and reclaims the political and cultural implications of these words.  
 
In reclaiming the political and cultural implications of these poems it is 
important to acknowledge the ways in which gender stereotypes have been used 
to marginalise the female poet. To say poetess, as Alicia Ostriker points out in 
Writing Like a Woman, ‘is and always has been a gentle insult’ (Ostriker 1983, 
146). More specifically, it is a gendered insult as a ‘poetess is a poet who is 
sensitive and knows how to feel, perhaps very intensely, but does not know how 
to think or judge. She has no authority to change our minds’ (146). It is a term 
that applies an unnecessary gender dichotomy to poetry and in doing so, 
privileges male writing by bestowing it with greater authority. Women poets are 
defined as feeling rather than thinking, and their expressions of these feelings are 
not accorded any significance or authority. This is a view that regards women’s 
poetry only as being influenced or controlled by the discourses surrounding it, 
rather than recognising any potential to disrupt or reshape these discourses. 
Applying gendered distinctions to how we describe poets also encourages us to 
apply these distinctions to their work, meaning that themes and motifs - such as 
motherhood - in which women may claim the authority to speak to and influence 
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attitudes are dismissed as being of little importance. This is another form of 
silencing which has seen the discourses surrounding motherhood co-opted or 
derided by men. Seeing women poets as feeling rather than thinking beings 
further marginalises their work, and casts them as the passive respondents to 
cultural forces, denied ‘authority to change minds’ (146). 
 
Without diminishing the importance or relevance of discursive texts such as Of 
Woman Born, which take a more social realist approach to the interrogation of the 
patriarchal containment of the maternal, this thesis will contend that the contributions 
of feminist psychoanalytic critics are fundamental to our understanding of maternal 
subjectivity. Moving through the trajectory of the discourses, from the 1970s through 
to the 1980s and further to more recent responses, I will examine the development 
and impact of psychoanalytical and post-structuralist feminist theory on the critical 
exploration of motherhood in theorists such as Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray, 
whose theoretical interventions and innovations reshaped our understanding of 
language, and by extension our understanding of maternal subjectivity. The impact 
of these structural and linguistic challenges is especially evident when one takes a 
heterogeneous approach to one’s reading of maternal discourses. Just as our 
understanding of aesthetic exploration of maternal subjectivity is enhanced by an 
engagement with the polemic discourses of second wave radical feminists such as 
Rich, so too our understanding of the interaction of the poetry and these discursive 
incursions is expanded by an engagement with the work of Kristeva and Irigaray and 
other theorists working through deconstructive approaches.  
 
 A comparative reading of the various theoretical considerations of maternity 
recognises that understanding maternal subjectivity requires a dialogic and dialectic 
approach. This approach by its very nature involves a certain amount of conflict, but 
the clashing of theoretical positions has the potential to productively extend our 
perceptions of the maternal. Kristeva’s theorising of mother-child relations and the 
symbolising of the maternal, and Irigaray’s radical refusal of the masculine linguistic 
parameters of the symbolic frame the challenge of maternal subjectivity as a question 
of the symbolising potential of language. Kristeva in particular has often sought to 
distinguish her arguments from those of second wave feminists, as can be seen in her 
essay ‘Stabat Mater’ (1977) in which she writes:     
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When feminists call for a new representation of femininity, they seem to identify 
maternity with this idealized misapprehension; and feminism, because it rejects 
this image and its abuses, sidesteps the real experience that this fantasy obscures. 
As a result, maternity is repudiated or denied by some avant-garde feminists, 
while its traditional representations are wittingly or unwittingly accepted by the 
"broad mass" of women and men. (Kristeva, 1985, 133) 
 
Kristeva appears to be suggesting here that the ‘avant guarde’ feminist response to 
maternity may be as lacking in nuance as that of ‘the “broad mass”” (133). While 
such an assertion can be seen as an attack on feminist tenets, it can also be read as a 
valuable confrontation of the limits of feminist polemic, in which Kristeva cautions 
against a tendency towards reactionary thinking. Kristeva recognises here the need 
for a discourse that can encompass the heterogeneity of maternity. A discourse that 
allows for an explication of all the problematic and damaging implications of the 
cultural veneration of motherhood that doesn’t call for a knee-jerk repudiation of the 
ongoing psychic and emotional importance of maternity as identity and experience.  
 
 The space between such positions can be measured as a difference of 
language. Rich writes in Of Woman Born of motherhood as an institution that has 
historically ‘ghettoized and degraded female potentialities’, and contends that 
women are controlled ‘by lashing us to our bodies’ (Rich 1995, 13). Rich’s argument 
is not substantively different to Kristeva’s in ‘Stabat Mater’ in which she refers to 
Western conceptualising of maternity as ‘the ambivalent principle that derives on the 
one hand from the species and on the other hand from a catastrophe of identity’, even 
though the stylistic tone invoked by the two is markedly different (Kristeva 1985, 
134).  
 Rich’s critique in the quoted passages takes the form of an invective, in that 
her language has a similar heightened emotional immediacy to that attributed to the 
poetry. One gets the sense she is speaking from a position informed by a passionate 
and personal identification with the tenets of her argument. This is in contrast to 
Kristeva’s more measured tenor which avoids rhetorical urgency, instead favouring a 
more scholarly detachment, but which engages with complex concepts using 
language and terminology that might make it inaccessible to those without an 
academic background. I note these stylistic differences, not to invite comparisons 
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that favour one over the other, but rather as evidence of the benefits of a breadth of 
reading for the serious scholar of maternal writing. Rich’s polemic often reflects the 
emotive intensity engendered by the lived experience of motherhood. Her work 
galvanised and marshalled this intensity into powerful discursive and aesthetic 
productions which continue to influence thinking and debates regarding motherhood. 
Kristeva’s writings offer deeply considered meditations that attempt to open up and 
untangle the multifarious, intricate cultural impulses encircling the Western notion of 
maternal subjectivity.  Both contributions are integral to the arguments developed in 
this thesis. 
 
 
Maternal Subjectivity in the Digital Age 
 
 
In the final portion of my discussion I turn my attention to new forms of 
maternal writing, specifically blogging and the potentially transformative impact the 
digital space has had upon the ways in which motherhood is represented in 
contemporary discourse and popular culture. Maternal writing has, to use popular 
parlance, ‘exploded’ in the last decade with the opening up of online spaces and the 
resulting (and arguable) democratisation of culture. In my final chapter I ask if 
blogging, with its almost exclusive focus on the personal, and its uses of the first 
person narrative, can be seen as the new confessionalism. Positioning the digital 
space as the site of this new confessionalism will also involve an examination of the 
ethical considerations occasioned by the growing embrace of this new media as a site 
of maternal representation.  
 
This discussion of blogging and the textual connectivity and interactivity of the 
digital space brings the discussion into the twenty first century, enabling us to 
measure the “progress” of the maternal subject in cultural discourses, both poetic and 
polemical. What has been the impact of earlier poets and theorists in shaping the 
maternal subject in the contemporary world? 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
ANNE SEXTON: FROM MATERNITY TO MATERNAL POETICS  
 
 
In the eulogy she delivered at Anne Sexton’s memorial service following her 
suicide in 1974, Adrienne Rich spoke about Sexton’s relationship to feminism. 
Sexton was not, Rich acknowledged, ‘in any narrow or politically correct sense, a 
feminist, but she did some things far ahead of the rebirth of the feminist movement’ 
(Rich 2012, 7). Rich spoke these words at the height of what she would later call ‘the 
new politicization of women’ (Rich 1995, ix) and she delivered them to an audience 
containing many women poets who were beginning to bring this new feminist 
consciousness into their work. Perhaps most significantly, while Rich did not feel 
Sexton had claimed allegiance to this politicisation, in paying tribute to Sexton’s life 
and work she emphasised that Sexton’s poetic achievement lay in her willingness to 
write ‘poems alluding to abortion, masturbation, menopause, and the painful love of 
a powerless mother for her daughters long before such themes became validated by a 
collective consciousness of women’ (Rich 2012, 7). Rich reclaimed Sexton’s work 
for the women’s movement by positioning it as a foreshadowing. In order to do so 
she illuminated the influence Sexton’s poems, which were among the first to have 
the courage to address intimate and confronting issues that had previously been 
considered unsuitable not just for poetry but also for public discussion, had on future 
discourses of feminism and mothering. 
 
The dead can no longer speak for themselves, nor can they raise their voices 
to contradict or influence what others say about them. As a poet, Sexton was aware 
that releasing her work into the world meant relinquishing control over how it was 
read and interpreted. As a poet herself, Rich would also have been aware of this. The 
implications of this dynamic, with its loss of privacy, are intensified in the aftermath 
of death. In choosing and enacting her own ending, Sexton was also choosing to fall 
silent and to end her active participation in the cultural dialogue of her work; but her 
poems remain and so the conversation continues. It is appropriate then, when 
eulogising Sexton’s life Rich should also begin navigating the uneasy balance 
between celebrating Sexton’s work and reclaiming in the name of a new or growing 
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meaning. For Rich, and for many other scholars and readers who followed, it was 
important that this reclaiming and celebrating be done within the, at that point new, 
cultural and theoretical contexts of feminism. In essence, Rich was signalling the 
politicising of Sexton’s work in this eulogy.  
 
For poetry critics this has meant an examining of the relationship of 
confessional poetry, the genre most commonly associated with Sexton, to the 
women’s movement; or in other words – the remaking or recontextualising of the 
highly personal into the political. Rich was already familiar with this kind of 
endeavour. In 1966, as organiser, Rich had asked Sexton to read Sexton’s poem 
‘Little Girl, My String Bean, My Lovely Woman’, a poem addressed to Sexton’s 
eldest daughter, Linda, at ‘a read-in against the Vietnam war, at Harvard’. In this 
context Sexton’s poem, which depicts a personal moment with a localised focus, a 
woman speaking intimately to her daughter, became an act of protest against a 
distant, violent conflict. This particularly feminine protest is embodied in the poem’s 
focus on the tenderness between mother and daughter rather than the destruction 
wrought by the masculinist endeavour of warfare: 
 
Famous male poets and novelists were there, reading their diatribes against 
[Robert] McNamara, their napalm poems, their ego-poetry. Anne read—in a 
very quiet, vulnerable voice—“Little Girl, My String Bean, My Lovely 
Woman”—setting the firsthand image of a mother’s affirmation of her 
daughter against the second-hand images of death and violence hurled that 
evening from men who had never seen a bombed village. That poem is dated 
1964, and it is a feminist poem. Her head was often patriarchal, but in her 
blood and her bones, Anne Sexton knew (Rich 2012, 7). 
 
Rich frames the difference between Sexton’s poem and the other, male, 
participants of the anti-war protest, as an explicitly gendered one. Or, to be more 
precise, one that reflected the gender paradigms of the 1960s. Sexton’s performance 
is described as softly spoken and evincing vulnerability in comparison to the more 
aggressive ‘diatribes’ of her male counterparts, which traffic in violent imagery even 
as they decry the violence of war. The title of Sexton’s poem ‘Little Girl, My String 
Bean, My Lovely Woman’ is playful, almost girlish, and crafted to convey maternal 
and familial intimacy rather than gravitas or institutional authority. As Rich points 
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out, by choosing to read this poem, Sexton positions her foregrounding of the private 
realm of the family as her act of protest against the war. Significantly, she uses a 
depiction of maternal subjectivity as a counterpoint to the destructive forces of war.  
 
‘Little Girl, My String Bean, My Lovely Woman’ also served as a contrast to 
what Rich contemptuously dismisses as ‘ego poetry’. Framed as a mother’s wistful 
contemplation of her daughter’s blossoming into womanhood, ‘Little Girl’ is a poem 
of effacement rather than ego. Juxtaposed amongst the whimsical, yet sensuous, 
imagery of the daughter’s blooming fecundity, is the bittersweet realisation that the 
speaker’s maternal subjectivity must give way to the daughter’s own becoming 
subjectivity, so that by the end of the poem, the speaker has become retrograde, if 
not obsolete; there to offer encouragement and knowledge as her daughter navigates 
her liminality  
 
What I want to say, Linda, 
is that there is nothing in your body that lies. 
All that is new is telling the truth. 
 
But the speaker is also aware that she is about to be consigned to silent, mostly 
passive observation in relation to this other, her daughter: 
 
I’m here, that somebody else 
an old tree in the background (Sexton 1999, 148).  
 
There is an obvious polarity between the gentle, blossoming of fertility 
invoked in ‘Little Girl’ and the violent and destructive invective Rich noted in the 
poems read by male poets. Equally significant, however, is the sense of alterity that 
haunts the narrative of Sexton’s poem. While the speaker’s growing sense of 
otherness (or of receding subjectivity) is located in her maternal experience, she 
retains an awareness of the physical alterity thrust upon women in a world in which 
physicality is measured by masculinity. She pushes back against it on behalf of her 
daughter, offering laudatory encouragements to ‘stand still at your door, / sure of 
yourself, a white stone, a good stone - / as exceptional as laughter’ (Sexton 1999, 
148). With playful observations like ‘you are too many to eat’ (146) which tease out 
the garden metaphor, the speaker appears to be attempting to fashion for her daughter 
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the kind of multifaceted subjectivity she herself is sacrificing to become ‘an old tree 
in the background’ (148). But there is also an air of menace to the seeming 
puckishness of ‘you are too many to eat’ (148). By repeating this twice throughout 
the lyric, the mother/speaker is endeavouring to shore up her daughter’s autonomous 
subjectivity from malevolent forces that might devour her, including potentially the 
mother.  
 
Rich highlights the first person immediacy of Sexton’s poem as evidence of its 
efficacy as an anti-war protest. However, as an examination of the poem reveals, 
when placed in this wider context, the struggle enacted within the lyric is one of 
representation and identity. Rich rejects the ‘ego-poetry’ of her male counterparts, 
but her claiming of Sexton’s poem as feminist shifts the focus of protest away from a 
condemnation of war towards a more broad-based commentary on gender and sexual 
politics. In this political economy, the feminine and the maternal are positioned as 
the antitheses of masculine destructiveness. While this can be seen as an acclamation 
of motherhood as an important cultural, social and political designation, Rich also 
risks constraining maternal subjectivity in the same narrow, idealised parameters she 
herself rejected in her poetry and discursive work as she was coming into her own 
feminist consciousness during the late 1960s. Enshrining motherhood as an antidote 
to the destruction of war would seem to deny, or at least ignore, the heterogeneity of 
motherhood as a subject position in which, as the poetry of Anne Sexton so richly 
demonstrates, destructive impulses can exist alongside the generative ones.  
  
Rich’s observation that Sexton’s head was ‘often patriarchal’ sounds almost 
condescending in light of her posthumous defining of Sexton’s work and life as 
emblematic of the then nascent struggle for gender equality. However, Rich’s words 
recognise that the prevailing conditions Sexton was socialised under, and in which 
she began writing pushed her towards an internalisation of patriarchal norms. They 
also underscore how important the reclamation of personal experience in a public 
arena had become in challenging dominant paradigms not just of mothering and 
gender, but also of 1960s Cold War geopolitical power balances, which in turn 
influenced the make up of personal and domestic ones. Rich’s acknowledgement that 
Sexton ‘knew in her bones’ the reality of her social and political subjugation 
recognises that Sexton’s adherence to social dictates did not preclude her cognisance 
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of the damaging implications of these rituals. The tension and struggles with 
knowledge can, I will argue, manifest in the heightened emotive actuality of Sexton’s 
poems. Motherhood was seen as a private concern in the capitalist and resolutely 
individualistic society of Cold War America; a social construct meant to operate at 
personal rather than state level. However, it was also one that was, paradoxically, 
heavily championed by the State as the desirable condition of femininity. Sexton’s 
reading of her poem at an anti-war gathering transformed the performance and 
speaking of motherhood into a challenge to the power of the state and the 
assumptions informing its hegemonic structures.  
 
Seen in this light, Sexton’s work with its intense focus on the personal was 
ground breaking. Rich concluded her eulogy with this beautiful tribute to Sexton’s 
legacy, acknowledging the cultural pressures that shaped Sexton’s patriarchal 
outlook: 
 
I think of Anne Sexton as a sister whose work tells us what in ourselves we have 
to fight, in ourselves and in the images patriarchy has held up to us. Her poetry is 
a guide to the ruins, from which we learn what women have lived and what we 
must refuse to live any longer. Her death is an arrest: in its moment we have all 
been held, momentarily, in the grip of a policeman who tells us we are guilty of 
being female, and powerless. But because of her work she is still a presence; and 
as Tillie Olsen has said: “Every woman who writes is a survivor.” (Rich 2012, 7) 
 
 In what way was Sexton a survivor? After all, Sexton’s poems first arose out of the 
depths of despair motherhood initially consigned her to. Her poems were both 
anguished cries and acts of personal protest against forces Sexton was struggling to 
understand, largely in isolation, before the collective consciousness of second wave 
feminism began the double task of deconstructing such meanings, and constructing 
communal solidarity. Writing and publishing poetry that spoke of motherhood with 
unflinching honesty was an act of defiance for a wife and mother in 1950s America. 
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The Despair of Containment 
 
 
Married just out of high school and the mother of two children while in her 
twenties, in many ways Sexton was the epitome of the bored, dissatisfied housewife 
Friedan wrote of in The Feminine Mystique. Sexton’s biographer Dianne 
Middlebrook describes her as having been socialised from an early age to see herself 
as a wife and mother. Entrenched in the dominant gender discourses of the Cold War 
period that would later be deconstructed by Friedan, Middlebrook writes that Sexton 
saw her worth embodied in her potential as a homemaker. Despite an early 
experimentation with writing poetry that a college professor described as showing 
promise (Middlebrook 1991, 21), Sexton, unlike her contemporaries Adrienne Rich 
and Sylvia Plath, did not initially harbour ambitions beyond the domestic: 
 
Anne did not get particularly good grades at Rogers Hall. She selected the 
non-college preparatory curriculum, which suggests that no-one expected 
academic achievements from her. On the evidence of her own record-keeping, 
her aim in high school was to acquire a fiancé. (21) 
 
It is telling that the only expectations placed upon Sexton as she matured 
into adulthood were preparing for life as a wife and mother. Her initial 
engagement with language as a means of expression through the writing of 
poetry was overtaken by her desire to conform to the feminine mystique 
Freidan was to anatomize years later.  
 
Like so many of her peers, Sexton was embedded in the dominant 
discourses of gender and motherhood. Marriage and motherhood were the 
dominant rites of passage available to women during the 1950s, irrefutably 
symbolising the path into adulthood. During this period marriage was still a 
largely paternalistic institution in which daughters were passed from their 
father’s care into their husband’s. Maternity, even more so than marriage, 
was one vocation in which women were able to claim any sort of expertise 
and superiority. This was a view, argues Middlebrook, that was heavily 
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promoted and reinforced by popular publications aimed at and consumed by 
women: 
 
After a “boy crazy” girlhood culminating in early marriage, and 
especially after the birth of two children, Sexton’s life was virtually a 
caricature of the ideal of womanhood promoted in the movies, in 
women’s magazines, and at women’s college commencements. [...] This 
was a view Sexton and her friends had ardently shared. As she later told 
an interviewer, “I wanted to get married from the age of thirteen on. I 
wanted nothing else. I thought that having children was some kind of 
answer, then” (Middlebrook 1991, 40). 
  
In Sexton’s case the cult of domesticity that was so pervasive during the 1950s 
engendered a level of anxiety towards motherhood that was to prove paralysing. She 
would later reflect on the toll that attempting to conform to the social mores of the 
time and place in which she found herself as a young mother had taken: 
 
I was trying my damnedest to lead a conventional life, for that was how I was brought up, 
and it was what my husband wanted of me. But one can’t build little white picket fences to 
keep nightmares out. The surface cracked when I was about twenty eight. I had a psychotic 
break and tried to kill myself (35). 
 
Regardless of the complex causes of such a situation, Sexton’s choice of language 
here is provocative, her words hinting at a potential for political subversion beyond 
the personal anguish they describe. A conventional life was agonising for Sexton 
because it required submitting to the restrictive social dictates of the period, forcing 
her towards an existence not of her own making. 
 
The subsequent unflinching performance of this suffering in poems that were 
read and appreciated by a wide audience elevated Sexton’s words into something 
larger and more resonant than a record of personal angst. Sexton identified the 
pressure she faced, first from her parents, and later from her husband, to ‘lead a 
conventional life’ as being the catalyst for her breakdown. The surface of domestic 
conformity cracked and the fallout was painful. This was more than just the fear of 
exposing oneself to censure from society. The ‘white picket fences’ that symbolised 
middle class conformity and domesticity could not repel the nightmares that taunted 
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her and the fallout was such that she no longer wanted to live. Seen in this light, 
Sexton’s suicide attempts were an explicit rejection of the doctrine of the feminine 
mystique. But the poetry was already beginning to bridge the chasm between the 
painfully personal and the political. Sexton’s use of the term “psychotic break” is 
significant because this violent verbal act also symbolised a visceral and psychic 
break from the pervasive discourses of mothering which inspired it. Later, when she 
discovered poetry as a means of exploring and expressing her troubled emotions, 
Sexton’s poems emerged as carefully crafted sledgehammers that she wielded 
against the cultural and social boundaries she found so constricting. They can also be 
read as articulating the counter-discourse to Cold War cultural paradigms that 
Elizabeth Gregory (2006) attributed to the confessional lyric. In Sexton’s poetry this 
counter-discourse with its exploration of the multiplicity of maternal emotion and 
experience, emerges as an intense and deeply felt challenge to reductive readings of 
maternal subjectivity. 
 
In many ways, the Anne who began writing poetry in the late 1950s was like 
the ‘partly brave and partly good’ speaker of Adrienne Rich’s famous 1963 poem 
‘Snapshots of a Daughter in Law’ who ‘fought with what she partly understood’ 
(Rich 2002, 19).  Or, to return to the equivocal pronouncement of Rich’s eulogy, 
while Sexton grappled with the repressive patriarchal discourses of the time in her 
daily life, writing poetry enabled her to aesthetically reject these discourses with a 
clarity and resonance she was unable to articulate in any other medium. The tension 
between the opposing impulses of conformity and rebellion informed much of the 
proto-feminist sentiment in Sexton’s poetry that Rich would later identify in her 
eulogy. Understanding this tension in feminist terms transforms Sexton’s 
willingness to expose the painful fallout of this tension in her poetry from mere 
exhibitionism, or agonized narcissism, into an act of artistic and cultural resistance. 
Exploring the symbolic implications of Sexton’s poetic representations of 
motherhood highlights their important, transformative and at times disruptive impact 
upon our understanding of maternal subjectivity and its positioning within both the 
discourses of the Cold War period and more recently.   
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In her biography, Middlebrook points to Sexton’s inability to engage with 
motherhood in terms defined and dictated by the feminine mystique as being integral 
to her suffering and her art: 
 
These babies were supposed to provide Sexton’s fulfilment as a woman, but 
instead they made demands on her emotions; rather than feeding her hunger for 
acceptance, they required her to respond to their separateness. […] Sexton 
expressed this conflict at first in bodily suffering, later in plain language to her 
doctor: “I want to be a child and not a mother, and I feel guilty about this.” 
(Middlebrook 1991, 39) 
 
This highlights the complex interplay between specifically female bodily suffering 
and language in Sexton’s battle with mental illness and motherhood. In societies that 
venerate maternity as the apogee of feminine achievement, mothers bear the weight 
of both private and public expectation, and, as Sexton discovered, there were few 
sanctioned outlets in Cold War American society in which to confront the 
destructive potency of these expectations. As French feminist Elizabeth Badinter, 
among many other feminist writers, would later observe that motherhood ‘is more 
difficult to live than one might believe and that all-powerful nature has not 
sufficiently armed women to confront it’ (Badinter 1981, 58).  
 
Sexton’s initial response to the personal distress engendered by her 
motherhood was to express it in bodily ways, through self-harm, thereby imbuing 
her suffering with a visceral and irrefutable immediacy that was destructive and 
confronting. The link between the bodily and neural changes wrought by pregnancy 
and depression is by now well-established in popular and scientific discourse; but as 
Freidan argues in The Feminine Mystique, in 1960s America women who rejected or 
reacted negatively to motherhood were denigrated as hysterics or heretics. Sexton’s 
explicit linking of her mental breakdown and subsequent suicide attempts to her 
experience of maternity, represents a bold (and brave) push back to these repressive 
and damaging cultural norms. In retrospect, Sexton’s willing solicitation of what, at 
the time, was serious social censure can be seen as an important act of social 
resistance. Her explicit naming of motherhood as the locus of her distress, and the 
subsequent poetic representations of this distress, breached the ordered confines of 
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the feminine mystique and shifted attitudes regarding the ‘legitimacy’ of less 
sanguine responses to motherhood.  
 
Language, both in poetry and in conversation with her doctor, seemingly 
offered Sexton the chance to navigate her painful experience of motherhood in a 
powerful, political way. If her experience of maternity can be said to have opened up 
a body/mind conflict that Sexton initially sought to overcome by attacking her body, 
then it is significant that language was to be the mediating force that enabled her to 
attempt an integration of this conflict. But seeing Sexton’s poetry as only an 
extension or an aesthetic performance of her psychotherapy is problematic. Given 
that her poems were often considered controversial because they made explicit 
references to suicide, abortion, menstruation and her ambivalent feelings about 
motherhood, it can be argued (as it often was by critics and mentors) that language 
employed in such a way held an equally dangerous and destructive potential, not 
least of all for her immediate family. Herein lies the central paradox of Sexton’s 
artistic legacy that continues to confront critics and scholars – was Sexton bold and 
courageous, or reckless and irresponsible, to write the way she did?  
 
Certainly, the act of writing poetry that confronted the destructive aspects of 
contemporary sexual politics glossed over by mainstream discourses on gender and 
family can be considered heroic and daring, but that is to overlook the impact on 
those who also had their lives co-opted into Sexton’s poetic narratives. Over forty 
years after Sexton’s death, critics and readers are left with a series of complex 
questions about her legacy, both as a poet and as a mother/woman/feminist. Women 
in Cold War America, whose ambitions and desires did not conform to societal 
expectations of domestic contentment, were caught in a web of expectations that was 
almost impossible to push through. Language, and poetic language in particular, 
offered a site of resistance from which women like Sexton could challenge these 
expectations while finding fulfilment outside of their socially sanctioned roles as 
wives and mothers. If we subscribe to the Lacanian notion that we are all subjects in 
language, and that the symbolic order, the social mores and dictates which keep us in 
check, is structured as a language, then this linguistic resistance is particularly 
radical. There is a pleasing symmetry to the notion that language, once the means by 
which women like Sexton were controlled and subdued via the dictates of the 
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symbolic order, should provide the fertile site of resistance to this subjugation.  
Resistance via language allowed poets such as Sexton to self-represent as maternal 
subjects in language, crafting poems that evoke the complexity and heterogeneity of 
motherhood as both a speaking position and lived experience. 
 
 
Navigating the Personal 
 
 
Confessional poetry blurs the boundaries between life and art for readers and 
onlookers. Trafficking in subjects which modernist poetry considered taboo and too 
private to discuss publically, further muddies the waters. Inevitably, readers and 
critics find themselves asking at what point does the use of personal experiences in 
public aesthetic productions become exploitative and inappropriate? Concerning the 
performance of motherhood in poetry, this question becomes further entangled in the 
pervasive ideas of maternal responsibility and the historically idealised and 
mythologised mother/child relationship which poets and writers such as Sexton 
pressed up against when they wrote of their experiences as mothers. Further, this 
notion of motherhood as a personal and private experience was also often in conflict 
with institutional socio-political pronouncements regarding the maternal and its 
positioning within American society. While personal satisfaction was assumed to be 
intrinsic to motherhood, and much emphasis was placed on the nation building 
importance of repopulation in the wake of the war, women of the 1950s and 60s 
were not encouraged to see themselves as embodying any kind of officially 
recognised professional expertise in their roles as mothers. Consequently, when 
poets began to experiment with more personal themes, female poets such as Sexton 
were not amongst those first acknowledged as giving legitimacy to this new poetic 
mode. As Elizabeth Gregory points out in her essay ‘Confessing the body, Plath, 
Sexton, Berryman, Lowell, Ginsberg and the Gendered Poetics of the ‘Real’’ (2006), 
the participation of male poets was required in order to bestow artistic and cultural 
validity to this poetic engagement with the personal. 
 
Robert Lowell and W.D Snodgrass are often credited as being the founding 
members of the confessional school of poetry, and both were important mentors to 
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Sexton. Their work was among the first to attract significant critical attention and for 
its incorporation of subjects previously considered too personal into lyric poetry. 
Upon the 1959 publication of Lowell’s Life Studies, influential twentieth century 
poetry critic M.L Rosenthal was quick to anoint the collection as the culmination of 
‘one line of development in our poetry of the utmost importance’ (Rosenthal 1991, 
113). While he is considered to have been the first critic to use the term 
‘confessional poetry’, Rosenthal was not without his reservations about this 
confronting new poetic technique, admitting that Lowell’s poems inspired 
discomfort and admiration in equal measure: ‘It will be clear,” Rosenthal wrote, 
‘that my first impression while reading Life Studies was that it is impure art, 
magnificently stated but unpleasantly egocentric’ (110). However, while Rosenthal 
may have found the poems in Life Studies ‘unpleasantly egocentric’ there is no 
suggestion in his review of his questioning Lowell’s right to write these types of 
poems. Laying bare the painful interactions of his family and exploring the mental 
health issues tormenting him might have made for uncomfortable and confronting 
reading, but Lowell’s work was well received by local critics. Writing within a 
culture in which men were encouraged to see their families almost as an extension of 
their personal property meant critics did not question Lowell’s decision to write 
about socially sensitive topics such as mental illness and marital discord. This 
acclamation was not extended in the same degree to women poets such as Sexton 
who adopted a similar candour in their work. 
 
  Sexton’s long time friend and fellow poet Maxine Kumin has denounced 
what she saw as a curious resistance to Sexton’s work from critics ‘for the most part’ 
male who seemed to take offence at the expressions of femaleness and bodily 
experience which permeated her work (Kumin in Sexton 1999, xx). Sexton’s poems, 
she notes in her introduction to Sexton’s The Complete Poems ‘rapidly became a 
point of contention over which opposing factions duelled in print, at literary 
gatherings, and in the fastness of the college classroom’ (xx). Kumin pointed out 
that while the ‘ground for Sexton’s confessional poems had been well prepared’ by 
male poets, ‘the major and by far most vitriolic expressions of outrage were reserved 
for Sexton’ (xx-xxi). Given that critics were not objecting to Sexton’s use of 
confessionalism as ‘the use of le moi was being cultivated in fashionable literary 
journals everywhere’ (xxi), it would seem that the outrage and contention was in 
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response to Sexton’s refusal to censor the visceral immediacy of bodily experiences, 
of which motherhood is one of the most extreme, from her work. Madness and 
infidelity, although still taboo, were now valid and appropriate subjects for poetry in 
the new cultural terrain navigated by confessionalist poets of the 1960s, but the 
female body was beyond the pale and still subject to aesthetic and social censorship. 
 
The discomfort provoked by Sexton’s forthright depiction of the body as 
found in poems such as ‘Menstruation at Forty’ and ‘In Celebration of my Uterus’ 
speaks to a preference to remove bodily experience from public discussions and 
depictions of motherhood – a preference that persists to varying degrees today. 
‘Menstruation at Forty’, the poem Kumin reminds us famously prompted the critic 
Louis Simpson to declare ‘the straw that broke this camel’s back’, confronts the 
reader with the uncomfortable intersection between motherhood and unpleasant 
bodily secretions (Kumin in Sexton 1999, xx). It is a poem that celebrates that most 
taboo of all feminine biological functions. Menstruation is quite literally the eruption 
from the body of a visceral affirmation of femininity from which society recoils. 
Perhaps Simpson was so disconcerted by the poem’s foregrounding of the previously 
hidden experience of menstruation because it served as an all too confronting 
representation and reminder of what Julia Kristeva has described as ‘the baleful 
power of women to bestow mortal life’ (Kristeva 1982, 158). In Kristevan terms, 
menstruation also represents one of the most powerful manifestations of both bodily 
and maternal abjection.  
 
In Sexton’s ‘Menstruation at Forty’, love is contaminated by menstrual blood 
‘That red disease’ (Sexton 1999, 138). This bloody signifier of fecundity is also a 
marker of the finite limits of youth and fertility: 
 
The womb is not a clock 
nor a bell tolling 
but in the eleventh month of its life 
I feel the November of the body as well as of the calendar. 
In two days it will be my birthday 
and as always the earth is done with its harvest. 
This time I hunt for death, 
the night I lean toward, 
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the night I want. 
Well then – 
speak of it! 
It was in the womb all along (137).  
 
The paradox of identifying the womb as the locus of life and death is further 
heightened by the speaker’s ambivalence towards life and mortality. In leaning toward 
the monthly reminder of bodily and maternal abjection, ‘the night I want’, the speaker 
draws a perverse power from the darker implications of decay embedded in the 
menstrual cycle in which fertility and the attendant generative possibilities ultimately 
give way to degeneration (137). Or to paraphrase Kristeva, the speaker marshals the 
‘baleful power’ of the feminine body, by embracing all its contradictions (Kristeva 
1980, 158).  The ‘hunt for death’ is contrasted with a wistful lament for the son the 
speaker never had. Birthing a son, the speaker imagines, would have bestowed the 
ultimate authority, and also immutability upon her as a woman, for mothers possess 
sons ‘before all women’ (Sexton 1999, 138). Writing a poem that bluntly refuses to 
separate the physical from the symbolic with regards to menstruation challenges the 
notion that this biological function is unspeakable or that it should exist outside of 
language.  
  
Kristeva has written of western society’s need to remove or quarantine the 
physical reality of motherhood when mythologising the maternal. The implications 
of this physical reality are arguably most potent in relation to childbirth. Kristeva 
argues in Powers of Horror that the brutal physicality of giving birth is 
uncomfortably confronting because it represents ‘the height of bloodshed and life, 
scorching moment of hesitation (between inside and outside, ego and other, life and 
death), horror and beauty, sexuality and the blunt negation of the sexual’ (Kristeva, 
1982, 155). But, as Kristeva points out in her 1977 essay ‘Stabat Mater’, this denial 
of the physical with regards to motherhood also denies the mother’s base humanity 
or agency. Pointing to the Virgin Mother as the most powerful symbolic construct of 
maternity in both Christian and secular Western mythology, Kristeva argues that in 
her most exalted form Mary exists primarily as the vehicle through which Christ is 
made human:  
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Thus, Christ, the Son of man, is in the end "human" only through his mother: as if 
Christic or Christian humanism could not help being a form of maternalism (which 
is precisely the claim that has been made repeatedly, in a characteristically esoteric 
fashion, by certain secularizing tendencies within Christian humanism). Yet the 
humanity of the Virgin mother is not always evident, […] Mary is distinguished 
from the human race, for example by her freedom from sin (Kristeva 1985, 134). 
 
Given that in some fundamentalist interpretations of various religions menstrual 
blood is regarded as unclean, or even as the embodiment of feminine depravity, 
Sexton’s poetic celebration of it can be read as arguing for maternity in which 
women as mothers can retain their complex humanity and physicality rather than 
being ossified into restrictive dichotomies of good and bad, saint and sinner, spirit 
and flesh.  
  
Paula Salvio argues that Sexton’s body images were reductively read ‘by her 
critics as faithful representations of her life history, as if her history was literally 
contained in her stomach, her chest, her genitals, throat and head as if her poetry was 
a somatic reiteration of her body’ (Salvio 2007, 4). Such a reading of Sexton’s work, 
as a direct mirroring of her life, is problematic because, as Salvio points out, Sexton 
herself ‘considered the autobiographical I as a literary rather than a literal identity’ 
(4). The inability of critics to acknowledge the constructed nature of the self that 
emerges from Sexton’s poetry highlights the uneasy position occupied by the 
woman poet, strung between the authority of the symbolic order that restricts the 
signifying power of the female and maternal subject, and the symbolising potential 
of poetry.  
 
Sexton’s refusal to censor references to the physical reality of gender and 
motherhood from her work was a significant challenge and disruption to 
contemporary discourses of the maternal because in invoking the artistic liberation 
afforded by the fictionalising of the self she was in effect taking control of her 
cultural and aesthetic representation in a way often denied to women. Lyn Hejinian 
has noted that being able to create or influence one’s own ‘description’ is liberating 
for women because ‘traditionally women have been described but they have very 
seldom been the describers’ (Hejinian & Watten 2014, 737). In this regard Sexton’s 
use of the autobiographical I in her poetry is a political act.  
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We can read Sexton’s use of the first person as a literary identity that is not 
always fixed or stable, while still recognising the transformative and transgressive 
impact of poems which inhabit that first person as a woman and mother, because as 
Hejinian says, to be described relegates the object of description to a passive textual 
position which denies subjectivity:  
 
Being an object of description but without the authority to describe, a woman may feel 
bounded by her own appearance, a representation of her apparent appearance, not sure 
whether she is she or a quotation. She may feel herself defined from without while 
remaining indefinite in or as herself (737) 
 
Sexton may invite ethical judgement both as a person and an artist in so openly 
using the first person, but doing so enables her to retain control over the initial 
descriptive process of the persona she presents even if surrendering her work to the 
scrutiny of publication means she is unable to control how it is received and read. By 
inhabiting the autobiographical I in her poetry Sexton retains her position as subject 
and resists the objectifying external gaze. 
  
 
Challenging Masculinist Poetic Norms 
 
 
A survey of Sexton’s early reviewers (in particular male reviewers) 
highlights the critical double standards she faced as a poet. Many critics were quick 
to point out that she was operating within what they saw as territory already 
colonised by men. One such reviewer, Robert Bagg wrote: ‘If I say that Anne 
Sexton’s book might not have been written, or written as well, without Lowell’s Life 
Studies and W.D Snodgrass’ Heart’s Needle, it’s less to call her an imitator than to 
point out that her predecessors have liberated her for a most powerful and exacting 
style.’ (Bagg in Wagner-Martin 1989, 24). Perhaps Bagg felt he was paying 
appropriate homage to Sexton’s particular genius by absolving her of the status of 
imitator, but his insistence that her male poetic mentors liberated her is troubling. 
The implication seems to be that, as a woman poet Sexton needed the influence of 
male poets to legitimise her own creative endeavour.  
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Bagg’s review makes the assumption that male engagement with an artistic 
mode represents a shortcut to validity, and further, that this approval is only 
bestowed upon poems that engage with subject matter considered of sufficient 
importance and interest to male readers. While Bagg’s overriding tone is positive, he 
appears dismissive of the poems with a female-specific focus. This is particularly 
evident in his flippant description of ‘Unknown Girl in the Maternity Ward’ as 
having ‘a fine feminine fancy’ (24). The chauvinistic condescension inherent in 
Bagg’s words is disappointing. Dismissing a poem that deals with the painful 
experience of birthing and surrendering an illegitimate child as a ‘fancy’ suggests he 
is making sexist assumptions as to the importance of poems preoccupied with the 
performance of motherhood and also of the emotional impact for many readers of 
such poems. Bagg’s glib summation overlooks the poignant gravity of ‘Unknown 
Girl’ in which the speaker grapples with her anguish and shame at experiencing 
motherhood outside the rigidly defined standards of the day. 
 
 Bragg’s use of ‘feminine’ as a descriptor, coupled with the more explicitly 
reductive term ‘fancy’, appears to reinforce the broader trend towards the 
disparagement of female poets who invoked the personal critics such as Gregory 
have noted. Reading this particular poem as fanciful overlooks Sexton’s masterful 
navigation in ‘Unknown Girl’ of the tension between motherhood as a private, 
personal and emotionally fraught subject position, and the faceless public cultural 
sanctioning of maternity – a tension that is foregrounded in the title which initially 
appears to invoke this censure by dismissing the speaker as ‘unknown’.  However, 
the poem’s focus on the experiences of an underage, unwed mother exposes the 
cruelty of a society that idealises maternity while shaming those women whose 
experience of motherhood is tainted in the eyes of others by the absence of a 
husband. Sexton deploys contrasting tone and metaphors to deftly weave these 
opposing strands of public and private maternity throughout the narrative. Thus the 
unnamed speaker is humanised with emotive descriptions of her predicament while 
the doctors and nurses attending to her are represented as brittle embodiments of the 
detached institutional edifices that control public perceptions of the maternal. This 
has the effect of emphasising the strength of the speaker while creating a counter-
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discourse in which the shame attached to bearing an illegitimate child is positioned 
as a cultural and social failing rather than a personal one. 
 
In the first stanzas the speaker juxtaposes the beauty of the mother/child 
bond, again described in physical terms through the act of breastfeeding: ‘Your lips 
are animals; you are fed / with love’ with the sterility of the ‘institution bed’ in 
which she is subject to judgement and condemnation – ‘The doctors are enamel. 
They want to know / the facts’ (Sexton 1999, 24). Sexton uses short, sparse 
sentences throughout the poem, from which the vivid descriptions of the speaker’s 
infant ‘fisted like a snail, so small and strong’ emerge in sharp relief, emphasising 
the depth of the speaker’s attachment to her child and her despair at being forced to 
relinquish her newfound maternity (24).  
 
The moment in which the speaker is forced to confront the supposed shame 
of bearing an illegitimate child paradoxically becomes one of actualisation and 
strength in which she summons a different kind of honour by refusing to cave in to 
the doctor’s scolding regarding her child’s paternity: ‘“Name of father – none.” I 
hold / you and name you bastard in my arms’ (25). Sexton positions the line break to 
emphasise the speaker’s remaining maternal power, her physical protection and 
cradling of her infant. And there is also a perverse strength in the speaker’s naming 
of her child, even though it is overwritten by the cruel enforcement of masculinist 
social mores that condemn the fatherless baby as ‘bastard’. After having watched the 
speaker wistfully learn her child as ‘Bone at my bone’ who senses ‘the way we 
belong’ the final lines are a jarring disruption to this vision of maternal instinct: 
 
   […] You bruise 
   Against me. We unlearn. I am a shore 
   rocking you off. You break from me. I choose 
    your only way, my small inheritor 
   and hand you off, trembling the selves we lose. 
   Go child, who is my sin and nothing more (Sexton1999, 25). 
 
In enacting this personal moment of maternal despair, Sexton pushes back 
against public discourses of inheritance and sin which haunt the lived experience of 
maternity, and which were particularly potent at that point in history. The speaker’s 
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desperate clinging to anonymity and her refusal to speak the name of her child’s 
father invoke the shame that stains her maternity, but the decisiveness with which 
she assumes the burden of this sin on behalf of her child suggests that the shame is 
externally applied rather than internally located.   
 
 
Embodying Her Kind 
 
 
 The voice of Sexton’s early work is that of a woman both raging against and 
measuring forces she is often unable to control or influence. This is evident in one of 
her most famous early poems, ‘Her Kind’ – the poem her daughter Linda later 
referred to as her ‘signature poem’. The poem begins by invoking the familiar 
narrative of the fallen woman shunned by society, ‘a possessed witch, / haunting the 
black air, braver at night’ (Sexton 1999, 16). In this first stanza, the speaker seems to 
be apologising for her physical and emotional depravity, for being ‘twelve fingered, 
out of mind’ saying that, ‘A woman like that is not a woman, quite’ (16). Although 
shunned and reviled by her peers, the speaker still feels the weight of expectation of 
social and domestic conformity. She attempts a grotesque parody of the nurturing 
role of wife or mother in preparing ‘the suppers for the worms and elves’ and 
appears to search for redemption in her bid to transform the ‘warm caves’ to which 
she has been banished by filling them with the accoutrements of suburbia, the 
‘skillets, carvings, shelves / closets, silks, innumerable goods’ (16). The lyrical 
listing of these accoutrements, unfurling rhythmically throughout the stanza belies 
the bizarre juxtaposing of the fantastical ‘worms and elves’ with the mundane and 
domestic.  
 
 The second last line of the stanza abruptly disrupts this narrative of martyred 
resignation: ‘A woman like that is misunderstood’ (Sexton 1991, 16). This simple 
sentence changes the tone of the poem from apologetic to defiant, shifts our attention 
from the supposed degeneracy of the speaker, focussing it instead on the failings of 
those around her. ‘A woman like that is misunderstood’ is a shot fired across the 
bow signalling Sexton’s desire to reject and subvert the feminine mystique Friedan 
felt was stifling so many of Sexton’s contemporaries. It is a declaration that accuses 
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the reader rather than the speaker of the poem by exposing and challenging possible 
assumptions of femininity, womanhood and maternity prevalent in the cultural 
moment within which Sexton was writing. No longer apologising for her 
differences, the speaker proclaims instead ‘I have been her kind’ demanding the 
reader acknowledge the humanity of this six fingered woman who earlier in the 
poem has aligned herself with the most despised and feared specimen of 
womanhood in western mythology – the witch. The speaker of ‘Her Kind’ is the 
antithesis of all that the ‘thousand expert voices’ Friedan decried. She is in all ways 
objectionable and repellent to those around her, and yet remains unbowed and is not 
only ‘unafraid to die’ for her differences, but inhabits them openly (16). 
 
 Similarly, ‘The Double Image’, one of Sexton’s most famous early poems, 
attempts to sympathetically present another unsympathetic figure – the mother who 
has abandoned her child. This is the poem which most often invoked comparisons to 
Snodgrass’s ‘Heart’s Needle’ given that both dealt with the emotional fallout of 
being separated from small children. Middlebrook notes that Sexton herself cited 
‘Heart’s Needle’ as having had an enormous transformative effect on her art because 
it ‘engaged issues central in Sexton’s therapy’ (Middlebrook 1991, 77) which were 
also becoming central to her work. According to Sexton, “Heart’s Needle” had an 
even bigger, more significant impact on her motherhood because it prompted her to 
actively work towards being reunited with her daughter. After reading it, she 
recalled, she ‘ran up’ to her ‘mother in law’s house and brought my daughter home’ 
(177). This recollection is also a performance of sorts itself. It is likely Sexton’s 
description of running straight to her Mother-in-law’s house to bring her daughter 
home after reading the poem is exaggerated for effect, but it was a decisive 
illustration of how it succeeded in doing what ‘a poem should do – move people to 
action’ (177). Reading ‘Heart’s Needle’ may not have untangled Sexton’s fraught 
relationship to her maternity: “I didn’t keep my daughter at the time – I wasn’t 
ready” (177), but it did convince her that this was the direction in which she wanted 
to take her life and her work. ‘Heart’s Needle’ was a pivotal moment for Sexton 
because it gave her the impetus to reengage with motherhood both physically and 
symbolically, and it gave her the courage to write about it because it ‘provided a 
model of truthfulness that was also carefully artful’ (78). 
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 In this regard ‘The Double Image’ does proceed directly from ‘Hearts Needle’, 
but seeing the poem as merely derivative is to overlook the differing ways in which 
the poems interact textually and symbolically with the parent/child relationship and 
the differing discursive positions from which they speak. Maxine Kumin wrote that 
Sexton liked to sum up her poetic process as being an act of regeneration: “out of 
used furniture [she made] a tree” (Sexton, 1999 xxiv). This seems a neat metaphor 
for the relationship between ‘Heart’s Needle’ and ‘Double Image’, in that Sexton’s 
makes use of Snodgrass’s ‘furniture’ in order to fashion a poem that can be read as 
its own starting point. Which is not to overlook the original point Kumin is making 
here about Sexton’s particular genius for making art out of the tangled and broken 
strands of existence. Indeed, Sexton’s starting point in writing ‘Double Image’ is 
necessarily different to Snodgrass’s because the gender norms of the period dictated 
that both had been conditioned to approach the experience of parenting differently, 
and both had been socialised to see their position both as parents and as individuals 
within society differently.  
 
 This can be seen in the differing way in which the two poems frame their 
narratives of separation and absence. Snodgrass uses the backdrop of the Korean 
War as a metaphor for the more personal conflict of divorce that has resulted in his 
periodic separation from his child: 
 
Child of my winter, born  
When the new fallen soldiers froze  
In Asia’s steep ravines and fouled the snows,  
When I was torn  
 
By love I could not still,  
By fear that silenced my cramped mind  
To that Cold War where, lost, I could not find  
My peace in my will […] (http://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/hearts-needle) 
 
Snodgrass’s assertion that he is the child’s ‘real mother’ seems a bitter recrimination 
against a society that does not recognise the importance of his relationship with his 
child, and positions him also as a victim of patriarchal gender norms in which men 
are sacrificed to war and denied the chance to meaningfully engage in the kind of 
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nurturing role typically thrust upon women. It also provides an interesting 
perspective on Gregory’s assertion that confessionalism afforded a paradoxical 
authority to male poets who did not conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity, 
by allowing them to subvert and blur gender lines (Gregory in Gill (Ed) 2006, 37). 
While I have previously read Gregory’s framing of the male confessional poet’s 
claiming of this authority somewhat disapprovingly as evidence of a cynical 
masculine appropriation of the feminine, the anguish evinced here by the speaker at 
social boundaries which keep him separated from his daughter serves as a reminder 
that the patriarchal delineation of maternity can also be damaging for fathers. 
  
 In contrast to ‘Heart’s Needle’, Sexton’s ‘The Double Image’ takes on a more 
apologetic tone reinforcing the notion that a mother’s willing separation from her 
child is a more egregious transgression than a father’s reluctant absence. ‘The 
Double Image’ can be considered confessional in the most literal sense – it is a mea 
culpa in which the speaker directly addresses her child and confesses to the ‘sin’ of 
being unable to adequately discharge her maternal duties. Jane Hedley describes it as 
‘the confession of a woman who, in becoming a poet, has transgressed against 
motherhood’ (Hedley, 2009, 46). Certainly Sexton does not discourage this sort of 
autobiographical identification by using her daughter’s name, but it would also be 
accurate to say that ‘The Double Image’ is Sexton’s tribute to the role poetry played 
in healing her fractured relationship both with her daughter and with motherhood 
more generally. As Middlebrook writes, in 1957 ‘poetry had saved [Sexton’s] life; in 
1958 it was restoring her to motherhood’ (Middlebrook, 1991, 79). 
 
 This is not to say that ‘The Double Image’ is an unequivocal celebration or 
endorsement of motherhood. The speaker’s troubled relationship with her daughter, 
her ongoing battle with her mental health, her ambivalence towards motherhood and 
the shame this inspires in her permeate the poem. Shame and apologia are the 
jostling premises of ‘The Double Image’ as the speaker attempts to explain to her 
child why she ‘chose two times / to kill myself’ (Sexton, 1999, 35). Mental illness 
and suicide take on a more troubling significance when motherhood is also a 
consideration – the aggressive individualisation suggested by the desire for one’s 
own death sits uncomfortably with maternity and its attendant narratives of nurturing 
and sacrifice. The act of suicide sits in stark opposition to the myth that mothers are 
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made whole or in some way more fulfilled through their performance of 
motherhood. The desire for death corrupts the mythology of maternity, and Sexton’s 
frank naming of these dark impulses in her poem impresses upon the reader a more 
complex, if disturbed and troubling, vision of maternal subjectivity. 
 
 
Oedipal Conflict Re-imagined 
 
 
 Middleton argues that while the narrative of ‘The Double Image’ ‘incorporates 
many factual details’ drawn from Sexton’s life, its meaning extends beyond mere 
autobiographical reflection: 
 
Within the autobiographical line of the poem, however, is a second network 
of meaning that broadens its reference, making it an important contribution 
to the literature of feminine psychology. Sexton pointed to this larger set of 
meanings herself. “The mother-daughter relationship is more poignant than 
Romeo and Juliet,” she commented once before reading this poem to a radio 
audience. “Just as Oedipus is more interesting” (Middlebrook 1991, 87).  
 
Sexton’s allusion to the mother-daughter relationship being ‘more poignant than 
Romeo and Juliet’ is provocative considering the poem’s reference to suicide. Her 
reference to Oedipus is perhaps the more pertinent one, given that ‘The Double 
Image’ is a poem that confronts motherhood and the emotional fallout of suicide 
from dual perspective of mother and daughter. Also significant is Sexton’s 
positioning of the mother/daughter relationship as more interesting than any 
romantic relationship, as it emphasises the overarching psychic importance of the 
maternal to all female subject positions. 
 
The poem begins by situating the speaker and the daughter in the narrative as 
mother and child while revealing the failure that troubles the most: ‘And I remember 
/ mostly the three autumns you did not live here’ (Sexton, 1999 35). We are 
immediately made aware that the shame this inspires is in part externally imposed: 
‘They said I’d never get you back’ (35). This pitiless outside gaze is the embodiment 
of the feminine mystique. It infects the speaker’s motherhood and Sexton again 
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invokes the spectre of witches, this time as the malevolent, corrupting forces found 
in fairy tales: 
 
 […] Ugly angels spoke to me. The blame, 
I heard them say, was mine. They tattled 
like green witches in my head, letting doom  
leak like a broken faucet; 
as if doom had flooded my belly and filled your bassinet, 
an old debt I must assume (36).  
  
Here, Sexton again draws attention to the ways women are victimised by the 
discourses of motherhood which prescribe impossible standards of perfection and in 
which the ‘blame’ for any failure to meet these standards is laid at the feet of the 
struggling woman – this debt she must assume.  The use of the term debt to describe 
the speaker’s maternal responsibility can also be read as speaking to her failure to 
successfully subsume her desire for individuation to the pervasive maternal 
discourses of the period.  The allusion to the simplistic world of fairy tales in which 
‘good’ young women are often victimised by ‘evil’ older women highlights how 
internalised and self-policing the dictates of these discourses become.  
   
 Jane Hedley writes that the poetry of Sexton’s first published collection To 
Bedlam and Part Way Back was often addressed to male authority figures be they 
therapist, father or mentor. She notes what she describes as Sexton’s propensity ‘to 
call attention to a difference in status and authority between their female speaker and 
her male interlocutor.’ These poems, Hedley writes, do ‘not challenge’ this authority 
directly, ‘but instead contrive in more insidious ways to unsettle or call [it] into 
question’ (Hedley, 2009, 35). In this sort of textual interaction, although the balance 
of power seemingly rests with the male interlocutor, the female speaker acts as the 
disruptive force pushing back against the authority of the interlocutor in order to 
retain her subjectivity and regain control of her narrative.  
 
 This is particularly evident in ‘For John who begs me not to Enquire’ in which 
Sexton famously states the case for her poetic confessions. This is a poem that, as 
Francesca Haig has noted, highlights the ongoing difficulties of positioning Sexton’s 
work within feminist discourses because it occupies an ‘ambiguous, liminal space 
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between a passionate critique of traditional feminine roles, and a desperate search 
for validation through paternal authority’ (Haige 2006 38). ‘For John’ does indeed 
seek validation from paternal authority, but this is acknowledged only in bluntness 
of its title which directs our attention to this otherwise unidentified interlocutor. The 
poem also acts as an impassioned defence of the speaker’s story ‘as something worth 
learning’, and a rejection of the interlocutor’s attempts to silence her. It is a taking 
back of language, no matter how dangerous or disagreeable (Sexton, 1999 34). 
 
 ‘The Double Image’ destabilises the power balance of the speaker/interlocutor 
interaction Hedly identified, by having the speaker simultaneously inhabit both a 
dominant and submissive role (she is both mother and daughter) while still retaining 
her role as confessor. Haig argues that maternity, ‘in Sexton’s poetry, implicates an 
abject threat to the self. […] It also evokes, perhaps more obviously, the self-
blinding of Oedipus, in the seminal tale of the dangers of a failure to separate from 
the mother. This difficult process pervades Sexton’s poetry’ (Haig, 2006, p 42-43). 
The speaker of ‘The Double Image’ grapples with the dual struggle of her ‘failure to 
separate’ from her mother and her failure to connect with her daughter. One feeds 
into the other in a seemingly endless feedback loop in which suicide, a taboo on par 
with failed maternity, is the only circuit breaker. Suicide, the literal attempt to 
destroy the physical body, paradoxically represents the speaker’s most aggressive 
attempt to resist this ‘abject threat to self’, (42) and to establish a separate identity 
that is distinct from both her mother and her daughter. In ‘The Double Image’ the 
speaker’s mother aggressively resists the speaker’s violent claiming of identity, 
proclaiming: ‘I cannot forgive your suicide’ (Sexton 1999, 37).  
  
 The reproachfulness of the speaker’s mother is in stark contrast to the lyrical 
pathos of self-recrimination the speaker evinces in her confessions to her daughter: 
 
 Today, my small child, Joyce, 
 love your self’s self where it lives. 
 There is no special God to refer to; or if there is, 
 why did I let you grow 
 in another place (Sexton 1999, 36). 
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As is the case in her later poem ‘Little Girl, My String Bean, My Lovely Woman’, 
Sexton frames the mother/daughter exchange here as one in which the mother 
attempts to delineate a separate identity for her child – ‘love your self’s self where it 
lives’ (36). However, where the speaker of ‘Little Girl’ confidently inhabits her 
maternal responsibilities, in this instance the speaker gives the impression of being 
mostly mystified by them. In this context, the plaintive cry that there ‘is no special 
God to refer to’ can be read as the speaker’s anguish at not being able to submit to 
the collective, institutional vision of the maternal, which she seems to imagine might 
abnegate, or at least ameliorate, some of the personal responsibility she finds so 
crippling.  
 
 The speaker’s uneasy relationship with the push and pull of maternal 
responsibility is further emphasised by her insistence on addressing her 4-year-old 
daughter throughout the poem as if she were an adult contemporary. This maternal 
unease is also evident in the contrast the narrative draws between the speaker’s 
mother’s recriminations and her daughter Joyce’s artless forgiveness for the 
speaker’s maternal transgressions: ‘The time I did not love / myself, I visited your 
shovelled walks; you held my glove’ (36). Although Joyce may appear to forgive her 
mother’s absence, the reader will note the speaker’s troubling juxtaposition of her 
emotional distress with the soothing presence of her child. This again reads as an 
uncomfortable inversion of the maternal relationship in that it places responsibility 
for the speaker’s emotional well being squarely upon the slender shoulders of her 
small daughter.  
 
 While the speaker remains caught between the opposing summons of her 
mother and her daughter, she remains trapped in her cycle of self-loathing – an 
attitude that is reinforced by the powerful presence of the dominant discourses of 
motherhood. The need to be mothered herself, which is an acknowledgement of the 
unbearable pressure that motherhood has placed on her, keeps her trapped as ‘a 
partly mended thing, an outgrown child’, and while her ‘mother did her best’ (37) to 
provide this nurturing, the poem ultimately suggests that redemption and recovery 
can only be achieved through the resumption of her own maternity. But the narrative 
arc provides no neat resolution – the speaker’s journey back to motherhood is 
interrupted by further breakdowns: ‘I missed your babyhood, / tried a second 
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suicide, / tried the sealed hotel a second year’ (39), and her identification as a 
daughter is the site of still more guilt and pain: ‘On the first of September she looked 
at me / and said I gave her cancer’ (38). 
 
 Francesca Haig argues that the ‘The Double Image’ depicts an intensely Oedipal 
drama in which the speaker grapples with the idea of both motherhood and mothers. 
That is to say, she is continually unable to separate, or to integrate the passive act of 
being mothered from the active performance of her own motherhood, thereby 
‘intertwining three generations in a network of maternity and madness’ (Haig, 2006 
42). Haig sees this crisis of identification and identity as being indicative of Sexton’s 
fear of ‘the trap of the contagious mother’ (42). Simultaneously fearing and desiring 
the stifling influence of a mother inspires an ambivalence towards, and recoiling 
from, the idea of motherhood that infects the speaker’s relationship with her own 
child. As both mother and daughter, the speaker occupies an uncomfortable 
switching point in this interrogational network that has become an unsettling 
triumvirate rather than a dyadic bond.  
 
 This troubling tangle of identification and mirroring is symbolised by the 
mother/daughter portraits her mother has commissioned – the double image that 
gives the poem its title: 
    
   And this was the cave of the mirror, 
   that double woman who stares  
   at herself, as if she were petrified 
   in time – two ladies in umber chairs (Sexton 1999,  41). 
 
I note also that within this Oedipal drama Haig identifies at play in the ‘The Double 
Image’, the speaker appears mostly preoccupied with her embattled relationship with 
her own mother. The speaker’s pull towards identification as daughter rather than 
mother suggests that the maternal abjection Kristeva saw as preceding from the 
mother’s failure to relinquish the intense dyadic connection with her child can also 
be a reciprocal exchange. Or even, as depicted in ‘The Double Image’, a crisis of 
identity resulting from the child’s rather than the mother’s refusal to separate. 
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  By invoking Plato’s allegory of the cave, where, in this instance, the woman 
‘stares / at herself as if she were petrified’, Sexton seems to be associating 
motherhood with a kind of imprisonment that traps women by denying them access 
to enlightenment and knowledge and that keeps them ‘petrified’ in one idealized 
role. For the speaker, the oppressive internalised focus of the cave brings into sharp 
relief the failure of her attempts at individuation: ‘And this was my worst guilt; you 
could not cure / nor soothe it. I made you to find me’ (42). This final line of ‘The 
Double Image’, acknowledges the speaker’s specific ongoing struggle with 
differentiation and identification and as a broader repudiation of the discourses of 
motherhood which encouraged women to see maternity as the ultimate fulfilment, as 
a cave of ideals from which no woman should long to escape. 
 
 
Resisting the Silencing Impact of Maternal Immediacy 
 
 
 Further to the idea of motherhood as represented in the allegory of the cave, I 
want to look at the ways in which maternity has historically silenced women, and 
how Sexton’s poetry sits within this narrative of maternal silencing. Fellow writer 
Tillie Olsen wrote extensively of the ways in which motherhood as it is constructed 
in western society as a dyadic relationship in which women bear almost exclusive 
responsibility for the care of their children made any kind of creative endeavour 
almost impossible: 
 
In motherhood as it is structured, circumstances for sustained creation are almost 
impossible. Not because the capacities to create no longer exist, or the need (though 
for a while as in any fullness of life the need may be obscured), but … the need 
cannot be first. I can have at best only part self, part time … Motherhood means 
being instantly interruptible, responsive, responsible. Children need one now (and 
remember, in our society, the family must often try to be the centre for love and 
health the outside world is not). The very fact that these are needs of love, not duty. 
That one feels them as one’s self; that there is no one else to be responsible for 
these needs, gives them a primacy (Olsen 1978, 33). 
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Sexton’s relationship with motherhood and poetry appears somewhat different in that 
she discovered her creative impetus after she had children. Far from silencing her, or 
making ‘sustained creation’ impossible, it was Sexton’s pathological response to 
motherhood and her need to find an escape from the pressures of family life that 
inspired much of her oeuvre. Middlebrook writes that Sexton’s growing, almost 
evangelical devotion to writing poetry created tension within her immediate family, 
particularly in her husband for whom ‘poetry was an indulgence’ (Middlebrook 1991, 
79). Sexton’s husband resented her writing because it took her time and energy away 
from her roles as wife and mother, and it is not insignificant that it was left to his own 
mother to fill the breach. Sexton may have overcome the silencing effect of 
motherhood Tillie Olsen spoke of, but only because there was another woman in her 
life willing to assume some of her maternal and domestic responsibilities for her.   
 
 Sexton’s family may not have appreciated her willingness to forgo her maternal 
responsibilities in order to write, but the resulting poems and their refusal of silence 
would ultimately have a radically destabilising effect on the way the discourses were 
structured. In her book Philosophy and the Maternal Body: Reading Silence, Michelle 
Boulous Walker argues that women have typically had silence imposed upon them 
both materially and discursively by a patriarchy determined to impose its control over 
the way in which meaning is imposed upon maternity. This involves a ‘complex 
process of silencing, strategies such as exclusion, repression, denial and foreclosure’ 
(Boulous Walker 1998, 1). All of which are strategies explored and elucidated by 
Friedan in The Feminine Mystique and which would be later expanded upon by 
Adrienne Rich in Of Woman Born. Like Olsen, Boulous Walker argues that ‘women 
are silenced most effectively by their association with maternity’ and that ‘the 
maternal body occupies the site of a radical silence in the texts of Western philosophy, 
psychoanalytic theory and literature. Read symptomatically, these texts reveal a 
masculine imaginary that speaks for the maternal’ (1). If the dominant discourses of 
motherhood can be seen as a pervasive philosophy influencing all levels of society, by 
continuing to subversively engage with them through her poetry Sexton was insisting 
upon the right of women such as herself to articulate a version of maternal 
subjectivity that was free from masculine influence. 
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 Sexton’s conspicuous refusal of silence resulted in poems that resisted 
patriarchal attempts to control how motherhood was imagined, and that also 
challenged the silence imposed by social dictates which sought to control women’s 
bodies and their ability to exercise self-determination with regards to motherhood and 
the representation of maternal subjectivity. This can be seen in ‘The Abortion’, a 
poem from Sexton’s second published collection All My Pretty Ones. Here Sexton’s 
refusal of silence is particularly radical and confronting given the title blatantly 
signals her intention to write about a procedure that, as well as being morally charged 
and emotionally loaded, was still illegal at the time of publication. However, the 
speaker of ‘The Abortion’ is neither nonchalant nor defiant, but rather reflects 
regretfully on her situation. The poem is replete with self-recrimination, as the refrain 
‘Someone who should have been born / is gone’ (Sexton 1999, 62) is repeated 
throughout.  
 
 It is not the way in which Sexton writes about abortion in this poem that is 
revelatory, but that she was writing about it at all, given that abortion is an even more 
aggressive (and in the eyes of some, morally repugnant) repudiation of motherhood. 
Sexton’s reputation as a confessional poet makes such an endeavour even more 
fraught, as it is not unreasonable to surmise that many of her readers would read this 
poem as a literal confession. Adrienne Rich is quoted as saying ‘when a woman tells 
the truth, she is creating the possibility for more truth around her’ (Rich 1995, 191). 
When Sexton writes: 
 
   Yes woman, such logic will lead 
   to loss without death. Or say what you meant, 
   you coward … this baby that I bleed (Sexton, 1999, 62)  
 
she speaks the truth about both the self-recrimination and the condemnation the 
speaker is subject to, and in doing so opens up the ‘possibility for more truth’ to be 
told about this aspect of women’s experience of maternity which has historically been 
silenced. The call to ‘say what you meant, / you coward’, can also be read as the 
speaker’s challenge to herself to resist interpellation into the social dictates which 
would silence her.  
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 But speaking the truth, especially about such culturally sensitive subjects, was 
not without its cost, and again we must consider the impact on Sexton’s survivors. 
Sexton’s commitment to telling her personal ‘truth’ through her poems remained 
unwavering until her death, and she has been admired, celebrated and reviled for this 
in equal measure both in death and in life. However, the responses of readers not 
directly affected by Sexton’s confessions necessarily carry an air of detachment born 
of the distance from which the reader observes these textual performances. Sexton’s 
survivors were granted no such distance or detachment. Twenty years after her death, 
Sexton’s daughter Linda published Searching for Mercy Street a moving memoir of 
her childhood in which she detailed a life growing up in the shadow of both her 
mother’s genius and her madness, and in echoes of ‘The Double Image’ highlighted 
how tightly bound the experiences of mothering and being mothered are: 
 
My story as a daughter and my mother’s story as a mother begin in a Boston 
suburb, back in the 1950s, when I was exiled from my childhood home to 
make room for someone else: Mother’s mental illness, which lived among us 
like a fifth person. At ages one and two and three, I could not understand that 
Anne Sexton’s experiences with mental institutions, insanity, and the 
underside of her own unconscious would one day be put to good use in the 
crafting of a poetry recognized worldwide. I knew only that I was small and 
alone […] I had been taken away from mother at the period of childhood in 
which separation anxiety is acute for even the most secure, beloved child. 
This rupture in the fabric of our family was the event that defined my 
childhood, just as her responsibility for casting me out was the event that 
defined her motherhood (Sexton (L), 1994, 18). 
 
Linda’s words remind us that it was not just Sexton’s story being told in her 
poetry. Although she remains steadfast in her admiration of her mother’s work, 
Linda’s descriptions of the painful reality living with a mother who was often 
happier writing about rather than being a mother, and who made use of their 
intimate interactions in her poems, do imbue Sexton’s writings on motherhood 
with a more troubling weight. As readers we are left wondering at what point 
does ‘telling the truth’ become exploitative and damaging? Do mothers have the 
right to tell their children’s stories alongside their own?  
 
  62 
 With regard to Sexton’s work, her daughter has at least been afforded the 
right of reply, and so the final word on the confessions of her mother’s poetry 
must go to her. When faced with the difficult task of balancing her mother’s 
posthumous desire to continue revealing all, with the scruples of her other 
family members, while working with Middleton on the biography, Linda Sexton 
concluded: 
   
If we must hear the truth, let us hear it all. Let us be able to say at the end: 
this is the price and reward of madness; this is the price and reward of genius 
(Sexton L 1994, 285). 
 
As someone who knew in intimate and devastating detail what the price and 
reward of madness and genius were, Linda’s words echo Rich’s in honouring 
the value of ‘speaking the truth’ about motherhood. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
SYLVIA PLATH: MATERNAL POETRY AND THE CONSTRUCTED SELF  
 
 
 Psychoanalyst and literary critic Jacqueline Rose writes that Sylvia Plath 
‘haunts our culture’ (Rose, 1991, 1). Rose is speaking of what she sees as Plath’s 
positioning in both literary and popular culture, of the way  
 
she hovers between the furthest poles of positive and negative appraisal; she hovers 
in the space of what is most extreme, most violent, about appraisal, valuation, about 
moral and literary assessment as such. Above all she stirs things up. More than any 
other writer, perhaps, she lays bare the forms of psychic investment which lie, 
barely concealed, behind the processes through which a culture – Western literary 
culture – evaluates and perpetuates itself (1). 
 
What then, do we as readers and critics make of this claim, that Plath hovers between 
the extremes of ‘positive and negative appraisal’, laying bare ‘the forms of psychic 
investment’, when we consider the context of motherhood in her poetry? As with 
Sexton, much has been written about the peculiar emotional intensity of Plath’s 
poetry and of its engagement with unsettling and disturbing imagery, but in what 
ways might such a reading apply to her poems that invoke maternal subjectivity?  
 
Plath’s husband, Ted Hughes, said that she went straight for ‘the central 
unacceptable things’ in her work (Hughes in Plath 1982, xiv). Certainly there can be 
few things more ‘unacceptable’, more off-limits, to invoke, both aesthetically and 
discursively, than the spectre of death by suicide. Does it therefore follow that 
Plath’s complex performance of motherhood in her poetry intensifies the haunting 
that Rose speaks of by troubling broad social norms and assumptions about psychic 
investments in the maternal? Conversely, might the poems in which Plath 
foregrounds maternity be read as counter narratives to the ‘unacceptable’, the death 
drive critics have read in the Ariel poems in particular? It’s not necessary to draw a 
blunt contrast between the generative potential of the maternal and the destructive 
actuality of suicide, but rather to acknowledge that a reading of Plath’s maternal 
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poetry, with a specific focus on her depiction of and engagement with maternal 
subjectivity, might engender new perspectives on her oeuvre.     
Haunting is a word that suggests a visceral response. Rose is speaking here of 
a cultural reaction or phenomenon (Western literary culture to be precise) but 
haunting is a concept that is also understood on an intensely personal level. To be 
haunted by something is to fear and recoil from it while also feeling a compulsion to 
keep returning to it, and to be unable to detach from the site of psychic disturbance. 
Rose suggests that it is both the figure (or perhaps more specifically the idea) of 
Plath and the aesthetic actuality of her work that haunts her readers. The idea of Plath 
both symbolically and literally haunting our culture is a provocative one, but it begs 
that we ask how readers and critics of Plath have engaged with this shadowy and 
evocative presence that continues to disturb and disrupt us fifty years after her death. 
If indeed it is possible to elucidate or quantify such a thing? A reading of Plath’s 
work through the lens of the maternal that evaluates its evolving relationship to the 
shifting discourses of motherhood is enhanced by situating Plath’s experience of 
maternity within the specific context of her time. Contextualising Plath’s maternal 
poetry enables us to measure her response to the pervasive maternal paradigms of the 
period, and the ways in which these responses have historically been, and continue to 
be, read. 
 
 
The ‘Plath Problem’ 
 
 
First, it is important to address the ever-present issue of the way in which 
Plath’s biography transgresses upon our reading of her poetry and fiction, as it is a 
phenomenon that persists. I say “transgresses” because even a cursory survey of the 
numerous critical studies on Plath reveals how pervasive the question of Plath’s 
personal life is, and how insistently it intrudes into the discourses surrounding her 
work. Regardless of their interpretive positions, Plath scholars and critics tend, 
almost inevitably, to find themselves grappling with what Sarah Churchwell 
describes as ‘the politics of publication, representation, and literary authority’ 
(Churchwell 2001, 102). These ‘politics’ are complicated by the way in which 
Plath’s poetry has often been read as being literally rather than allegorically 
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autobiographical – a reading that positions Plath as both as speaker and subject. This 
is also a reading position that places critics in the fraught situation of intruding upon 
the privacy of Plath’s survivors, putting them at odds with her literary executors.  
Of this uncomfortable exchange, Rose writes 
 
To write about Sylvia Plath is, inevitably, to raise and confront difficult ethical 
issues – about the legitimate scope of interpretation; about the rights of literary 
interpretation to discuss living as well as dead writers; about the difficulty involved 
in analysing textual figures when these appear to refer to real persons, both living 
and dead; about how or whether to use material that has been omitted from Plath’s 
published writings, given that to do so can involve an infringement of privacy, but 
not to do so is to accept uncritically a version of Plath’s writing that is not complete, 
not her own (Rose 1991, xii). 
 
This chapter will examine these issues of ‘publication, representation and literary 
authority’, and ask if they and our relationship to Plath’s haunting presence are 
further complicated by Plath’s status as a mother and her engagement with the 
maternal in her poetry. 
 
To see Plath as both the subject and speaker of her poems can have the effect 
of encouraging us to see “Plath” the historical woman as the central character in a 
dramatic narrative culminating in her figurative and actual death. Such a reading 
risks precluding an acknowledgement of the ‘disordered, fragmented, shifting 
subjectivity’ that Rose, as a post-structuralist critic, reads in Plath’s poetry (Rose 
1991, 10). While biographical readings can encompass the possibility of 
fragmentation or ‘shifting subjectivity’, the danger is that an urge towards a literal 
reading of the first person speaking position might lead us to believe we can know 
Plath, can say with some certainty who she was. Or, more crucially, that we can say 
we understand her death and the events that preceded it, by reading her poetry. In the 
context of this thesis’s critical focus on the maternal, a literal biographical reading 
might also impinge upon Plath’s survivors, offering them up as supporting characters 
in her tragedy. Hughes is cast in the role of Plath’s tormentor; the ‘man in black with 
a Meinkampf look / And a love of the rack and the screw’ from ‘Daddy’, while her 
children are reduced to tragic footnotes - the toddlers depicted in the biographies 
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safely tucked asleep upstairs, transformed into the dead children folded ‘back into 
her body as petals’ of her last poem ‘Edge’ (Plath 1981, 273).  
In his article ‘Sylvia Plath Death and Gossip’, John Newton observes that the 
surfeit of information about Plath’s life encourages us toward the false certainty that 
‘if we just read the poems carefully enough, and sift through the journals and the 
letters and the biographies, then we ought to be able to say why it [her death] 
happened’ (Newton in McCredden & Trigg 1996, 8). Ultimately, however, as 
Newton argues, it is this same desire for depth of knowledge which exposes the 
limits of what can be known about Plath, both through her poetry and biographical 
writings, because it ‘shows us the biographical project foundering on its own 
impossibility. Where it promises “the truth of Sylvia herself”, it yields up instead this 
egregious fantasy’ (5). Thus, attempting to read the poems, these textual 
performances upon which Plath’s fame (and therefore the interest in her personal 
life) is founded, as being analogous or complimentary to the various published 
biographies of Plath forces us to acknowledge the difficulty of locating any kind of 
‘true’ - or even fixed - image of Sylvia in her poetry. Indeed, I would argue that the 
poetry articulates the impossibility of the biographical project because we are left, 
like the speaker of Plath’s earlier poem ‘The Colossus’, unable to piece ‘together 
entirely’ this mythical figure into any recognisable form, to get her ‘glued and 
properly jointed’ (Plath 1981, 129). And like the speaker of this poem, who can only 
elicit unintelligible sounds from the colossus she is attempting to build, readers who 
expect to find a particular image of Plath reproduced in her poems are confronted 
with the limits of language to make things concrete.  
 
 Pushing the argument further, I would contend that the poetry can be read as 
resisting the difficulty that the biographical project imposes upon our reading of 
Plath with its foregrounding of the burden of what the critic Alvarez derided in The 
Savage God as our fascination with ‘the gossipy, extra-literary ‘human interest’’ 
(Alvarez 1974, 55). Of course, there is a degree of irony (or perhaps, as Hughes 
contended, hypocrisy) in Alvarez making such a statement in the midst of an essay 
that made public for the first time details of Plath’s suicide and the events that 
preceded, but it does highlight how intertwined what we suppose to be the ‘facts’ of 
Plath’s death have become with how we view her as a poet, given that by writing and 
publishing this essay Alvarez was arguing that the details of her death should be 
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made public because they are essential to our understanding of her aesthetic 
motivations.  
As Hughes was later to complain (Malcolm 1994, 123-130) Alvarez was, in 
effect, giving the ‘peanut crunching crowd’ their first access to the ‘gossip’ 
surrounding Plath, thereby engaging their curiosity for more of said gossip while 
implying that reading the poetry could satisfy it. Alvarez’s attempt to imbue his 
discussion of the logistics of Plath’s death with the weight of literary significance 
ultimately had the opposite of its intended effect because it encouraged readers to see 
the ‘extra literary ‘human interest’’ of Plath’s biography as being inextricably linked 
with her literary output by suggesting that one could not be understood without the 
other. But reading the poetry makes explicit the impossibility of trying to extract the 
definitive ‘truth’ one expects from biography from the aesthetic complications and 
challenges of poetic language, which defies the idea of a fixed or definitive reading. 
  
 When trying to reconcile the ‘extra literary’ fascination with the human 
interest his article encouraged, with a ‘literary’ (and therefore endorsed) appreciation 
of the poetry, readers are left wrong-footed by Alvarez’s pronouncements. The 
specifics of her death have been sanctioned by this critic as worthy of scholarly 
interest and made available for our dissection, but everything else pertaining to 
Plath’s personal life (the details for which Alvarez created a more urgent interest by 
revealing upfront the most shocking part) has been dismissed as gossip, with all the 
attendant shame implicit in such a designation. More troubling is the disapprobation 
Alvarez directs towards the notion of ‘human interest’. As a poet who, like Sexton, 
was seen as operating within the confessional mode it is not unreasonable to say that 
Plath’s poetic focus was informed by a desire to explore the human condition 
through the lens of her own specific experiences as a woman and later as a wife and 
a mother. To dismiss any interest in these experiences as only a fascination for 
tawdry gossip unworthy of literary or critical exploration is to reduce both Plath’s 
life and her oeuvre to one final, desperate and destructive act. This critical position 
attempts to define Plath by the way she died rather than how she lived, or even how 
and what she wrote. More crucially, it strips her work of any aesthetic focus or 
interest other than death.  
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Motherhood, the Personal and the Constructed Self 
 
 
As the above discussion demonstrates, navigating the interaction between the 
personal and the constructed self of aesthetic productions is particularly fraught in 
the highly charged world of Plath scholarship. Indeed, when grappling with the 
tangled elements of Plath’s personal and literary history, critics may find themselves 
feeling as though they are engaged in a circular argument in which they attempt to 
reconcile what seem to be, in Plath’s case, the competing interests of privacy and 
critical analysis. How does one balance a resistance to the delineation, such as 
Alvarez attempts, of what is available for both representation and analysis in poetry 
with a genuine concern for the privacy of those potentially impacted by such an 
analysis? The answer would seem, arguably, to be to focus on the inescapably 
constructed nature of the self that emerges – or fails, or refuses to emerge - from 
these poetic enactments of the personal. The maternal self is caught up in the dramas 
of such constructedness.  
 
A reading that proceeds from an interest in exploring the personal 
implications of Plath’s poetry (as distinct from an intimate knowing) need not reject 
widely accepted tenets of literary criticism that call for a separation of author from 
text. Plath herself addressed this in the 1962 BBC interview when she spoke of her 
belief that poetry should be ‘relevant to the larger things’, and that poets should be 
able ‘to manipulate these experiences with an informed and intelligent mind’ (1962) 
(my emphasis). Plath notes here the poet’s dual role of commentator on, and 
linguistic manipulator of, aspects of the human condition. A focus on this duality of 
poetics, of the means by which the fictionalising of the personal speaks ‘to the larger 
things’, is especially relevant to the theoretical and aesthetic situating of maternal 
subjectivity as a heterogeneous and pliable – and therefore transformable - subject 
position.  
 
However, as the ensuing discussion will canvass, such a reading must still 
recognise that while the first person invoked in the poems is a literary rather than 
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autobiographical identity, the maternal speaking voice is necessarily a relational one. 
Maternal subjectivity is understood in relation to the existence of children. While this 
is also the case for any fictional text in which the author draws on their own life, the 
sense of the presence of others is heightened in the case of the maternal because 
representations of motherhood, fictional or not, tend to read as depictions of a 
relationship rather than of one person’s individual and solo ‘journey’. The 
implications of the fictionalising of the personal in Plath’s poetry become more 
complex and tangled because of the ways in which the poems are perceived to be 
drawing upon the experiences of her children and husband also.     
 
  Hughes felt that discussing Plath’s death represented the most egregious and 
unforgivable transgression upon both his and Plath’s privacy and that of her family, 
describing it as ‘the one thing she ought to be allowed to keep to herself if nothing 
else – her infinitely humiliating private killing of herself’ (Malcolm 1994, 128). 
Hughes’s letters to Alvarez quoted both in The Letters of Ted Hughes and Janet 
Malcolm’s The Silent Woman are remarkable for the impassioned way in which he 
rejects Alvarez’s attempts to defend or justify his discussion of the unvarnished 
specifics of Plath’s death as being integral to her critical legacy. These letters signal 
Hughes’s fear that Alvarez has opened some kind of Pandora’s Box of public interest 
into the intimate details of his life with Plath, as though, just as with Pandora, 
something unstoppable has been unleashed, something which will prove harmful to 
his and Plath’s children. While this would prove to be a well-founded fear, it is 
interesting to note, given Hughes was aware that his fear was situated in the 
uncomfortable intersection between the literary and the personal embodied by Plath’s 
poetry - an intersection she actively engaged with – that he directed his censure 
towards the literary establishment which provided it with a cultural legitimacy 
beyond that of gossip.  
 
In his letters to Alvarez, Hughes invokes the same dichotomy between the 
literary and gossip, but he goes one step further than Alvarez by rejecting the idea 
that the details surrounding Plath’s death are somehow separate from the 
contemptuous designation of gossip ‘under the guise of fashionable commentary’ 
(Hughes 2010, 322). Literary criticism, in the pretext of ‘fashionable’ commentary, 
is similarly dismissed. In doing so, Hughes was arguing that Plath’s life should be 
  73 
divorced from her poetry and that critics had no right to transgress on Plath’s or his 
privacy when constructing their reading of her work. ‘It enlightens nobody,’ he wrote 
in reference to critical readings of Plath’s work, ‘it is matter for students to stuff into 
answers & theses […] It doesn’t even have the justification of an artistic compulsion’ 
(322). Significantly, Hughes’s invoked Plath’s status as a mother as ultimate 
justification for his rejection of any critical focus that drew upon her autobiography. 
In excoriating prose, he berates Alvarez for failing to consider Plath’s children: 
 
You tell yourself maybe it is all literary history, she belongs to the public, she gave 
herself to the public etc. You know that is rubbish. She didn’t give her family & she 
didn’t hand over the inner life of her children to the offication of critics. […] 
 
For you she is a topic for intellectual discussion, a poetic/existential phenomenon 
[…] But for F. & N [Plath’s children, Frieda and Nicholas], she is the absolute 
centrepin – they have made her very important, the moreso because of her obvious 
absence (320-321). 
 
 
On an emotive level, it is hard to fault Hughes’s concern for his children, then 
aged 9 and 11, but upon closer inspection, his denouncement of Alvarez can also 
function as a denouncement of Plath’s poetry and her decision to draw upon personal 
experience as her muse, and Hughes’s reference to their children would seem to 
suggest he saw her status as a poet as being separate to, or even in conflict with, her 
role as a mother. Hughes’s critique of Alvarez also incriminates Plath because it is 
her poetry, and the persistent way in which it interacts with her personal history that 
exposed his private life to examination. Decrying the discussion of Plath’s ‘infinitely 
humiliating private killing of herself’ also calls upon us to reject her poetry, 
especially her later work, which many critics have read as an evocation of this 
‘infinitely humiliating’ private experience, and which contributed in no small 
measure to the scrutiny Hughes found himself under following Plath’s death.  
 
Hughes leads readers who are interested in Plath’s exploration of the maternal 
into something of a critical dead end with these pronouncements in which he invokes 
her motherhood in an attempt to silence the discussion. He suggests that the 
transgression against his family is exaggerated because of Plath’s status as a mother 
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and the ongoing existence of her children; the implication being that a woman with 
children has no business writing the sort of poetry that draws that kind of attention 
upon her family. In this regard, we might say that Hughes was playing into the 
discourses of motherhood as defined by the feminine mystique, because in attempting 
to define the limits of what critics might say about his wife’s poetry based on her 
status as a mother, by implication he is also questioning the limits of what she may or 
should say herself in her poetry.  
 
Hughes may not have realised it, but he left himself little room to manoeuvre 
in defence of Plath’s work in those letters. Rejecting Alvarez’s take on it because of 
its reference to the personal left him with no means of embracing the poetry which he 
also recognised as being inspired, at least in part, by the personal. It would seem that 
much of Hughes’s ongoing objection to the way in which Plath is represented in both 
literary and popular culture was predicated on the very reading – that they were 
autobiographical in the most literal sense - he was at pains to disavow. Indeed, by 
rejecting the academic study of Plath’s poetry as unenlightening, Hughes is 
foreclosing one of the means by which it might be read and analysed as something 
more than purely personal. 
 
Hughes’s defence of his and his children’s privacy was central to his 
objections to the biographical interest in Plath. This is evident in the letter he wrote 
The Independent in 1989 in response to a piece written by Plath biographer Ronald 
Hayman, in which Hughes famously states 
 
Mr Hayman tells us that “nobody owns fact”. I hope each of us owns the facts of his 
or her own life. Otherwise you, reader, might suddenly find yourself reinvented by a 
Mr Hayman who had decided that he owns your facts and can do what he likes with 
them (Hughes 2010, 558). 
 
Of course, as Janet Malcolm points out, everyone ‘who has ever heard a piece of 
gossip’ knows ‘we do not “own” the facts of our lives at all. The ownership passes 
out of our hands at birth, at the moment we are first observed’ (Malcolm 1994, 8). 
Leaving aside the problematic nature of the word ‘facts’ – a powerful signifier 
engendering expectations of an immutable and knowable truth that exists beyond 
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subjectivity or perspective - given that our lives intersect to varying degrees with 
others, one wonders how we might make the distinction between which facts belong 
to whom.  
 In examining Plath’s performance of motherhood in her poetry, we might also 
ask how this entanglement is navigated in poems which focus on the mother/child 
relationship – a relationship in which the balance of power differs to that of marriage 
in that it often involves speaking for someone who is unable to speak for themselves 
and who, in the case of infants and very small children, may not always be seen as 
independent, self actualising beings? What ownership do dependent children have 
over the facts of their lives when these intersect with those of their parents? How are 
these rights balanced against the rights of their parents to memorialise their lives, and, 
in this case, of the artist to draw on their own experiences when creating their art? 
How do we consider the voice of the child when we interrogate the discourses of 
mothering? 
 
 Hughes acknowledges this difficulty when he says ‘the facts of Sylvia Plath’s 
life are the facts of my life (this is a complication, I realise, but there it is, it can’t be 
helped)’ (Hughes 2010, 558). Hughes might as well be decrying the failure of 
language (or literary criticism, or readers) to erect what he sees as appropriate barriers 
between his life and Plath’s poetry – a barrier he presumably sought to establish with 
his reference to ownership of said facts. However, his disagreement with Hayman 
over the implications of the word “fact” is as much a dispute about consent as it is 
about the nature of language. As with Alvarez, Hughes makes clear his objection is to 
having his privacy encroached upon, an intrusion he has not consented to, and an 
intrusion he refuses to consent to on behalf of his children. Hayman has attempted to 
pre-emptively invalidate this objection by enshrining ‘facts’ as he sees them, as 
shorthand for truth. When he states that ‘nobody owns the facts’ he seems to be 
setting them up as some kind of democratic principle that exists beyond any scrutiny 
or notions of individual ownership, or of maternal and paternal responsibility, rights, 
or ethics. He presents them as infallible actualities not open to interpretation or 
question. In trying to wrest back ownership of these facts, Hughes does little to 
disabuse us of the notion of their potential for truthfulness. He points out the 
inaccuracies of Hayman’s second hand account of events that took place some 
decades prior but does not reject the possibility that any unequivocal truth can be 
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known about Plath. Rather, he casts Hayman in the role of the unreliable narrator who 
was never in possession of the facts, and asserts his right as her husband as the only 
person qualified to tell (as well as his right not to tell) the story of their life together, 
thereby reinforcing the assumptions the biographical project is predicated on, that 
there is a factuality and truth which can be established.  
 
 Hughes seems to have spent much of his time in the years after Plath’s suicide 
trying to assert these rights while attempting to find some balance in the publication 
and dissemination of her work that would enable it to find the respect he believed it 
deserved without exposing himself and his children to further examination or (in his 
case) censure. Certainly, this is a most understandable pursuit. However, we cannot 
overlook the fact that his claim of ownership over the facts of his life, coupled with 
his acknowledgement that these are often interchangeable with the facts of Sylvia’s 
life, makes his attempts to define the limits of what can be said about Plath’s poetry 
and how it should be read based on her status as a mother, appear a kind of silencing 
in the context of Plath’s positioning within the discourses of both feminism and 
motherhood.  
 
 Further, in his attempts to reject or discredit much of the external commentary 
on Plath, by championing the idea that poetry, done properly, is an articulation of the 
writer’s ‘true self’, Hughes falls back on the same assumptions he is at pains to 
correct. In his foreword to the original published version of Plath’s Journals Hughes 
speaks of what he observed as her attempts to cast off the ‘conflicting voices of the 
false and petty selves’ (Hughes in Plath 1982, xii). Hughes appears to be inviting the 
sort of reductive literal reading of Plath’s poetry he has argued against. These 
conflicting selves he speaks so disparagingly of can also be read as embodying a 
complex textual heterogeneity. Recognising the possibility of plurality within the first 
person speaking position also recognises the poet as having some control of the 
construction and representation of these selves.  
 
 In anointing the Ariel poems as the fulfilment of the casting off of false selves, 
Hughes speaks of his recognition that her writing confirmed for him ‘what I had 
always felt must happen had now begun to happen, that her real self, being the real 
poet, would now speak for itself, would throw off all those lesser and artificial selves 
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that had monopolized the words up to that point, it was as if a dumb person had 
suddenly spoke’ (Hughes in Plath 1982, xii). It’s hard not to read an undertone of 
patriarchal condescension in the way Hughes, drawing on his supposed powers of 
prophecy (his claim ‘I had always felt must happen’ sounds almost like an edict), 
directs readers towards the aspects of Plath’s work he deems worthy of interest and 
admiration, especially in his allusion to Plath being given the power of speech for the 
first time – ‘when a real self finds language, and manages to speak, it is surely a 
dazzling event – as Ariel was’ (xii). 
 
 The problem with Hughes’s ‘true self’ theory is that it fails to acknowledge, as 
Rose has pointed out, the idea of any shifting subjectivity in Plath’s work. The idea of 
a true self is as essentialist and as lacking in nuance as the notion of truth in 
biography. It is also reductive, as it attempts to define Plath’s work through the lens 
of the very simplistic, but nonetheless pervasive, dichotomy of true and false, thereby 
placing the poems beyond the reach of any kind of external context which might 
enhance our understanding of them, and removing Plath and her poetry from any 
participation in the discourses of feminism, motherhood or gender. Finally, it is an 
elusive and evasive concept that obfuscates and confuses as much as it attempts to 
define – in the case of Hughes who felt unfairly maligned by the external contexts 
applied by readers in the shaping of Plath’s public literary image, perhaps 
intentionally so. How does anyone define what constitutes Plath’s true self? If we 
were to allow, as I would contend, that the tone and voice of Plath’s poetry was more 
diverse and equivocal than suggested by the term “true self,” which poetic narrative 
would we pick as representative of Plath’s story?  
 
 Rejecting the notion of one true self, feminist critics such as Susan Van Dyne 
have argued for the integration of Plath’s work into feminist discourses because her 
poems explore ‘the nature of the relation between a woman’s life and her artistic 
revision, between her sexuality and textuality, between a psychosexual identity and 
cultural authority’ (Van Dyne1993, 2). Van Dyne’s reference to the relation between 
‘life and artistic revision’ is the key phrase here. With this sentence she highlights the 
work feminist literary criticism has done to frame the way literary productions and 
the critical discourses that proceed from them have historically given women the 
opportunity to explore, and more importantly, revise or reimagine their lives and in 
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the process articulate and shape their own narrative. Rather than trying to locate a 
fixed notion of Plath’s true self or arguing ‘for the ‘poetics of transference’ in which a 
woman is assumed to be writing directly and authentically from her lived experience’, 
Van Dyne explores the importance of Plath’s poetic subjectivity as being emblematic 
of feminine subjectivity (1). 
 
 Acknowledging, as Van Dyne does, the ‘proliferation of masks and 
performances Plath produced in her poetry’ (Van Dyne 1993, 1) allows us to expand 
our reading of Plath’s poetry beyond the politics of biography and confessionalism 
and to see her poems as complex symbolic constructs of specifically female 
experiences such as motherhood, rather than supposedly factual records of lived 
experience subject to the interrogation of verification or repudiation. In contrast to 
Hughes’s true-self theory, this is a reading that ‘assumes there is no master narrative’ 
that can explain Plath’s ‘life or art’. Nor does Van Dyne identify any ‘single 
explanatory paradigm’ or ‘inevitable progression’ towards pathology in her reading of 
Plath’s work, but rather focuses on the textual and metaphoric strategies Plath used to 
poetically reimagine her experiences (1).  
 
 This is also a reading that restores agency and cultural authority to Plath and her 
readers. Plath’s work is freed from its literal biographical associations, her 
subjectivity and symbolic positioning is reinstated, and readers are permitted to 
explore the contextual, symbolic and metaphorical implications of the poetry without 
being weighted down by the politics of publication and representation that have 
plagued so many critics in their dealings with Plath’s literary estate. As other feminist 
critics such as Susan Sulieman have noted, the examination of maternal subjectivity is 
of particular significance to our exploration of the performance of motherhood by 
women writers because of the resistance it offers to the discursive, cultural and socio-
political ‘silence to which mothers in our culture have traditionally been reduced’ 
(Sulieman 1988, 26) 
  
 This is not to say that all autobiographical implications can be completely cast 
aside when reading the poems in which the speaker identifies as a mother. As we 
have seen in the discussion of Sexton’s poetry, the co-opting of children into poetry 
can have, and has had, a negative impact on those involved, but, as was also made 
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evident in the previous chapter, writing about the act of mothering is an important act 
of defiance to the silencing of women’s voices in the pervasive paradigms of 
motherhood and gender. Van Dyne notes that Plath’s navigation of her positioning 
within the discourses of gender and motherhood of her time is not always explicitly 
disruptive in the way Sexton’s so often was. While many critics have read Plath’s 
writing primarily as a resistance to the gender norms of her historical moment - norms 
which have been understood as ‘uniformly oppressive’ - and have therefore cast Plath 
as the ‘duped victim’ of these repressive discourses, Van Dyne posits that Plath’s 
public and private writings reveal that ‘the meanings for female experience available 
in her culture were plural and often contradictory’ (Van Dyne 1993, 2). It must be 
noted that the notion that the meanings for female experience might be plural is at 
odds with Friedan’s theory of the overwhelming ubiquity of the feminine mystique, 
but it is a reading that emphasises Plath’s cultural agency by framing her writing as 
the site of the ‘resourceful negotiation of the incompatible possibilities that were 
embedded in the 1950s ideology of gender’ (2). It is also a reading that recognises the 
multiplicity of maternal subjectivity.  
 
 Thus, Plath is no longer the ‘duped victim’ of an oppressive ideology, but the 
negotiator, and manipulator, of her lived experience. Whereas Sexton’s poetry 
exposed the limits of the feminine mystique in understanding or expressing women’s 
relationship to maternity and the detrimental impact this had upon women, Plath’s 
relationship to these discourses is less easily understood in terms of opposition 
because, as Van Dyne notes, ‘she assimilated and invested in certain conventional 
scripts as the paradigm for her own success’ (Van Dyne 1993, 2). In contrast to the 
definitive and confining pronouncements of Hughes, we can read Plath as embracing 
and exploring her subjectivity in the way her poetry navigates rather than submits to 
the ‘incompatible possibilities’ of the maternal discourses of her era. Or to quote 
Plath, her poems redraft her personal experiences with ‘an informed and intelligent 
mind’ (Plath, 1962) as cultural output capable of both disrupting and conforming to 
‘conventional scripts’ (Van Dyne, 1993, 2). Plath’s ability to successfully integrate 
these ‘incompatible possibilities’ enabled her to assimilate motherhood with her 
creative drive more successfully, poetically at least, than many of her contemporaries. 
While much of Plath’s oeuvre, in both prose and poetry, does exhibit a degree of 
ambiguity towards maternity and fertility as cultural constructs, I believe the poems 
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in which she engages with motherhood offer a contrast to the more suffocating, 
internalised focus of other Ariel poems. Not only do these poems differ in tone and 
focus, they are also often stylistically divergent from the more famous poems such as 
‘Lady Lazarus’, ‘Fever 103’, ‘The Rabbit Catcher’ and ‘The Jailer’ that have been 
read as expressions of Plath’s internalised rage and her rejection of a brutal and often 
indifferent patriarchy, and can also be seen as articulating an experience of 
motherhood that contrasts with Sexton’s traumatic response to her maternity.  
 
 
The Maternal ‘Self’ in Plath’s Poetry 
 
 
 This contrast becomes evident when we compare two poems – ‘The Hanging 
Man’ and ‘Morning Song’ - written in the months after her first child was born. ‘The 
Hanging Man’, the first poem Plath completed after the birth of her daughter 
articulates a harrowing psychic disruption, and is remarkable for the relentless way in 
which it communicates the internal suffering of the speaker in three stunning verses 
consisting of just two lines each. It is a poem that is notable for both what it reveals 
about the speaker’s pain ‘By the roots of my hair some god got hold of me. / I sizzled 
in his blue volts like a desert prophet’, and what it refuses to reveal ‘If he were I, he 
would do what I did’ (Plath 1981, 141-142). There is an immediate sense that readers 
are being pulled along as violently as the speaker is. Such is the terse intensity of 
‘The Hanging Man’ we are left feeling there is no respite from the harsh rhythm of 
the six brief lines that drum out their message in brutal, minimalist staccato - night 
has ‘snapped out of sight like a lizard’s eyelid’; a feeling further emphasised by the 
‘world of bald white days in a shadeless socket’ (141). The speaker’s position appears 
uncertain in the poem’s central paradox whereby the ‘shadeless socket’ of the lizard’s 
eyelid suggests her suffering is caused by a pitiless external gaze, only to be 
contradicted by the acknowledgment that a ‘vulturous boredom pinned me in this 
tree’ (142).  
 
 The word ‘vulturous’ conjures images of a predatory force – images that are 
cofounded in the next beat with the positioning of the word ‘boredom’ which 
dissipates much of the urgency built in the preceding stanzas, deflating the almost 
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unbearably fierce energy of the language. Invoking the word ‘boredom’ with all its 
implications of self-indulgent introspection muddles any certainty of the speaker’s 
victimisation the opening lines may have evinced and prompts us to question if the 
origin of this unnamed, tormenting ‘god’ is external or internal. ‘The Hanging Man’ 
hints at the tense, nightmarish ambiance of many of the Ariel poems in the way it 
assaults the reader with the force of the speaker’s suffering, only to pull back with a 
final line – ‘he would do what I did’ which is as elusive as it is irrevocable, leaving us 
unsettled by our encounter with this terrible world of ‘bald white days’ (142) and 
without any possibility of disclosure or closure. 
 
 In ‘Morning Song’, we encounter a different, gentler landscape in which the 
speaker looks outwards and to others for meaning. Rather than being assailed by 
images of a violent and immediate suffering, we are struck by the complexity of the 
opening simile – ‘Love set you going like a fat gold watch’ (Plath 1981, 156). There 
is a certain economy in the use of the image of a gold watch as a signifier of joyful 
abundance – an economy that is further enhanced by the use of ‘fat’ as an evocative, 
if unexpected, qualifier. However, there is also a certain peculiarity in invoking this 
image of a watch, which can also be read as symbolising mechanical detachment, as a 
metaphor for the creation of new life. This opening statement functions as both a 
playful allusion to the act of conception and an announcement of the uncomplicated 
delight attendant upon the birth of a child. But any pleasure or satisfaction we might 
take in the idea of this decadent, fat gold watch set ticking by love is immediately 
complicated by an accompanying sense of remoteness that catches the speaker, and 
us, unawares: 
 
Our voices echo, magnifying your arrival. New statue. 
In a drafty museum, your nakedness  
Shadows our safety. We stand around blankly as walls  (Plath 1981, 157). 
 
‘New Statue’ is a cold and unsettling way to describe an infant. It is a 
descriptor that is made all more detached by the blunt way it is presented as a 
separate sentence, standing out in sharp relief from the rest of the stanza, and we are 
reminded of Janet Malcolm’s assertion that birth marks the first moment of 
observation in which we surrender ‘ownership of the facts of our life’ (Malcolm 
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1994, 8). This stanza invokes the alterity of motherhood in which the new existence 
of the child is framed as a moment of alienation rather than connection.  The speaker 
recoils from the nakedness of this moment of observation which is configured as a 
threat to her safety rather than to the child’s; and we are given no accompanying 
explicatory imagery, suggesting that the risk is visceral rather than concrete or 
locatable.  
 
This sense of missed connection is further heightened in the next stanza 
which contains one of the most complex and elusive metaphors found in Plath’s 
poetry: 
 
I am no more your mother 
Than the cloud that distils a mirror to reflect its own slow 
Effacement at the wind’s hand (Plath, S, 1981, p.157). 
 
 Plath again uses an abrupt line break to draw attention to, and heighten the drama 
of, the frank, almost brutal, declaration ‘I am no more your mother’. It seems 
something of a self-defeating prophecy to be anticipating the ‘slow effacement’ 
motherhood will wreak upon her existence so soon after birth, as though maternity 
represents in the very first instance a permanent disruption to her selfhood and 
signals the gradual slide into irrelevance – an irrelevance the child’s own 
development will mirror back at her.  
 
 Plath’s articulation of the fear of being physically and metaphorically 
subsumed by what Suleiman terms the ‘urgency of the needs of others’ (Suleiman 
1988, 26) foreshadows the narrative of maternal effacement that would be elucidated 
by Friedan in The Feminine Mystique. It also speaks to the struggle for selfhood and 
identity feminist critics such as Alicia Ostriker and Van Dyne have been reading in 
women’s poetry since feminist literary theory began its task, as described by Van 
Dyne, of articulating a critical framework which acknowledges ‘the relation between 
a woman’s life and her artistic revision’ (Van Dyne, S, 1993, p.2). Women’s search 
for self has historically been complicated by what Ostriker refers to as their ‘sense of 
identity as marginality’ (Ostriker 1986, 61). This sense of marginality, Ostriker 
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argues, manifests in the poetry through imagery and language in which ‘the self is 
seen as non-existent, invisible, mute, dissolving or deformed’ (61).  
 
In Stealing the Language, her study of women’s poetry in twentieth century 
America, Ostriker theorises that these ‘dissolving selves’ are illustrative of the way 
women have been indoctrinated into a master narrative of paternal subjugation 
structured around narrow definitions of feminine potentiality that often pathologised 
creativity, positioning it in opposition to motherhood. ‘Each of these images may be 
understood as a variation on a key theme’, she writes, ‘to be a creative woman in a 
gender polarized culture is to be a divided self’ (Ostriker 1986, 61). This dilemma 
facing the creative woman Ostriker describes has weighty implications for the poet 
who is also a mother and for whom the ‘urgency of the needs of others’ will always 
be in competition with her artistic impulses. Ostriker’s argument may seem 
somewhat dated and essentialist from the current critical and cultural perspective, in 
which we may lay claim to not only having overcome at least some of the gender 
polarization she refers to, but also to moving towards a recognition of the fluidity of 
gender as a cultural construct, but it is an argument that would however, I think, 
resonate with the women of Plath’s generation for whom gender was as much of a 
restrictive symbolic and cultural designation as it was a fixed physical actuality.  
 
 To be a mother is to be both the literal physical embodiment and emotional 
manifestation of a divided self – a phenomenon acknowledged by Plath in her poem 
‘Three Women’ in which one of the speakers describes the experience of 
motherhood as being like ‘my heart / Put on a face and walked into the world (Plath 
1981, 185). But this division of the self does not only operate at a personal level. It is 
also embedded in cultural and discursive responses to motherhood, and is, as 
Ostriker points out, codified in the language women are taught to use when 
negotiating their selfhood and subjectivity. While Van Dyne has read Plath’s 
writings as articulating a ‘resourceful negotiation’ of the ‘plural’ possibilities 
available to her as a woman, it is important to note, as Van Dyne does, that these 
possibilities were ‘incompatible’ and ‘contradictory’, qualifiers that greatly reduce 
the depth and breadth of possibility on offer. In a culture that was heavily invested in 
encouraging women towards motherhood above all other ambitions, and in which 
gender was understood as the instinctive embodiment of a series of rigid 
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oppositions, creativity was often presented as being diametrically opposed to 
motherhood and destructive of women’s happiness. 
  
Plath may have been in the privileged and educated position of being able to 
recognise the plural possibilities available to her in the 1950s and 60s, but this did 
not mean she was exempt from the cultural and social mores of her historical 
moment which complicated and sought to restrict her access to these possibilities. 
The anxiety engendered by her experiences of these contradictory possibilities is 
evident in much of her writing, most explicitly in the famous fig tree scene in The 
Bell Jar. Given women of Plath’s generation were encouraged to seek meaning and 
fulfilment through maternity above all else, it is not surprising that any deviation 
from this aspiration should manifest in feelings of conflict and division, and that the 
expression of the creative drive should be couched in such hesitant and ambiguous 
terms. However, this thesis is arguing that Plath’s writing, both public and personal, 
seeks to reject any division between the creative and the maternal. In contrast to the 
‘sense of identity as marginality’ Ostriker has read in women’s poetry of that period, 
much of Plath’s work is remarkable for the way it uses language that refuses to 
surrender to hesitancy or marginality in its embodiment of selfhood. In her embrace 
of ambiguity, it can be argued that Plath is open to self-questioning as a liberating 
rather than weakening speaking position.  
 
‘Morning Song’ invokes much of the diffident imagery Ostriker identifies, 
but it is also a poem that engages with the complexity of motherhood and maternal 
subjectivity. The speaker describes herself as a ‘blank wall’ and her voice which 
‘echoes’ to herald the arrival of her child, falls silent in the aftermath as she is 
relegated to passive and fearful observer. While the birth of her child may have 
inspired a sense of unease in the speaker, her fear of effacement is not presented as 
proceeding from the physical demands made by her infant. Rather, her sense of self 
appears, if not restored, then at least rediscovered, by the poem’s switch of focus 
from an abstract engagement with the symbolic and psychic upheavals of new 
motherhood to the tangible actuality of tending to an infant. Like a camera adjusting 
its focus to include the main subject’s surroundings Plath draws our attention back to 
observe as the speaker participates in the rituals of new motherhood. Responding to 
the elemental pull – that ‘far sea’ – (which is a rather cold and distant descriptor) of 
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her baby’s cry we are treated to a more reassuringly domestic scene in which she 
performs that most exigent and immediate of maternal duties and awakes in the 
night to breastfeed her child.  
 
Having previously acted out the textual equivalent of throwing up her hands 
in confusion when contemplating the birth, the speaker now appears at ease 
responding to her baby’s cry: 
 
[…] I awake to listen: 
A far sea moves in my ear. 
 
One cry and I stumble from bed, cow-heavy and floral 
In my Victorian gown (Plath 1981, 157) 
 
At first glance, this would again seem to be another nod to the idea of 
motherhood as unending and exhausting drudgework. Notice that in inhabiting 
the role of mother the speaker appears at pains to strip herself of any kind of 
sexuality, or sensuality, becoming ‘cow-heavy and floral / In my Victorian gown’ 
(157). But this is to understand the use of ‘cow-heavy’ as unequivocally 
derogatory. Certainly, cow-heavy is an unappealing image, suggesting Plath was 
less than sanguine about the physicality of motherhood, but Plath’s private 
writings provide more nuance to our exploration of her relationship to this word.  
 
In a letter to her mother, written in the days before her second child was 
born, Plath describes herself as being ‘cow-like and interested suddenly in soppy 
women’s magazines and cooking and sewing’ as she anticipates the birth of her 
son. However, this immersion into mindless domesticity does not pose a long-
term threat to her creativity because she is reassured by her previous experience 
of pregnancy and birth resulting in ‘some of my best poems’ (Plath 1999, 439). In 
this context ‘cow-like’ or ‘cow-heavy’ reads as a playful reference to the physical 
ponderousness that is also associated with fertility and the manifestation of her 
creativity. It also a nod to the elemental profusion that allows her to nourish her 
child, and thus the speaker’s physical performance of motherhood is integrated 
with her creativity. However, the potential negative connotations of maternity 
being depicted as ‘cow-like / heavy’ persist. Mary Ellmann writes that Plath’s use 
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of that term is a signifier, intended to invoke judgement, much like the term 
‘poetess’ used by Robert Lowell in his introduction to Ariel, of Plath’s ‘sex (that 
inescapable membership) and that her sex was not male’ (Ellmann 1968, 34). 
Concerning Plath and women’s writing about motherhood in general, poetess is 
perhaps even more problematic than ‘cow like’.  
 
Though this membership of one’s sex may have seemed inescapable to 
Ellmann in 1968, she notes that Plath does manage to disrupt patriarchal 
expectations of how women should respond to motherhood by demonstrating a 
willingness - again noted by Lowell in his introduction - to “laugh at herself” 
(Ellmann 1968, 34). I say disruptive because, as Ellmann contends ‘self-mockery, 
particularly sexual self-mockery is not expected in a woman, and it is irresistible 
in the criticism of women to describe what was expected: the actual exists only in 
relation to the preconceived’ (34). Ellmann is suggesting here that this kind of 
self-awareness is not expected of women poets, hence the surprise and 
puzzlement evinced by male critics or commentators when they encounter it. 
Plath’s use of ‘cow-heavy’ to describe the speaker’s physical performance of 
motherhood both supports and unsettles preconceived images of the maternal, of 
which a dedication to the nourishment of the infant at the breast is one of the 
most powerful. By assigning such an easily recognisable but unflattering epitaph 
to herself she signals her particular positioning within narratives of mothering and 
breastfeeding while recognising, in a tongue-in-cheek way, the potential for this 
narrative to dehumanise the body and disrupt selfhood. 
 
 Plath’s treatment of motherhood in ‘Morning Song’ and the resulting stylistic 
divergence from other, more famous, Ariel poems is repeated throughout the 
collection in both its original published form and its more recent ‘restored’ format – 
a divergence in which both Plath’s negotiation of the multiplicity of meanings of 
motherhood, and her struggle against the divided self Ostriker speaks of, is evident. 
Indeed, the interplay between these differing poetic narratives – the mother, the 
suicidal woman in the thrall to her death wish, the avenging wife and the angry 
daughter can also be understood as manifestations of competing selves; but while 
reading them in the wake of Plath’s death encourages us to see this conflict as 
catastrophic and destructive, it does not necessarily follow that Plath inhabits the role 
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of victim in these poems. Ariel as a body of work has a sense of dramatic urgency 
and chilling finality to it and while it is tempting to read the poems, as many critics 
have, as articulating the inevitability of Plath’s tragic fate, I believe much of this 
urgency stems from the absence of hesitation or passivity in the language.  
 
Many of the Ariel poems adopt the cadence of perpetual and at times 
aggressive momentum to emphasise a relentless progression towards some terrible, 
irrevocable conclusion – a conclusion over which the speaker often appears to 
maintain a paradoxical sense of control. However, this control is not that of a unified 
(essential) self, but rather of an artist manipulating language to create an atmosphere 
or impression. And while there is evidence to suggest that Plath had an overarching 
narrative in mind for the Ariel poems, as famously explored in Marjorie Perloff’s 
essay ‘The Two Ariels’ (1984), it does not follow that this controlling consciousness 
was always at play when Plath was writing each individual poem that would make up 
the collection. 
 
Thus, we have the speaker of ‘Lady Lazarus’ declaring ‘Out of the ash / I rise 
with my red hair / And I eat men like air’ (Plath 1981, 247), while in ‘Getting There’, 
a poem that confronts readers with the disturbing imagery of the boxcars of the 
Holocaust bearing their human cargo inexorably to their doom, the opening refrain 
‘How far is it? /How far is it now?’ is querulous and impatient, and the speaker is ‘An 
Animal / Insane for the destination’ (249), despite the suspected misery awaiting her. 
This embracing of unyielding forward momentum is also found in ‘Years’ where the 
speaker declares in a sparse stanza betraying no hesitancy or ambivalence and in 
which the definitive brevity of each sentence echoes the detached efficiency of the 
machinery it evokes: 
 
What I love is 
The piston in motion – 
My soul dies before it. 
And the hooves of the horses, 
Their merciless churn (255). 
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The galloping horse is also famously invoked in ‘Ariel’, in which the act of 
flying through the countryside on horseback affords the speaker the chance to hone 
her existence and shed those manifestations of the self, those ‘Dead hands / dead 
stringencies’ which weigh her down so that she might become ‘the arrow / The dew 
that flies’ (Plath 1981, 239-240). In all of these poems Plath presents her speaker as 
self-determining – as being both in control of her negotiation of her selfhood and an 
active and informed participant in whatever destructive trajectory this negotiation 
may send her on. Plath, the poet, is the one who sets the piston in motion, who 
commands language to transform her speaker into the suicidal arrow. It is, therefore, 
a paradoxical control Plath exerts through language, in that it knowingly embraces 
and invokes control, but also destruction and annihilation. 
 
 
The Poetic Particularity of Maternity 
 
 
 As with ‘Morning Song’, the other Ariel poems that imagine the experience 
of motherhood inhabit an altogether gentler landscape. Their rhythms and metre are 
softened as again the lens is pulled back to allow us to observe the tender 
relationship between mother and child. Even the titles, such as ‘The Night Dances’ 
are more lyrical signalling a more outward looking sensibility in which the speaker’s 
maternity both anchors her by directing her attention to the needs of others, and 
threatens to overwhelm her with all its attendant threats to her selfhood. Unlike the 
arrow of ‘Ariel’ with its sharpened focus upon the suicidal drive, the speaker of ‘The 
Night Dances’ is given space and time to recognise the beauty and pathos of the 
outside world through her contemplation of her sleeping child. Although arranged 
into short stanzas of two lines each, Plath relaxes the pace here, allowing her 
sentences and their lyrical imagery to spill over from the end of each stanza, so that 
instead of the violent rhythm of irrevocable forward movement, we get a softer 
cascading of metaphors signifying the multiple and contradictory meanings of 
maternity.  
 
In contrast to the ‘merciless’ pursuit of the paradoxical ambitions of selfhood 
and self-annihilation of the above quoted poems, ‘The Night Dances’, like ‘Morning 
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Song’ dissolves into uncertainty as the speaker contemplates her connection to her 
sleeping infant – a connection in which vulnerability is shared and magnified: 
 
Such pure leaps and spirals –  
Surely they travel 
 
The world forever, I shall not entirely 
Sit emptied of beauties, the gift 
 
Of your small breath, the drenched grass  
Smell of your sleeps, lilies, lilies. (Plath 1981, 249-250) 
 
Whereas Sexton often approached motherhood defensively as an intrinsic threat to 
the self, a threat to be resisted– a threat that resulted in mental breakdown and the 
painful fragmenting of the self, Plath does not resist the psychic investment required 
of her by her maternity, even when that investment involves submitting to an 
ambiguity that is at odds with the nihilistic certainty of the more dominant strand of 
her poetic narrative. Or when that ambiguity leaves her overwhelmed by her own 
insignificance in the shadow of the cosmic scale of motherhood: 
 
The comets 
Have such space to cross, 
 
Such coldness, forgetfulness. 
So your gestures flake off – 
 
Warm and human, then their pink light 
Bleeding and peeling 
 
Through the black amnesias of heaven. 
Why am I given 
 
These lamps, these planets 
Falling like blessings, like flakes 
 
Six sided, white 
On my eyes, my lips, my hair 
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Touching and melting. 
Nowhere (250). 
 
 In contrast to other women writers of the era, such as Sexton and Rich, Plath 
is described by Diane Middlebrook in the context of motherhood as representing the 
possibility of creative enrichment rather than threat - an attitude that was rather 
singular in that historical moment and an attitude she struggled to find endorsed in 
her search for literary role models: 
 
Plath also kept a list that segregated women writers according to whether or not 
they had children. Woolf didn’t; Rich and Sexton did. For Sylvia Plath – not for all 
women writers, not for all women artists, but for Sylvia Plath – one kind of 
imaginative fulfilment would arrive only through the integration of pregnancy and 
child-bearing into her sense of agency as an artist, and this would be the 
psychological issue she would resolve as she reached maturity as an artist. That she 
was beset by anxiety over this we can have no doubt, not only because of the 
numerous entries in her journal (Middlebrook 2003, 127). 
 
The idea that successfully combining motherhood and poetic ambition symbolised 
Plath’s artistic and psychic maturation perhaps plays into Ted Hughes’s idea of Ariel 
as representing Plath’s ‘true self’; but again, the lack of integration between various 
aesthetic personas and narrative strands of Ariel resits this reading. This is not to say 
that the divergence of the motherhood poems from the other, more aggressive, 
internally focussed poems is evidence that Plath was unable to assimilate 
motherhood with ‘her sense of agency as an artist’ (127).  
 
 Rather, in preserving and embracing the contradictoriness of these experiences 
in her aesthetic productions, Plath was arguing for a recognition of the multiplicity 
of female and maternal experience that rejected the doctrine of the feminine 
mystique and encompassed the shifting subjectivity produced by poetics. By 
refusing to restrict herself to one particular poetic persona because of her maternity, 
and by pursuing the ‘central, unacceptable things’ despite her status as a mother, 
Plath offers a more nuanced and subjective model for the relationship of motherhood 
to the creative project. (Rose 1991, xiv).  
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 In the imagined world of Ariel it is possible for a woman to simultaneously 
inhabit both maternal tenderness and aggressive suicidal certainty. The tentativeness 
evident in the motherhood poems also speaks to a recognition of the ‘otherness’ 
inherent in motherhood. Kristeva spoke of this 30 years after Plath’s death when she 
wrote that outside motherhood ‘no situations exist in human experience that so 
radically and so simply bring us face to face with that emergence of the other’ 
(Clement & Kristeva 2001, 57). By this definition, motherhood is a threat to 
selfhood, a threat that is amplified by the way in which the discourses of the 
maternal position women as the vehicle through which the child becomes, rather 
than as the becoming subject. The Ariel poems resist the threat both to self and 
creativity posed by motherhood, but without rejecting maternity. In this sense they 
can be seen as important aesthetic contributions to a cultural narrative of maternity 
that embraces motherhood as separate and particular subject positioning.   
 
 While the maternal arc in Ariel – in both the original published format and in 
the chronology revealed in Plath’s Collected Poems - does eventually succumb to 
the more destructive elements of Plath’s muse in the ‘doom mark’ of her final poem 
‘Edge’, her penultimate poem, ‘Balloons’ offers a last, lingering glimpse of a 
melancholy sense of hope and possibility suggested by motherhood. Plath made 
repeated use of balloons as a metaphor/simile to suggest intangible otherness and 
paradoxical strength and fragility of the mother/child relationship. Whereas in 
‘Morning Song’ the child is the elusive element with her ‘clear vowels’ that rise and 
dissipate like ‘balloons’, juxtaposed against the ‘cow heavy’ solid, maternal, 
presence of the speaker, (Plath 1981, 157), in ‘Balloons’ it is the children who have 
become fully realised ‘others’ while the speaker inhabits the edges of our awareness 
as an observer communicating her delight in her children in a language that is full of 
the intimacy of their connection: 
 
Your small 
 
Brother is making 
His balloon squeak like a cat. 
Seeming to see 
A funny pink world he might eat on the other side of it (272). 
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  Despite the abrupt line breaks that carve the sentences into shorter, more 
urgent bursts, it is interesting to note that Plath maintains a conversational tone 
reminiscent of how one might describe a treasured snapshot to a child in order to 
make the shared memory more palpable. So we have the unhurried unfolding of a 
cherished moment between mother and children overlaid with the speaker’s exigent 
need to commit the scene to posterity before her withdrawal. Whereas the infant son 
is a ‘fat jug’, a solid vessel waiting to be filled, the mother, like the balloons, those 
‘travelling globes of air’, is the one who dissipates as her child moves towards a 
certainty, ‘a world clear as water’ (Plath 1981, 272), while she looks on as passive 
witness. In this poem, the speaker is willingly effaced by her children, before 
stepping off into the void of ‘Edge’ which was written on the same day, and in 
which the self again asserts itself for one final, irrevocable act; so that in the end, it 
is the hard pursuit of selfhood, rather than motherhood or the combining of the 
maternal and the creative, that proves so destructive. 
  
It should be noted that Plath’s ability to combine maternity and creativity was 
aided in no small measure by her specific domestic situation. Unlike Rich and Sexton 
who had to contend with the demands upon their time imposed by their maternity 
before they could focus on their writing, Plath was able to balance her domestic and 
artistic commitments in a way that would be the envy of many contemporary women. 
Diane Middlebrook notes that The Bell Jar was written ‘rapidly’ over a period of six 
weeks after the birth of Plath’s first child. Without discounting the role that co-
operative muses play in such an endeavour, there can be no doubt that Hughes’s 
active championing of Plath’s writing and his willingness to share in Frieda’s care 
played a significant part in Plath ‘having arrived at that moment when she could use 
what she had stored in the pages of her journal having established herself in 
motherhood and gained a small foothold in the literary world of London’ 
(Middlebrook 2003, 127).  
 
Also central to Plath’s successful bringing together of maternity and 
creativity was the legitimacy with which her poetic ambition was regarded by those 
closest to her. Before her children were born Plath, her family and colleagues, all 
took her poetry and her desire to publish seriously. Even after the arrival of her 
children necessitated a shift in her focus, there appears to have been no doubt in 
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Hughes’s mind about the importance of ensuring Plath got equal writing time. There 
is ample evidence to suggest that despite his later misgivings about the attention 
brought upon him, Hughes arguably took Plath’s work as seriously as his own, which 
might go some way to explaining his initial confusion at the feminist re-imagining of 
Plath; from the outside at least, it would appear that Plath and Hughes achieved a 
strong work/family balance whereby Plath avoided having to make the irreconcilable 
choice between marriage and a family or a career which Esther feared in The Bell 
Jar. Nor was she required to subsume her ambition in order to support her husband’s. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
ADRIENNE RICH: TOWARDS A MATERNAL POLITICS 
 
 
As female poets embedded in the same time and place, Adrienne Rich’s work 
has often been discussed by critics in relationship to that of Anne Sexton and Sylvia 
Plath. Not only are all three poets associated with the literary milieu of late 1950s 
Boston detailed by critic Peter Davidson in his book The Fading Smile, all 
experienced motherhood from within the white middle class suburban setting Friedan 
interrogated and deconstructed in The Feminine Mystique. All three women came of 
age in an era in which marriage and maternity were seen as the most significant 
markers of the female passage into adulthood and in which their status as poets was 
often complicated or overshadowed by their status as women, wives and mothers. Of 
the three, Rich appears to have been the one to articulate most plainly in political 
terms recognisably informed by The Feminine Mystique that, for her, acquiescing to 
motherhood involved a culturally conditioned surrender of agency. As with Sexton, 
the language Rich later used to describe her decision to bear children was diffident 
and detached: 
 
I became a mother in the family-centred, consumer-oriented, Freudian-American world 
of the 1950s. My husband spoke eagerly of the children we would have; my parents-in-
law awaited the birth of their grandchild. I had no idea of what I wanted, what I could or 
could not choose. I only knew that to have a child was to assume adult womanhood to 
the full, to prove myself to be “like other women” (Rich 1995, 25). 
 
This sense of compulsion towards motherhood, the idea that it had been chosen for 
rather than by them, was, as Friedan tells us, not uncommon amongst American 
women of the 1950s.  
 
While Rich does not betray a sense of anxiety regarding her physical ability to 
enter into motherhood, the above passage suggests she felt distant and disconnected 
from the experience in a way that distinguished her from her family and their 
unequivocal reactions. In teasing out these feelings, Rich reveals that her 
disconnection does in fact stem from a sense of disquiet surrounding her socialisation 
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as a woman in a culture in which ambition and the desire for adventure is understood 
to be in opposition to the conventions of her gender:  
 
To be “like other women” had been a problem for me. From the age of thirteen or 
fourteen, I had felt I was only acting the part of a feminine creature. At the age of 
sixteen my fingers were almost constantly ink-stained. The lipstick and high heels of 
the era were difficult to manage disguises. In 1945 I was writing poetry seriously, 
and had a fantasy of going to postwar Europe as a journalist, sleeping among the 
ruins in bombed cities, recording the rebirth of civilization after the fall of the Nazis. 
But also, like every other girl I knew, I spent hours trying to apply lipstick more 
adroitly, straightening the wandering seams of stockings, talking about “boys”. There 
were two different compartments, already to my life. But writing poetry, and my 
fantasies of travel and self-sufficiency, seemed more real to me; I felt that as an 
incipient “real woman” I was a fake. Particularly was I paralyzed when I encountered 
young children. I think I felt men could be – wished to be – conned into thinking I 
was truly “feminine”; a child, I suspected, could see through me like a shot. This 
sense of acting a part created a curious sense of guilt, even though it was a part 
demanded for survival (Rich 1995, 25) 
 
In recognising that being “like other women” involved ‘acting a part’ and adorning 
herself with accoutrements such as lipstick, heels and stockings, all of which were 
culturally endorsed signifiers of femininity, Rich anticipates post-structuralist 
theorists such as Judith Butler who would later advance the theory of gender 
performativity. Gender, Butler posits, is ‘an identity tenuously constituted in time, 
instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts’ (Butler 1990, 191).  
 
Rich’s comments suggest that even as a young woman she was aware of the 
burden these performances engendered. Assuming a costume of femininity may have 
enabled her to present the necessary mask to the world at large, but the element of 
deception – the idea that men could be ‘conned’ by this costume and the ‘curious 
sense of guilt’ it prompted indicates a fundamental unease with this performance. 
Rich’s description of her experience of gender as a performance evokes an aporia by 
recognising she is both in control of and controlled by this performance. Because 
Rich had not completely internalised these stylised acts of femaleness their 
performativity was not concealed and she retained an acute awareness of the artifice 
they represented. Her recognition of the role repetition plays in reinforcing these 
  99 
expressions of gender further heightened her awareness of the pretence. Spending 
hours learning to ‘apply lipstick more adroitly, straightening the wandering seams of 
stockings,’ and ‘talking about “boys”’ allowed Rich to perfect and manipulate her 
performance, suggesting she was able to exert some control over how she was 
perceived by the world at large; but any power she may have gained from this was 
offset by the recognition that conforming to gender expectations involved playing a 
‘part demanded for survival’ rather than an exercise of choice or free-will (Rich 1995, 
25).  
 
More troubling was the realisation that playing this part separated her from the 
things that seemed ‘more real’. Rather than shoring up her identity, the dictates of 
gender performativity and conformity rendered Rich a split subject divided between 
‘two distinct compartments’ whereby her artistic identity was seen as having the 
potential to undermine her femininity (25). It is significant that this division 
disconnected her from her poetic ambitions by creating a dichotomy between external 
expectations and internal desires, trapping her in an inherent contradiction whereby 
behaviour which felt hostile to her sense of self was enshrined as proper and correct, 
while that which felt ‘real’ – poetry and ambition – was rendered fantastical and 
distant, thereby ensuring she was always performing a part rather than privileging her 
selfhood. In essence, this would suggest that Rich was socialised to see herself as a 
woman rather than a poet.  
 
The stylised repetition of acts designed to reinforce this - the lipstick and 
stockings were therefore overvalued while the articulation of another kind of selfhood 
through poetic language was devalued. In this context, and by extension in the 
context of motherhood, Rich’s poetic career becomes an on-going, evolving act of 
defiance to the dictates of gender forced upon her as a young woman in 1950s 
America. Central to Rich’s dilemma was the notion, apparently prevalent in the 
America of her early adulthood, that being a poet was predominantly a male preserve. 
In this sense American society was organised around a very restrictive and 
constructed concept of gender roles that limited the professional opportunities 
available to women. However, given the idea that performativity is not inherently 
hostile to poetics, we might also contemplate the ways in which the female poet of 
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this era was able to engage constructively, in a poetic sense, with the cultural and 
structural artifices thrust upon her.    
 
 The complex way in which gender interacted with the artistry of the female 
poet of the 1950s has been the subject of numerous feminist critical studies, many of 
which have evinced a degree of contradiction and ambivalence when contemplating 
the impact the feminine mystique had upon the ways in which women were poets 
able to articulate their own selfhood. Jane Hedley notes that Rich, Plath and Sexton 
‘who were near contemporaries, all had their gender working both for and against 
them. Being female may indeed have worked for them by working against them, in 
that it brought each of them inescapably to grips with the question of who she would 
be speaking as in her poems and where she would be speaking from’ (Headly 2009, 
3).  Hedley highlights here the constructive potential of the hyper-awareness of 
gender these poets grappled with. Although it might seem paradoxical to point to 
restrictive notions of gender as being liberating for the female poet, Hedley’s 
comments emphasise ways in which a strongly constitutive view of the female 
subject can be beneficial to said female subject. 
     
Given much of Friedan’s Feminine Mystique is devoted to arguing how 
limiting and obstructive notions of gender were with regards to how American 
women experienced culture during the Cold War period, Hedley’s comments about 
being female having ‘worked for them by working against them’ seem counter-
intuitive until one realises that this kind of ambivalence was a direct product of the 
delicate balance female poets were required to navigate between their gender and 
their artistry. The central paradox, as argued by Headly, is that while their gender 
may have restricted these poets (particularly in the eyes of their male 
contemporaries), it also enhanced their work because it forced them to confront (and 
resist) notions of subjectivity predicated upon the assumptions surrounding the 
cultural implications of womanhood of the period. This is an unsettling argument 
because it ensnares women poets within a potentially reductive conundrum. The 
exploration of selfhood from specifically feminine speaking positions may be praised 
as an important contribution to poetic discourse, but the foregrounding of gender 
ultimately devalues the female poet’s work, in certain sectors, because it defines her 
as woman rather than human, therefore putatively limiting her authorial influence in 
  101 
a society which values masculine authority. Thus, poems which engage with gender 
were considered both more and less interesting because they are written by women. 
The female poet’s status as ‘other’ within patriarchal paradigms traps her in an 
eternal paradox wherein her gender is an inescapable condition that must be 
confronted because it is assumed her audience will be unable to ignore it, while her 
very attempts to do so also serve to restrict and dictate the ways in which her work is 
read. 
While the idea of a female poet being able to decide who ‘she would be 
speaking as’ appears to echo Susan Van Dyne’s (1993) assertion that some women 
poets, such as Plath, were able to articulate their own unique voice by engaging both 
with and within the restrictive gender norms of the period, the question of ‘where she 
would be speaking from’ is more problematic (Headly 2009, 3). Such a question can 
be read as simply relating to the poet’s subject positioning, but the idea that a space 
in which the female poet might speak must be sought rather than assumed highlights 
how cultural constructions of gender encroached upon the artistic identity of women 
poets, saddling them with the chauvinistic qualifier of ‘poetess’, silencing their 
voices and limiting the spaces available to them.  
Further complicating the status of the female poet of 1950s, was the 
‘“Western tradition of the lyric’ she inherited in which, Hedley tells us, the poet was 
held to be ‘a unique individual who leaves “his” individuality behind to some extent 
in order to be able to speak both to and from “our” shared humanity’ (Headly 2009, 
3). This was a tradition based largely upon the assumption that our shared humanity 
was encapsulated within, and represented by, masculinity – ‘a status only poets who 
were white and male could lay claim to. In 1950 a woman who aspired to poethood 
had to learn by trial and error what kinds of authority she could lay claim to’ (3). As 
with Sexton and Plath, for Rich the process of finding her authority as speaker 
‘involved coming to grips’ with both ‘the problem of the “I”’ and ‘of how to write 
from the perspective of a woman’s experience and yet be taken seriously as a poet’ 
(3). While the late 1950s are seen as a period in which American poetry, underwent a 
transformation from the displacement of the personal that characterised the 
modernist lyric, to the confessionalist mode which privileged the use of “I”, as 
discussed in previous chapters, this was not necessarily a transformation that 
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privileged female poets, as the masculine voice and experience was still assumed to 
be the dominant consciousness from which the personal could integrate both the 
universal and particular.  
 
It can be argued that motherhood is one of the key areas in which the female 
poet can lay claim to an unassailable authority, particularly in a society which placed 
so much emphasis upon the relationship between the feminine and the maternal; but 
this too is fraught with contradiction, because this one area of irrefutable authority 
also foregrounds gender, especially for those who dare inhabit the speaking position 
of ‘I’ in their poems. This conflict was perhaps more pronounced in the late 50s and 
early 60s given, as The Feminine Mystique and later Rich’s Of Woman Born tell us, 
there was an exaggerated value placed upon the institutional perceptions of the 
maternal rather than the individual experience of motherhood, which in turn lead to 
the devaluing of women as equal economic and cultural participants in American 
society. However, while Freidan argued that the focus on the maternal was socially 
and culturally stultifying for women, motherhood can also be seen as a place from 
which female poets in post-war America could mediate the conflicts inherent in 
seeking cultural authority from speaking positions which embraced gender while also 
acknowledging the restrictions gender placed upon them.  
While it may have risked further entrenching the view that women were 
defined by their relationship to the maternal, the aesthetic exploration of motherhood 
also enabled women who were trying to live lives that combined maternity with 
poetry to find a position from which they could speak authoritatively. For as much as 
polemic texts such as The Feminine Mystique decried the exaggerated cultural 
emphasis placed upon motherhood during the Cold War period, for most women, 
daily existence was by necessity centred around the performance of maternal duties 
making it an integral part of female experience in the 1950s and 60s. If the opening 
up of the personal can be seen as enriching American poetic narratives of the period, 
then engaging with motherhood - even if to challenge or refute the seemingly 
monolithic pervasiveness of the cultural institution - was of vital importance in 
foregrounding female experiences and affording them equal recognition to those of 
men.  
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For a poet as conflicted about the impact of both motherhood and gender 
upon her writing as Rich speaks of being, the idea of maternity as the source of her 
cultural authority or representing the source of her aesthetic power is problematic. 
Further, the exploration of the personal via poetic language has implications for the 
relationship between the performative aspects of motherhood and gender. Butler 
argued, some 30 years after confessionalism encouraged the articulation of “I” – and 
by extension gender - back into poetry, that gender is ‘not expressive, but 
performative’. This distinction, Butler believes, is crucial because if  
[g]ender attributes and acts, the various ways in which the body shows or produces 
its cultural signification, are performative, then there is no pre-existing identity by 
which an act or attribute might be measured; there would be no true or false, real or 
distorted acts of gender, and the postulation of a true gender identity would be 
revealed as a regulatory fiction. That gender reality is created through sustained 
social performances means that the very notion of an essential sex and a true or 
abiding masculinity or femininity are also constituted as part of the strategy that 
conceals gender’s performative character (Butler 1991, 192). 
 
If we accept Butler’s argument that the expression of gender depends upon 
‘sustained social performances’ then perhaps language, particularly poetic language, 
represents a site in which these social performances can be subverted, distorted, or 
even divorced of some of the crippling context which enforces ‘the regulatory 
fiction’ Butler denounces. It is evident from Rich’s own description above that she 
saw the social performances she chafed against as being hostile to her creativity. 
From this perspective we might see her ongoing relationship to language and poetry - 
that dream that the dictates of gender threatened to distance her from – as the 
ultimate pushback against the gender expectations and limitations of the period, but 
this leads us to ask where is her relationship to her maternity situated within this? 
In poetry, cultural signification is divorced from the physical manifestation of 
the body. This is not to say that the body or physicality is always absent from poetry, 
but rather that the process of articulating rather than embodying – expressing rather 
than performing – affords more flexibility and fluidity in matters of gender. 
Although the act of publishing suggests the desire to be read and to communicate 
with an audience, poems are not always conceived as social performances. Poets are 
  104 
under no obligation to convince or placate, or even, it could be argued, address their 
audience, nor are they required to privilege politeness or respectability. Poets are 
therefore able to operate outside the prescriptive boundaries of cultural and social 
norms which Butler challenges. As discussed in previous chapters, it is the blunt 
rejection of social niceties that makes the work of poets such as Rich, Sexton and 
Plath so compelling to many readers. But while poetry and writing may have 
afforded Rich a space in which to hone her resistance to the restrictions society 
sought to place upon her, it is unlikely she saw it as a means of escaping gender 
entirely. 
Current critical discourse has largely embraced Butler’s rejection of the idea 
of gender essentialism, moving more towards a recognition of gender being a 
spectrum rather than a rigid binary, but motherhood perhaps resists this resistance. 
Maternity, as Butler’s fellow post-structuralist critic Julia Kristeva said in her essay 
‘Motherhood and Bellini’, is the ‘threshold where “nature” confronts “culture”’ 
(Kristeva 1993, 238). Which is to say that motherhood is the one social performance 
which cannot be entirely separated from biology or divorced from what Butler would 
consider an essentialist understanding of gender and gender roles. Motherhood, as 
Rich herself asserted, is a social construct, and while mothers may not define 
themselves in opposition to men, female biology was during the post-war era an 
inescapable necessary precondition to maternity. From our vantage point over half a 
century later, the critic can see how social and cultural changes alongside advances 
in reproductive technology have combined to reconstruct the relationship between 
biology and maternity, and in the case of gay men, biology and parenthood, but for a 
poet of Rich’s era, gender could not be removed from motherhood, even in poetry. 
Language, however, can negotiate and interrogate gender while constructing 
subjectivity.  
In this regard, Rich’s oeuvre differs from that of Sexton and Plath because 
her exploration of motherhood was navigated from both an aesthetic and discursive 
perspective. This dual perspective, with all the attendant variants of nuance and 
subtleties of language represents another kind of splitting of Rich as a speaking 
subject. Discursive writing, in it’s most traditional form, can be said to evoke the 
paternal authority of the symbolic order in that it seeks to persuade readers through 
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rational, detached and reasoned (although not dispassionate) argument informed by 
the dictates of the symbolic order, even when it sets out to disrupt this authority. 
Poetic language, on the other hand, is not expected to assume a fixed identity or 
speaking position, and according to theorists such as Kristeva, challenges the limits 
of the symbolic order. Of course, setting these linguistic modes (discursive and 
poetic) in such stark opposition assumes that all discursive writing operates within a 
set of rigid and fixed rules, and overlooks the more subversive contributions of 
writers such as Kristeva’s fellow poststructuralist Luce Irigaray who has championed 
a more ‘fluid’ style of discourse which, like poetic language, privileges a 
heterogeneous approach to identity and expression. However, while Irigaray’s 
linguistic innovations are notable for their subversiveness, she in fact positions her 
work not only in opposition to the more structured forms of discourse, but as a 
specifically feminine rejection of the patriarchal authority asserted over language 
within the symbolic. Irigaray’s theorising of discourse has both radical and 
reactionary potential. Radical in the sense it aims to articulate a vision of female 
subjectivity free of patriarchal control or definition, but reactionary in the sense that 
this subjective freedom relies upon a reinforcing of gendered difference that many 
feminists have argued is also restrictive and essentialist.  
 
The Dutiful Daughter 
 
Drawing any sort of gendered distinction between structured discourse and 
fluid poetics (whether in prose or poetry) and the different ways in which they 
engage with readers is potentially simplistic and reductive and risks straying into the 
kind of essentialism Butler warns us against. However, it is worth exploring the 
implications of Rich, a writer who was well established as a poet, electing to engage 
with her maternity and the attendant issues via two different written mediums. Why 
is it, we might ask, that a poet as accomplished as Rich would choose to do much of 
her writing about motherhood in a medium which in many respects is the 
dichotomous opposite of poetic language? Did Rich, whose discursive writing I read 
as adhering more broadly to the rationalist approaches Irigaray rejects, see persuasive 
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discourse as embodying a more authoritative or perhaps accessible voice than that of 
her poetry? Was motherhood an issue on which Rich felt more comfortable speaking 
from the more detached perspective of discursive writing? How might we see Rich’s 
choice of style as affecting the message she imparted in her writings, and, more 
specifically, what are the implications of her choice for the representation of 
motherhood? Did Rich feel freer to explore her personal experiences in prose? Was 
poetry with all its slippages, metaphors and opportunities for obfuscation and 
subjectivity somehow more revealing, rendering Rich as its presumed subject more 
vulnerable than the supposedly objective and direct prose employed in essay writing? 
When Rich first found success as poet while still a young unmarried and 
childless woman, her relationship to language and writing seems to have centred 
around a masculine-centric ideal of what constituted good and proper poetry. While 
no official (or otherwise) biography of Rich has been published in the wake of her 
death in 2012, offering a cohesive overview of her long and full life, Rich herself 
wrote of her childhood relationship to her parents and how this shaped her adult 
literary life in many of her essays. These essays often focussed on the mother-
daughter relationship (which will be of interest in later discussion), but the critic 
Paula Bennett points to Rich’s relationship with her father as being key, first to her 
acquisition of written language, and later to her early development as a poet (Bennett 
1986, 169-171). At her father’s insistence, Rich and her sister received their early 
educational instruction from their mother. This was, according to Rich, motivated by 
her father’s desire to inculcate his children into what she termed ‘his unique moral 
and intellectual plan, thus proving to the world the values of enlightened, unorthodox 
child-rearing’ (Rich 1995, 222).  
Rich’s mother was tasked with the day-to-day grind of implicating this 
‘unique moral and intellectual plan’ which Rich later saw as being driven by her 
father’s ‘Victorian paternalism’ and ‘controlling cruelty’. In Rich’s eyes, her father’s 
heightened focus on her education stemmed not from parental affection or concern, 
but from an egocentric, patriarchal need to control her access to information and to 
sculpt (albeit from a hands-off perspective) his children into acceptable reflections of 
his enlightened values. This pushed Rich into a state of permanent conflict with her 
parents. She resented her mother for both her passive acceptance and active 
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enforcement of this regime: ‘for years, I felt my mother had chosen my father over 
me, had sacrificed me to his needs and theories’, and she remained locked in a 
perpetual struggle with her father ‘for my right to an emotional life and a selfhood 
beyond his needs and theories’ (Rich 1995, 222-223).  
From her earliest moments, motherhood and creativity were pitted in 
uncomfortable opposition in Rich’s consciousness. The ability to control and 
command language to articulate selfhood was associated with paternal authority 
(Rich’s father was the one who taught her to read and who encouraged her love of 
poetry), while maternity as represented by her mother’s example, was associated 
with drudgery and the suppression of ambition. Successfully writing poetry 
symbolised an escape from her mother’s fate and was the key to her father’s 
approval. But, this approval was contingent upon her willingness to surrender her 
own writerly vision to his, which was based upon that same righteous intellectual 
plan in which the feminine voice and experience was not valued. Bennett writes that 
[f]or Rich, this situation, so fraught with irony has been crucial. Although her 
mother taught her daily lessons, her father was responsible for both the worst 
and the best that her childhood had to offer. From him she learned both the pain 
of enforced will: her own helplessness as a child and a woman, and the high-
minded idealism and love of learning that would one day set her free. […] From 
the time he taught her how to read around her fourth year, Adrienne Rich 
became her father’s, not her mother’s child. And in her struggle with the 
patriarchy and her rejection of the masculinist literary tradition, her lifelong 
quarrel with this strange, driven, and unhappy man is writ large [emphasis 
mine] (Bennett 1986, 171).  
Bennett stresses the significance of the father imparting the ability to read to his 
daughter. From a psychoanalytical perspective this can be seen as Rich’s father 
inducting her into the dictates of the symbolic order – note it is this point Bennett 
identifies as signifying the disruption to the mother/child dyad, the moment when the 
power of the father most forcefully intrudes into his daughter’s consciousness. 
Language represents the authority that is denied to the mother, whose subjectivity is 
compromised by her symbolic status. 
The idea that language, which in the symbolic order, represents patriarchal 
authority, would also ultimately afford Rich the means to reject and resist the 
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masculinist literary tradition upon which much of her father’s authority rested, 
provides a satisfying irony. While Rich may have ‘began her literary career as “a 
dutiful daughter, doing my craft right,”’ – a stance for which she was ‘handsomely 
rewarded’ with both male approval, and early success, this eventually gave way to 
various acts of rebellion when she began to write ‘“modern,” “obscure,” pessimistic” 
poetry, lacking the fluent sweetness of Tennyson’ in defiance (Rich 1995, 223). The 
latter part of that accusation is perhaps the most damning. In poetry, as in all things, 
Rich was expected to perform her gender by maintaining a level of womanly 
decency, to present her readers with ‘fluent sweetness’ rather than the more 
confronting, obscure pessimism Rich intimates her father accused her of 
preferencing. Casting off the mantle of dutiful daughter freed Rich poetically to 
explore her own notions of selfhood. The fact that her exploration of selfhood would 
ultimately involve an exploration of maternity speaks to the length of the shadow 
motherhood casts over female poets – for Rich as for the other poets discussed in this 
thesis, there could be no real negotiation of subjectivity that did not address it. 
To return to Hedley’s observation that for women poets in 1960s America the 
‘question of gender’ required coming to grips with ‘the question of who she would 
be speaking as in her poems and where she would be speaking from’ (Hedley 2009, 
3). For Rich, declaring this sort of artistic autonomy would involve breaking free of 
the cultural, emotional and linguistic influence of her male mentors to redefine her 
relationship with language – a project that had the potential to be as shocking as it 
was bold. To understand how completely Rich’s poetics and prose would come to be 
transformed by her difficult and ambivalent relationship to maternity, we might look 
to the way in which her early poems, which Bennett describes as epitomising ‘the 
poetry and poetic values’ she subsequently chose ‘to repudiate’ (Bennett 1986, 179), 
were received.  
Auden, the most distinguished (and therefore significant) of her reviewers, 
praised the poems in her first published collection for being ‘neatly and modestly 
dressed’, for ‘speaking quietly’ without mumbling, and for respecting ‘their elders’ 
(Auden in Bennett 1986, 179). From our current perspective, Auden’s comments 
may strike us as damning her work with the faintest of (sexist and condescending) 
praise, but they also underline how entrenched and inhibiting her status as dutiful 
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daughter was during the early years of her career. Auden’s remarks carry a strong 
hint of dismissive chauvinism that appears to be based on more than just his literary 
stature - he might be describing his views on acceptable behaviour for young ladies 
in society rather than works of art which are supposedly not bound by the rules of 
polite discourse as he sees them. The poems are applauded for their demure, 
respectful presence, for not speaking out of turn, rather than for their artistry, 
technical brilliance, or even competence. In short, Rich was praised by the male 
literary establishment for speaking softly in language they approved of, and for not 
saying anything inconvenient or confronting.  
Paternalistic condescension dressed up as praise encouraged a perception of 
Rich as a poet whose work was lesser because of the derivative nature of her early 
poems which was to persist amongst male critics long after Rich had distanced 
herself from the male literary tradition. Peter Davidson, writing almost half a century 
later, sounds vaguely contemptuous when he notes that in her early years Rich 
‘played the sedulous ape to her grand seniors’ (Davidson 1994, 189). Indeed, 
Davidson’s chapter on Rich in The Fading Smile sounds in turns condescending and 
perplexed when discussing the trajectory of her work. Her status as demure and 
compliant ingénue is emphasised at various points throughout, even when discussing 
her attempts to break free from this stifling designation. Whereas he decries the 
‘irritating paternalism’ of Rich’s grand seniors who refer to her as ‘a sort of princess 
in a fairy tale’, the reader cannot help but note his seeming regret that her poetic 
transformation should come at the expense of the ‘pixyish and charming’ public 
persona he enjoyed interacting with. (189, 194). Also telling is the fact that Davidson 
devotes most of this chapter on Rich to the opinions of various other male poets on 
Rich’s career and her attitude towards motherhood and children, thereby reinforcing 
the notion that women’s writing and poetry is only of interest or cultural significance 
when mediated through a lens of patriarchal entitlement.  
Here we see yet another gender-based paradox that constricts and silences the 
female poet. While imitation is expected and even encouraged in young poets - 
endorsed by no less exalted figures of the modern canon than T.S Eliot who 
famously said ‘immature poets imitate; mature poets steal’ – the implications of 
wearing one’s literary influences on one’s sleeves were not equal between the sexes 
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(Eliot 1997, 105). Women poets in the position Rich occupied in the early part of her 
career were seen as outliers to be indulged for their attempts at replication and 
reproduction, rather than the inheritors or producers of any tradition of language. 
Eliot’s whimsical observation about the ubiquity of imitation in poetry is spoken 
from the position of one secure in his place of influence and authority within both the 
symbolic and poetic order. He was free to implicate himself in this wholesale 
recycling of language because his own linguistic and poetic power was enshrined. 
Inherent in his comments is the assumption that his male imitators will speak as 
successors of this power. In contrast, the young poet Adrienne Rich was rewarded 
for being a woman who managed to be just clever enough to sound like a man, while 
still being expected to know her place as a woman. She was speaking in the language 
of the Father imposed upon her first by her own father and later reinforced by poets 
such as Auden and Eliot – an imposition that also sought to control not only the tone, 
but also the content of her poems.  
Eliot is also famous for his pronouncements upon the importance of 
impersonality in art. Poetry, he wrote, in his essay ‘Tradition and the Individual 
Talent’ ‘is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the 
expression of personality’ (Eliot 1997, 48-49). As seen in the discussion on Sexton, 
the implications of confessionalism for female poets of the 1950s differed to those 
for male poets such as Lowell – the most famous of confessional poets - who were 
afforded the kind of cultural and literary significance that enabled them to challenge 
establishment thinking. The endorsement of the work of Lowell and Snodgrass as 
articulating an important disruption to the edicts of Eliot and his cohorts over that of 
Sexton highlights the patriarchal biases of the literary establishment in which Rich 
learnt her craft. Bennett argues that in terms of finding their own speaking position, 
Eliot’s quarantining of the personal from the poetic was more inhibiting for female 
poets than any anxiety of influence might have been, because  
[t]he woman writer’s principal antagonists are not the strong male or female poets 
who may have preceded her within the tradition but the inhibiting voices that live 
within herself. The chief source of her anxiety is not that she will be insufficiently 
distinguished from her literary predecessors but that in fulfilling her destiny as poet, 
she will be forced to hurt or fail those whom she loves – whether they be mother, 
father, husband, lover, friends or children – and thus bring society’s opprobrium 
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upon herself. Her struggles are, in short not literary but part of life. It is to her life, 
therefore, that we must turn to understand the process by which she comes to both 
define and accept herself as woman and poet (Bennett 1986, 10). 
 
Bennett’s comments elucidate the contradictory impulses facing the female poet 
in post-war America in her search for signification. Mired in the personal, because 
she does not signify at a symbolic and structural level in the same way as the male 
poet, the female poet is also burdened by this investment in the personal because 
social expectations prompt her towards effacement by making her relationship to 
others her primary signifying factor. Thus, the woman poet, when looking to the 
personal as a means of establishing her subjectivity and selfhood, and of finding her 
voice, also risks being read only as a reflection of the role she plays in the lives of 
others and of being judged according to the needs and desires of those others. For 
Rich as a young poet the choice before her was stark – she could remain a dutiful 
daughter, or she could find a way to break free of both her father’s and her literary 
masters’ authority, even if that meant embracing the uncertain void which 
motherhood had the potential to cast her into in both a literal and symbolic sense. If, 
as a poet, language was to be Rich’s primary means of signification and construction 
of subjectivity, how was she to claim autonomy if her access to signifiers was 
dictated and restricted by the patriarchy? 
Clearly daughterhood did not afford Rich a speaking position of any personal 
or cultural authority, but rather kept her fixed in submission to both patriarchal and 
paternal authority. I make the distinction here between the institutional and structural 
authority of the patriarchy and the familial and personal authority of her father, 
permeable and blurred as that distinction may have been in the culture in which Rich 
came of age, because Rich herself would come to appreciate the importance of 
recognising the difference between the faceless institutional oppression she faced 
both as a woman and a female poet and the personal, sometimes loving tyranny 
enacted by her father. One could not exist without the other, and both resisted her 
attempts to break free into her own language. For Rich, motherhood occupied an 
uneasy intersection between conformity and rebellion, effacement and assertion. As 
discussed above, in 1950s America, the reverence with which motherhood was 
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regarded created a double bind for women because respect for the institution was 
built upon – depended upon – the sublimation of individuality and subjectivity. 
Nevertheless, Rich, like Sexton and Plath would have to embrace this most visceral 
of female speaking positions in order to access both her voice and agency, even 
though maternity as a cultural construct and motherhood as a daily reality would 
threaten to undermine both. But was motherhood as an aesthetic rather than social 
construct more signifying, or did embracing the maternal complicate her articulation 
of selfhood more than daughterhood?  
 
The Daughter (In Law) Writes Back:  
Subverting Patriarchal Law Through Poetics 
 
 Rich’s poem ‘Snapshots of a Daughter in Law’ can be seen as the switching 
point between daughter and motherhood, between the dutiful adherence to formalism 
and masculinist, paternalistic notions of good poetry and the rebellious modern, 
obscure and pessimistic poetry her father recoiled from. It is one of her most famous 
poems because it is seen as marking what Davidson describes as a ‘continental 
divide in her work’ (Davidson 1994, 194). ‘Snapshots’ is the narrative of a poet 
grappling with the emergence of a startling new voice she herself is unsure how to 
control. It confronts the reader with grievances that have been – one gets the sense – 
long buried under the mask of obedient sweetness she had been forced to inhabit, and 
abandons any sense of submissive forbearance. Again, Davidson’s bemused response 
to this transformation in Rich’s poetic voice is telling, as is his almost palpable 
dismay that he should find Rich’s tone so altered in this poem from ‘the amiable 
woman we saw from the outside’, the ‘woman who was expressed in her ingratiating 
early poems’ (194). Rich eschews deferential language in ‘Snapshots’, she makes no 
attempt to appeal to her audience’s sympathy, but the poem is not wholly unabashed 
or unapologetic in it’s rejection of patriarchal literary paradigms because, as Rich 
herself admitted in her essay ‘When we Dead Reawaken’ she hadn’t yet found the 
courage ‘to use the pronoun “I”’ (Rich 1995, 45). This evasion does not dull the 
power of ‘Snapshots’ and it should also be recognised that writing from a gendered 
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perspective having been indoctrinated into the cult of universality, which as Rich 
was well aware ‘meant, of course, nonfemale’, was a radical and risky act for a poet 
who up until that point had ‘tried very much not to identify’ herself as a female poet’ 
(44).  
 As if to emphasise her reluctance to invoke the personalised pronoun of ‘I’, 
‘Snapshots’ begins with the word ‘You’, which not only serves to deflect attention 
from the speaker, but also resonates as vaguely accusatory, seeming to signal an 
intention to interrogate this person, leaving the reader unsure if subsequent 
qualifying descriptor that the subject was ‘once a belle in Shreveport’ is meant as a 
compliment or a dismissal. The rest of the stanza and the one that follows further 
encourage this ambivalence – the woman being addressed is depicted in terms which 
navigate an ambiguous place between flattery: ‘with henna colored hair, skin like a 
peachbud’, and condescension for her attachment to the overt expressions of 
femininity as seen in the almost contemptuous sketch of this hennaed and burnished 
Southern ‘belle’ (itself a loaded descriptor) who remains stuck in the past clinging to 
memories and ‘dresses copied from that time’ (Rich 2002, 17). There is little 
sympathy evident for what appears to be a slow regression into dementia, described 
in terms that are both blunt and richly symbolic ‘Your mind now, mouldering like 
wedding-cake, / heavy with useless experience […] / crumbling to pieces under the 
knife-edge / of mere fact’. This ambiguity of tone is heightened by the allusion to a 
slowly deteriorating mind as being like a crumbling wedding cake which seems both 
haunting and mocking, leaving the reader uncertain if the last sentence of the second 
stanza, describing the woman as being ‘In the prime of your life’ is an ironic 
utterance, or if it is intended to suggest derision or despair (17).    
Sabine Sielke sees the comparison Rich draws between a ‘woman’s state of 
mind to a moldering wedding cake’ as a re-contextualisation of ‘Eliot’s 
preoccupation with cultural decline, sexual sterility and vegetation rituals’ (Sielke 
1997, 138). In this sense, Rich can be seen as working towards an integration of the 
universal and the personal via the female subject. While this represents a radical 
reimagining of poetics, as Sielke points out, the imagery Rich uses to embody the 
feminine and the maternal in ‘Snapshots’ also emphasises the historical devaluing of 
both modes in aesthetic representation. In this sense, Sielke finds the use of mold as 
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a symbol problematic because of the weight it places on women’s relationship to the 
biological functions of reproduction: ‘the word mold suggests that woman, just like 
nature grows to bloom and flower. Once deflowered and reproducing, she dwindles 
without further development’ (138).  
Sielke’s comments also suggest that for women the reproductive function is 
linked to both sexualisation and objectification – the ‘deflowering’ and performance 
of fertility represents the apotheosis of womanhood and the beginning of her 
physical and symbolic decline, thus highlighting the problematic impact of maternity 
on female subjectivity. Motherhood, the first stanza of ‘Snapshots’ tells us, 
diminishes the female subject, stripping her of most, if not all, nuance of 
identification and representation by trapping her in her in a perpetual state of decline 
in which embodying maternity means forgoing ambition and accepting the fading of 
her aesthetic appeal – one of the few, albeit dubious, means of signification women 
have at their disposal. The mother figure of this opening snapshot, Sielke argues, is 
especially vulnerable in her decline because her reliance upon appearance for 
validation leaves her prone ‘to maintain a shaky identity based on the youth of her 
body, on a beauty figured as nature’ which proves to be ‘no more than an imitation 
of an ideal’ which reveals its inauthenticity through the artifices she is forced to 
adopt as part of her performance of femininity (Sielke 1997, 137). 
Kristeva has argued in much of her writing that motherhood complicates the 
female subject’s positioning within the symbolic order because, despite the weight 
attached to the maternal, there is very little actual significance afforded to the mother 
(as opposed to the maternal) beyond the patriarchal understanding of the mother as 
symbol. The female subject is ever in danger of being subsumed under the sheer bulk 
of the maternal. In this respect it might be said that she both signifies too much and, 
in terms of individual subjectivity, not enough, so that the pervasive nature of her 
symbolic signification obscures her individualisation in some kind of symbolic 
feedback loop over which she has no control or influence. This lack of significance, 
Kristeva argues in her 1975 essay ‘Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini’, 
stems from the ways in which language reinforces patriarchal authority thereby 
regulating and supressing feminine representation and female subjectivity: ‘As long 
as there is language-symbolism-paternity,’ Kristeva writes, ‘there will never be any 
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other way to represent, to objectify, and to explain this unsettling of the symbolic 
spectrum, this nature/culture threshold, this instilling the subjectless biological 
program into the very body of a symbolizing subject, this event called motherhood’ 
(Kristeva 1993, 241-242).  
The disembodied speaker of ‘Snapshots’, positioned as detached observer in 
this first stanza, casts a cool eye over the mother figure and perhaps recognising the 
void into which the mother has been cast - the short circuiting of symbolic 
signification which renders her subjectless –resists identification or association with 
her. Rich goes part way to revealing the speaker’s positioning when she invokes the 
eponymous ‘[n]ervy, glowering’ daughter in the third person, but again, the 
avoidance of the first person pronoun seems incongruent in a poem which has 
primed readers to expect a less detached speaking position, both with its title – 
although the addendum of ‘in law’ to the titular daughter can also be seen as another 
evasion. The reader is left wondering at what appears to be the speaker’s attempts at 
disembodiment in a poem that has signalled its intention to discuss the personal from 
a feminine perspective (Rich 2002, 17). 
The onomatopoeic resonance of a coffee pot banging into the sink jolts the 
reader into the second snapshot in which the speaker’s focus shifts from observation 
to introspection. The sharpness of the image is somewhat in contrast to the mundane 
domesticity – ‘the raked gardens’ and the ‘sloppy sky’ - from which it emerges. In 
this case the chiding angels are not the censorious, stifling overseers Virginia Woolf 
decried, but rather, agitators who urge the daughter/mother towards rebellion. Their 
entreaties to ‘Have no patience’, to ‘Be insatiable’ and, most shockingly, ‘Save 
yourself; others you cannot save’ articulate both a rejection of the nurturing of the 
maternal role, and the threat of effacement it poses. Unlike the fading mother of the 
first snapshot, the figure being described here seems poised between the urge to 
succumb to a domestic torpor where ‘nothing hurts her anymore’ and attempting to 
rouse herself into the antagonistic defiance urged by her angels: ‘Sometimes she’s let 
the tapstream scald her arm, / a match burn to her thumbnail’ (Rich 2002, 17-18).  
Pointing to its use of symbolism and allusion, Sielke makes the case for 
‘Snapshots’ as being influenced by the very modernist poets, such as Eliot, from 
whose shadow Rich was attempting to escape. Reading the poem with this 
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comparison in mind makes the implications of gender seem even more inescapable, 
as even the most innocuous of objects reinforces the disparity of opportunity between 
the sexes. Where coffee spoons become an ironic measure of Prufrock’s life, the 
drudgery of household chores as represented by the teaspoons resentfully wiped by 
the daughter of ‘Snapshots’ signify her unwilling containment within and by the 
domestic. The troubling and confusing presentation of self-harm and pain as being 
affirming suggests that only a shocking or confronting disruption can break the 
numbing spell of domestic entrapment. 
From here, Rich pulls back from the embodiment of any one subject in the 
remaining snapshots, sharpening the referential relationship Sielke observes between 
‘Snapshots’ and the modernists with their preference for the universal over the 
personal. This retreat from a single, integrated subject also calls to mind Kristeva’s 
description of the conflicting impulses of ‘subjectless biological programme’ and 
‘symbolizing subject’, which mire the maternal both biologically and symbolically in 
an echo-chamber of frustrated signification. Sielke writes that from ‘the very 
beginning Rich’s text depicts woman as a performer of prefabricated texts’. In this 
sense we might see Rich’s use of the depersonalising tenets of modernism here as a 
frustrated attempt to deconstruct and thus break free of the language of the Father in 
order to arrive at new linguistic and poetic modes in which maternity and 
subjectivity might be more successfully integrated (Sielke 1997, 137).   
To this end, Sielke points to Luce Irigaray’s model of feminine discourse as 
providing the theoretical grounding on which Rich might situate her challenge to 
paternal language.  Sielke reads in Irigaray’s essay “When Our Lips Speak Together” 
(1977) an attempt to ‘reinvent mother-daughter relations and their particular 
economy of desire and discourse’ (Sielke 1997, 98). Irigaray emphasises the key role 
the maternal plays in positively differentiating and delineating the feminine: 
[a]ccording to Irigaray, the language of sameness, which originates in the 
absence of the maternal and the separation between subject and object, fails to 
account for an affiliation grounded in indifference alike. For her the recovery 
of this affiliation consequently entails the deconstruction of “their language.” 
The strategy Irigaray proposes in order to escape male categories is to “find 
our body’s language,” which in practice means to “invent a language” (This 
Sex 214). The discourse suited to delineate the dyadic relation of mother and 
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daughter she suggests, should be fluid, multidimensional, abundant, 
expanding, unlimited (98).   
Sielke contrasts Irigaray’s somewhat utopian take on gender embodiment in 
discourse with Rich’s more pessimistic view of motherhood as being limiting to 
‘cultural practices and self-realization’ (99). While I don’t disagree with Sielke’s 
assessment, I would argue her comparison does not acknowledge the differing social 
and cultural conditions informing Rich and Irigaray’s views. As discussed 
previously, Rich was writing in a time in which women were socialised to see the 
fixed, immovable reality of their gender as being an almost impenetrable barrier to 
the kind of fluidity of language and subjectivity Irigaray envisages.  
 
The Embodied Language Of The Same 
 
 The constricting influence of gender is the central concern of ‘Snapshots’. 
However, Rich does not enunciate here a specific awareness of the performative 
aspects of gender that Butler would later do, but rather, presents the constraints of the 
female condition as an inescapable reality thrust upon the subjects observed by the 
speaker. Gender is not inhabited comfortably and there is a sense of the speaker 
grappling with the shame that is attendant upon female subjectivity. This awareness 
overwhelms the psyche – the ‘thinking woman sleeps with monsters’ - with a painful 
sense of inevitability that is confirmed when ‘the beak that grips her she becomes’. 
Again, nature, when correlated with the feminine is made shameful: ‘the mildewed 
orange flowers, / the female pills, the terrible breasts / of Boadicea beneath flat foxes 
heads and orchids’ (Rich 2002, 18) The speaker’s repeated correlating of decay with 
the female body suggests an amplified association between femininity and the 
nebulous concept of nature, underlining the commodification and dehumanising of 
the female body alluded to in the first snapshot.  
Indeed, it can be argued that the poem positions nature as shorthand for 
‘woman’, inviting the reader to see the ‘still commodious / steamer trunk of tempora 
and mores’ as a specifically female symbol. Rather than celebrating fertility and 
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fecundity as a potentially actualising subjective process, the female body is situated 
as a receptacle (and this has obvious connotations for the maternal) weighed down 
by the ‘tempora and mores’ of the symbolic order and made repugnant by her 
physicality and what are conceived (by speaker and/or poet) as the ravages of the 
aging process. Thus, the female subject is, as Kristeva argues, ever in danger of 
disappearing into the murky uncertainty of the nature/culture threshold, of being 
subsumed by the exaltation of the maternal which controls signification. In 
‘Snapshots’ this acclamation of the maternal as the necessary condition of femininity 
that Kristeva interrogates is further complicated by the corresponding, yet 
contradictory revulsion with which the maternal body is regarded by the speaker: 
‘the terrible breasts’ (Rich 2002, 18). In this uncertain space, the female subjects 
represented in ‘Snapshots’ struggle to claim either physical or symbolic autonomy in 
the face of the demands – which are both conflicting and collusive - placed upon 
them by nature and culture, but it is through this struggle that the poet/speaker strives 
to forge a new understanding and representation of subjectivity. 
Kristeva further explored the tension between the physical and symbolic 
manifestations of maternity in ‘Stabat Mater’. Like Rich, Kristeva highlights the 
inescapable relationship between the maternal and feminine signification saying ‘[i]f 
it is not possible to say of a woman what she is (without running the risk of 
abolishing her difference), would it perhaps be different concerning the mother, since 
that is the only function of the ‘other sex’ to which we can definitely attribute 
existence’ (Kristeva in Moi (ed.) 1986, 161). ‘And yet,’ Kristeva continues ‘there 
too, we are caught in a paradox’ whereby the ‘consecrated (religious or secular) 
representation of femininity is absorbed by motherhood’ (161). By consecrated 
Kristeva is suggesting idealisation, so we again come up against the buttressing of 
motherhood as the ideal in the economy of female experience. This particular version 
of female experience is mediated through a cultural consciousness that is heavily 
invested in confining the maternal within western mythologies which are afforded 
greater cultural resonance by the ideologies of religion.  
This jamming of signification, Kristeva argues, is codified and supported in 
western consciousness by Christianity broadly, and the cult of the Virgin 
specifically, representing as she does, ‘the most refined symbolic construct’ in which 
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femininity is ‘focused on Maternality’ (Kristeva in Moi (ed.) 1986, 161). This 
psychic narrative, Kristeva contends, does not stand up to questioning or scrutiny, 
but rather, reveals itself to be ‘the fantasy that is nurtured by the adult, man or 
woman, of a lost territory’ involving ‘less an idealized archaic mother than the 
idealization of the relationship that binds us to her, one that cannot be localized’ 
(161). Further, this idealization and the parallel association with the cult of the 
Virgin entrenches the anxiety surrounding the physical manifestations of the 
maternal and feminine sexuality. The female subject is reduced to conduit or 
facilitator of relationships – she is sacrificed for the humanization of Christianity via 
the universalising of the ‘cult of the mother’. Her deification comes at the expense of 
not just her subjectivity, but also her autonomous sexuality and her access to, and 
experience of, love.  Love for her child is the only emotional exchange over which 
the woman is permitted some agency, because, ‘contrasted with the love that binds a 
mother to her son, all other ‘human relationships’ burst like blatant shams’ (172). 
 Therefore, for Rich in the 1960s, and Kristeva in the 70s, mothering is the 
one human activity wholly sanctioned for the female subject. The female body 
becomes the ‘cage of cages’ of Rich’s ‘Snapshots’, in which maternal love - the 
‘fertilisante douleur’ (enriching pain) is the only proper feeling or ‘natural action’ 
through which women may be ‘edged more keen’ (Rich 2002, 19). Situating Rich’s 
work in the Christian symbolic framework of Kristeva’s essay is perhaps awkward 
considering Rich’s attempts to recover the Jewish side of her ancestry her father 
sought to suppress, which she details in her 1982 essay ‘Split at the Root:  An Essay 
on Jewish Identity’. Although Rich writes of feeling conflicted about the forced 
disavowal of her Jewish identity, she also acknowledges that the sociocultural world 
of her childhood and early adulthood was founded upon ‘white social christianity, 
rather than any particular christian sect’, and further that the ‘norm was chrisitan’ 
(Rich 1986, 106). So while Jewishness represented another ‘split consciousness’, a 
‘forbidden current’ Rich positions as running counter to the ‘social christianity’ of 
her childhood, it is also clear that her socialisation as a woman and a mother was 
grounded largely in the broader Christian symbolic economy (106,108).  
 Kristeva argues that the symbolising of the feminine through the maternal 
demands the effacement of the female body: 
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We are entitled only to the ear of the virginal body, the tears and the breast. With the 
female sexual organ changed into an innocent shell, holder of sound, there arises a 
possible tendency to eroticise hearing, voice or even understanding. […] A woman 
will only have the choice to live her life either hyper-abstractly (‘immediately 
universal’, Hegel said) in order thus to earn divine grace and homologation with 
symbolic order; or merely different, other, fallen (‘immediately particular’, Hegel 
said). But she will not be able to accede to the complexity of being divided, of 
heterogeneity, of the catastrophic-fold-of ‘being’ (‘never singular’, Hegel said) 
(Kristeva in Moi (ed.) 1986, 172-173). 
While Rich may not make an explicit association between the maternal and the 
symbolic construct of the Virgin in ‘Snapshots’, she does explore a similar set of 
conundrums to those outlined above by Kristeva. Through the fragmented series of 
‘snapshots’, the narrative of feminine experience Rich unfurls over the course of the 
poem pivots and ricochets between the three metaphoric dead ends laid out by Hegel 
– ‘immediately universal’ via the maternal, ‘immediately particular’ in her rejection 
of maternity, and, most agonisingly, ‘never singular’ (173). The speaker seems often 
estranged from or alarmed by the female body. Alongside repeated allusions to decay 
and decline, is the suggestion that the corporal and literalised performances of 
femininity – such as the shaving of leg hair - are disfiguring and alienating as well as 
disingenuous. Here the attempt to define the physical limits of subjectivity via an 
engagement with culturally sanctioned rituals of feminine beautification renders the 
female subject both dehumanised and fantastical - ‘like a petrified mammoth-tusk’ 
(Rich 2002, 18). 
Disengaged from her physical being, the speaker of ‘Snapshots’ searches for 
meaning and attempts to demarcate the borders of her subjectivity through language 
– an endeavour that is frustrated by her uncertain positioning within the phallocentric 
structures of the symbolic order. The tone of the poem is most frustrated and bitter 
when invoking the devaluing of the feminine voice:  
 Our blight has been our sinecure:       
 mere talent was enough for us -        
 glitter in fragments and rough drafts. 
 Sigh no more ladies.        
     Time is male       
 and in his cups drinks to the fair.       
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 Bemused by gallantry, we hear        
 our mediocrities over-praised,        
 indolence read as abnegation,       
 slattern thought styled intuition,       
 every lapse forgiven, our crime        
 only to cast too bold a shadow       
 or smash the mold straight off.        
 For that, solitary confinement,       
 tear gas, attrition shelling.        
 Few applicants for that honor (Rich 2002, 20). 
Rich voices the ‘thinking woman’s’ frustration at her entrapment in, and by, the 
symbolic here. Rather than establishing her own borders through language, or more 
specifically through her linguistic challenges to the abundant representations of 
female subjectivity as being univocal and homogenous, the speaker finds herself 
defined by an overweening masculinist consciousness in which even time ‘is male’, 
and where all manner of degrading performances of gender and submission are 
‘over-praised’. Condescension is disguised as gallantry and the individuation of the 
female subject – ‘to cast too bold a shadow / or smash the mold straight off’ - is 
embargoed (20). In short, Rich articulates woman’s exclusion from what Kristeva 
calls ‘the complexity of being’ (Kristeva in Moi (ed.) 1986, 173).  
This marginalisation is specifically related to the maternal, as is made evident 
in the following: 
 “You all die at fifteen,” said Diderot,      
 and turn part legend, part convention (Rich 2002, 20). 
Diderot’s contemptuous observation has been read as meaning that the female 
subject relinquishes her individuality, and therefore significance, when she passes 
into adolescence, attains fertility and assumes her final (non) place in the symbolic 
order – namely as mother and appendage to the man. One imagines Diderot’s words 
must have represented a bitter irony to Rich given that marriage and motherhood had 
been her only means of escaping her father’s oppressive influence. This escape, as 
she was to discover, merely exchanged one cage for another and bound her more 
tightly to a system of patriarchal symbolic hegemony in which the female subject 
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was little more than a conduit for the subjectivity of others via the maternal function, 
and motherhood was the only feminine experience that signified.  
The speaker’s addendum to Diderot’s dismissal of female subjectivity, that 
the becoming female subject turns ‘part legend, part convention’ (Rich 2002, 20) as 
she passes into adulthood, is suggestive of Kristeva’s nature/culture threshold. The 
term ‘legend’ may imply a privileging of the subject’s status, but the term 
‘convention’, although not diametrically opposed, tempers this privileging. This 
reminds the reader of the female subject’s enforced entanglement in a symbolic 
economy in which her status as mother elevates her (as the legend). It also reduces 
her to what Kristeva refers to as ‘the receptacle of a signifying disposition’ 
(convention) denied subjectivity or autonomy beyond Western society’s 
preoccupation with maternity (Kristeva in Moi (ed.) 1986, 174).  
Kristeva contends in ‘Stabat Mater’ that this preoccupation with the symbols 
of virtuous motherhood as defined by the cult of the Virgin also acts as a banishment, 
as subject, from the linguistic modes – which is to say the tempora and mores - of 
the symbolic order. Pointing to breast milk and tears as ‘the privileged signs of the 
Mater Dolorosa’, Kristeva argues that these exaggerated symbols of maternity 
function as the denial, or ‘slipping away’, of female eroticism (and by extension 
female sovereignty) and are ‘metaphors of non-speech, of a ‘semiotics’ that linguistic 
communication does not account for’ (Kristeva in Moi (ed.) 1986, 174). Therefore, 
the female subject is alienated from both her body and language, or in Kristeva’s 
words, from nature and culture. The exile from language is particularly significant 
given that the ‘metaphors of non-speech’ Kristeva points to as being integral to 
female subjectivity are not accorded any significance within the symbolic order in 
which all interaction is primarily ordered around language, which privileges the male 
subject.   
As such, ‘Snapshots’, despite the discomfort with the physical manifestations 
of femininity it conveys at various points, can perhaps be seen as advocating for a 
linguistic integration of body and language, albeit from within the masculine 
parameters of the literary tradition, for the maternal subject. Such a project, while not 
as radical as Kristeva’s championing of a specifically feminine mode of 
communication (and in this Kristeva has been accused by some critics of 
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essentialising the feminine), nonetheless resists, or at least begins to resist, the 
silencing of the female voice.  
Rich herself, would also go on to explore more radical articulations of 
feminine and maternal subjectivity in both her discursive and poetic works as her 
career progressed and her speaking position evolved to embrace the political and 
cultural positioning of second wave feminism. It is also useful to pause here to 
consider from our current vantage what shifts in political and social discourses 
surrounding gender have occurred since Rich and Kristeva were writing. Both 
women fall back upon a universalising (to varying degrees) of masculine and 
feminine modes of experience in order to elucidate their arguments against the 
patriarchal control and suppression of female subjectivity. This suppression also has 
the effect of extinguishing the heterogeneity of male subjectivity, lumping all men 
under the collective banner of the patriarchy.  
Rich’s refusal of her effacement within the symbolic order is seen in her 
epigrammatic deployment of Mary Wollstonecraft’s Thoughts on the Education of 
Daughters (1787) to suggest both the material and metaphysical urgency of self-
determination –‘some stay’ - for the female subject: 
“To have in this uncertain world some stay     
 which cannot be undermined, is        
 of the utmost consequence” (Rich 2002, 19). 
Part conduct book – a precursor to modern self-help books in which advice on 
morality, etiquette and child rearing was imparted - and part feminist text, Thoughts 
on the Education of Daughters embodies many of the contradictions Rich grapples 
with throughout ‘Snapshots’. On the one hand, as a discursive text by a woman about 
women, it represents the sort of robust rejection of the policing and silencing of 
feminine experience the speaker of ‘Snapshots’ is trying to articulate.  
On the other, its endorsement of domesticity and maternity as the only 
spheres of influence available to women would appear to later readers to do little to 
help ‘smash the mold’ Rich rails against (Rich 2012, 20).  Much like ‘Snapshots’ can 
be seen as a precursor to Rich’s more radical feminist discursive writings, Thoughts 
on the Education of Daughters anticipates Wollstonecraft’s more polemical text A 
  124 
Vindication on the Rights of Women (subtitled With Strictures on Political and Moral 
Subjects) which she published in 1792. Both Rich and Wollstonecraft’s texts argue, 
albeit from perspectives over two hundred years apart, for the female subject’s right 
to autonomy and significance within the masculinist and supposedly rationalist 
frameworks of social expression. By invoking Wollstonecraft’s example in 
‘Snapshots’ Rich underscores her own attempts to transition from her positioning as 
daughter in thrall to her paternal mentors to fully realised, self actualising 
subject/speaker.  
The lines which follow Wollstonecraft’s words, ‘thus wrote / a woman, partly 
brave and partly good, / who fought with what she partly understood’ (Rich 2002, 
19) can be read as arguing for the symbolic complexity of the female subject.  And 
also for the emerging, processual nature of female subjectivity which Kristeva 
recognises with her ‘subject in process’ designation. The words ‘partly brave and 
partly good’ might seem a small equivocation, but they also offer a glimpse of the 
‘complexity of being divided, of heterogeneity,’ and ‘the catastrophic-fold-of 
‘being’’ Kristeva speaks of (Kristeva in Moi (ed.) 1986, 173). The speaker insists 
upon the multifariousness of the female subject – in this case Mary Wollstonecraft - 
by refusing to confine or define her to one state of being.  In this context, using 
‘partly’ as a qualifier enlarges rather than diminishes the female subject, rescuing her 
from ossification as maternal effigy or passive receptacle. This small nod to 
ambivalence has the potential to restore control over biological and cultural 
signification to the female subject, to give her dominion over her tears so that her 
emotions might be considered evidence of her humanity rather than ‘privileged 
signs’ of her maternity (174).  
Of course, in the context of the maternal, as Kristeva has argued, the 
lingering devotion to the Marian cult in which the mother is rendered an abstract, 
idealised symbol, does not allow or account for any nuance of symbolism or 
signification. It is not enough for a mother to be ‘partly good’ (Rich 2002, 19). Rich 
also recognises that those women who reject the ‘divine grace’ of consecrated 
maternity, that facilitator of ‘homologation with symbolic order’, risk denunciation 
as ‘other’ (Kristeva in Moi (ed.) 1986, 173). It is under the weight of such 
judgements that the symbolic order maintains the ascendency of phallocentric 
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language and thought. Or, as the speaker of ‘Snapshots’ observes of Wollstonecraft, 
‘Few men about her would or could do more, / hence she was labeled, harpy, shrew 
and whore’ (Rich 2002, 19). The sing-song rhyme of this couplet suggests an 
offhandedness, or perhaps an air of resignation, which belies the frustration 
underpinning the speaker’s survey of insults levelled at women who resist their 
symbolic positioning. The casual cruelty with which men deploy these slights is a 
constant refrain throughout ‘Snapshots’, again emphasising the narrow space 
afforded to the female subject. At best, women are petted as precocious children, 
praised for their ‘martyred ambition’ (20). At worst, those who refuse to sublimate 
their ambition beneath the maternal are cast out as whores. The bluntness of Rich’s 
wording here reminds us that the power afforded to men over the female subject 
within this economy is entrenched and unchecked and relies on the internalised 
performances of gender Butler identified.  
 
Appropriating Or Adapting The Master Discourse? 
 
In her introduction ‘Stabat Mater’ reprinted in The Kristeva Reader (1986), 
editor Toril Moi notes that ‘Kristeva herself has not really followed up’ on what she 
saw as ‘an urgent need for a ‘post-virginal’ discourse on maternity, one which 
ultimately would provide men and women with a new ethics: a ‘herethics’ 
encompassing both reproduction and death’ (Moi (ed.) in Kristeva in Moi (ed.) 
1986). As will be explored in the next chapter, this was also a project to which Rich 
devoted much attention and energy in the 1970s and 80s. The tenth and final 
snapshot of this poem, a seminal marker within Rich’s feminist trajectory, anticipates 
both Kristeva’s call for a new discourse on maternity and Butler’s theorising of the 
dismantlement of gender norms: 
            Well,     
 she’s long about her coming, who must be      
 more merciless to herself than history.      
 Her mind full to the wind, I see her plunge      
 breasted and glancing through the currents,      
 taking the light upon her        
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 at least as beautiful as any boy       
 or helicopter,         
      poised, still coming,       
 her fine blades making the air wince 
but her cargo         
 no promise then:         
 delivered         
 palpable          
 ours (Rich 2002, 21). 
These final stanzas discard all hesitancy or ambivalence and move beyond the 
frustration of the preceding snapshots towards the post-virginal discourse Kristeva 
would later advocate for. The detached impersonal allusions of her modernist 
mentors are cast off as Rich turns a sharpened poetic focus upon the realisation of a 
female subjectivity that attempts to breach the restricting confines of maternal 
symbolism.  
The abandonment of allusion in the final stanza is significant, I believe, 
because it signifies the poet’s intention to move, (or to attempt to move) past the 
hesitant liminality that characterised the previous snapshots, towards a more assured 
articulation of the female subject. Notably, this emerging new female subject is still 
situated in comparison, albeit playfully, to her faceless male counterpart. The 
archness of tone here leaves the reader wondering if speaker is endorsing Irigaray’s 
celebration of the specificity of the feminine, or lamenting its eventual sacrifice to 
the cause of equality; but this ambiguity serves only to highlight the confidence with 
which the speaker is now articulating her vision of female experience. The reader 
may be left in doubt as to the exact implications of her words, but not to their 
constitutive power.  
In contrast, Sielke characterises ‘Snapshots’ as being dependant ‘upon 
allusion and authorities’, arguing that it ‘rehearses monumental voices of cultural 
heritage, and reinforces male principles, less in person than in perspective (Sielke 
1997, 136). Further, Sielke expresses a discomfort with what she sees as privileging 
of the male voice via the poem’s use of quotations, which she argues, reinforce the 
very silencing of feminine experience the text seeks to repudiate. In ‘[o]rchestrating 
polyvocal echoes of common misconceptions of femininity,’ Sielke writes, ‘the 
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poem exposes, but also reproduces, the very positions it sets out to undo, thus 
inscribing the operation of mimicry as woman’s very speaking position’ (136-37). 
While Sielke’s comments recognise the weight of the ‘cultural heritage’ Rich 
struggles with in ‘Snapshots’, her assertion that the poem ‘reinforces male principles’ 
and re-enacts rather than refutes the silencing of women overlooks Rich’s repeated 
attempts throughout the fragmented narrative of ‘Snapshots’ to destabilise said ‘male 
principles’. Or, at the very least to expose their limitations through mockery, while 
necessarily speaking from within the symbolic order, albeit from the more fluid and 
subversive structures of poetic language.  
When considering the performance of gender and the power play of sexual 
politics, mockery, it can be argued, represents a more decisive undermining of the 
authority of male utterances than the failed irony Sielke attributes to ‘Snapshots’ 
(136). If Rich does draw on mimicry as a means of giving voice to her female 
subjects in ‘Snapshots’ this can be seen as highlighting and exposing rather than 
reinforcing the silencing of the feminine, because in doing so Rich exposes the lack 
of access to autonomy of both language and signification the female subject has been 
afforded. This exposition is necessarily complicated by the fact that Rich must do so 
from within the confines, however radical her speaking voice might be, of the 
symbolic. As Sielke points out, ‘Snapshots’ does emphasise the status of women as 
objects defined and described by men, but focussing on this aspect of the poem is to 
overlook the final stanza which reverses this process by having speaker be the one 
doing the describing of the female subject in terms which reject the devaluing and 
silencing of female experience.    
  
The speaker depicts this new female subject in terms that suggest there is 
something mythical about this woman who is ‘long about her coming’, infusing the 
stanza with a sense of dramatic anticipation. However, the rest of the opening 
sentence ‘who must be / more merciless to herself than history’ pulls the reader back 
from this initial vision of the long awaited fully formed subject towards which the 
trajectory of the poem has been working, to remind us that cultural censure, like the 
performance of gender, can also be internalised. The disruptive structuring of that 
stanza again unsettles the reader with its ambiguity, leaving us uncertain if the 
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speaker is chafing against the censorious gaze of history, or if she declaring her 
intention to submit only to her own judgment.   
By breaking the flow of this sentence so it spills over three lines, Rich adopts 
the cadence of oration and commands our attention as though for an announcement. 
The line break between ‘who must be’ and ‘more merciless’ stresses the imperative 
‘must be’ for the reader by delaying the revelation of what ‘must be’ done. This has 
the effect of heightening our awareness of the urgency surrounding this long awaited 
woman the speaker is describing. Rich presents this ‘coming’ as a birth, the 
triumphant culmination of the wearisome struggle of the preceding nine snapshots in 
which the speaker has chipped away at the patriarchal edifices which silence and 
restrict the female subject (Rich 2002, 21).  
Rich walks a fine poetic line in this stanza as her laudatory rhetoric reminds 
us of the ways in which the male subject is typically monumentalised and 
mythologised in literary and popular culture. Sielke sees such acts of mimicry as 
being reductive rather than fortifying for female subjectivity, arguing that they 
highlight rather than refute woman’s diminished subjectivity: 
Intending to counter misconceptions of femininity, she eventually echoes and 
reinforces the very voices she set out to oppose. Mimicry, parody, and travesty of 
male discourse thus stage, perform, and implicitly reproach women’s exclusion 
from the symbolic order, without providing for new (speaking) positions (Sielke 
1997, 96). 
  Sielke’s reading seems rather fatalistic here, in that she reads only a reinforcement 
of the ways in which male discourse oppresses those outside it, rather than seeing 
Rich’s appropriation of it as a subversive act which opens up space for new speaking 
positions for the female subject. Perhaps Sielke’s reading suggests more about her 
own internalised views of gender – that any appropriation of the male voice must 
necessarily endorse all of its oppressive and dictatorial posturing rather than 
disrupting it by repurposing it as an endorsement of the very subject positions it has 
typically been used to marginalise. 
In contrast, I would argue that transformation of the tenor and tone of the 
poem emphasises the boldness with which the speaker seizes upon her newly formed 
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vision of female subjectivity. Where the opening snapshot began on an accusatory 
note which served to distance the speaker from any identification with the women 
portrayed, in the closing snapshot this distance has vanished, replaced by an almost 
exultant sense of connection with this long awaited, unfettered female subject who 
represents the climax of the speaker’s struggle for self-articulation. The language 
used here is euphoric and the female body is no longer a source of anxiety or disgust. 
Her physicality restored to her, the subject is confident ‘breasted and glancing’, 
‘taking the light upon her’ (Rich 2002, 21).  
Rich retains a wry sense of humour when she declares her subject to be ‘at 
least as beautiful as any boy / or helicopter’ (Rich 2002, 21), deftly using irony to 
again ridicule the degrading and dehumanising ways in which women have been 
regarded and described by figures of paternal authority. While the speaker’s 
insistence upon invoking comparisons against which this new woman is measuring 
herself suggests an ambivalence and self-consciousness in her embodiment as female 
subject, this embracing of ambiguity and ambivalence serves to emphasise rather 
than diminish the multiplicity of her subjectivity. Where Sielke argued that the effect 
of the irony employed in previous snapshots was diminished by what she saw as the 
other female subjects’ ‘surrender to the adapted discourse’ (Sielke 1997, 136) of the 
patriarchy, here the subject is undiminished ‘poised, still coming’. Rather than being 
subsumed under the weight of the nature/culture threshold, she quite literally 
commands and repels the elements ‘her fine blades making the air wince’ as the 
reader is pulled forward with her ‘through the currents’ towards a hard won sense of 
self-determination (Rich 2002, 21).  
 
The final stanza with its reference to ‘cargo’ that is ‘delivered’ formulates a 
bolder vision of the maternal that pushes back against the confining cultural 
symbolism Kristeva identified in ‘Stabat Mater’. The use of such blunt terminology 
to suggest the maternal function might seem jarring (and can be read as a deliberate 
disruption to the sentimentality attached to maternity), but these words can also be 
read as an attempt to situate the maternal in the ‘post-virginal’ discourse Kristeva 
calls for. When considering the confrontation of the biological and the symbolic in 
the realm of the maternal, does the quarantining of maternity to a biological function 
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have the potential to empower rather than diminish female symbolizing subject? 
Rather than threatening female subjectivity, does emphasising the biological function 
remove the weight of cultural expectation from motherhood freeing the female 
subject to embrace more complex modes of being and to cast a bolder signifying 
shadow? Or in other words, by integrating the maternal as a part rather than the sum 
of her ‘promise’, has Rich found a way to render her female subject more palpable?
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DISCURSIVE FRAMWORKS OF THE MATERNAL 
 
 
The thesis began in the last chapter to examine Rich’s poetry from around 
the year 1963, ‘poised, still coming,’ much like the emerging subject of ‘Snapshots 
of a Daughter-in-Law’, as she attempted to realise a speaking position and a 
subjectivity that could integrate both maternity and multiplicity. While the sense of 
hope and articulation of agency is palpable in the closing stanza of ‘Snapshots’, Rich 
would later speak of the dampening impact the critical backlash against the poem 
had on her writerly vision. ‘I was told in print,’ she writes in her essay ‘Blood, Bread 
and Poetry’ (1984), ‘that this work was “bitter,” “personal”. And - perhaps more 
egregiously – Rich notes that a critic who she does not name, informed her that she 
had ‘sacrificed the sweetly flowing measures of my earlier books for a ragged line 
and a coarsened voice’ (Rich1986, 180).  
 
It is striking how the language of these denouncements is coded to both 
belittle Rich (‘bitter’, ‘coarsened’) and dismiss her work.  “Personal” is used here as 
a pejorative descriptor, suggesting that Rich has transgressed the conventions of both 
poetic and social discourse. Again, we get a sense of the confining impact of gender 
for women poets in 1960s America. Rich’s critics accuse her of inhabiting a 
speaking position that refuses impersonal detachment; while unspoken, but very 
much implied in this censure is the parallel accusation that Rich has erred by daring 
to write as a woman. Rich’s transgressions here are twofold. Not only does she 
inhabit a recognisably female speaking position, the speaker of her poem also 
refuses to conform to the prescriptions of acceptable female behaviour, instead 
insisting upon an articulation of heterogeneous female subjectivity via her 
fragmented, non-linear polyvocal poetic narrative. The charge of bitterness is 
particularly damning given the poem’s ambivalent engagement with motherhood 
and its positioning of the maternal role as threatening rather than affirming feminine 
identity. 
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If the reported criticisms can be taken as reflective of the general response to 
‘Snapshots’, it would appear that her male readers were really objecting to the 
poem’s assertion of the female subject’s right to self-articulation. One imagines 
Rich’s situating of the feminine and the maternal as a site of fragmented multiplicity 
rather than a unified symbolic construct had troubling social and cultural 
implications for the patriarchal establishment figures of 1960s America. Rather than 
being the voiceless objects of a paternal gaze in which the female subject was 
defined in relation to the domestic and the maternal, the disparate women of 
‘Snapshots’ – even though most remain in thrall to paternal law – collectively resist 
and disrupt deeply embedded cultural assumptions surrounding femininity. Most 
particularly, the assumption that a single, unifying symbolic, cultural and social 
narrative dictated by the patriarchy, can define the feminine.  
 
Rich was accused of being too personal in a poem in which she very 
deliberately avoided all use of the pronoun ‘I’ and which used its fragmented 
structure to suggest a spectrum of female experience. The assumption here seems to 
be that all female experience – and by extension female subjectivity - can be seen as 
homogenous, and therefore that the women Rich describes in ‘Snapshots’ must be 
reflective of her own thoughts, feelings and experiences, rather than vividly drawn 
characters who function (among other things) as a historical commentary on female 
experience. While confessional poetry had gained mainstream critical acceptance by 
the time ‘Snapshots’ appeared, categorising ‘Snapshots’ as a confessional poem by 
labelling it as feminine and personal seems a calculated attempt to reduce its impact 
and deny its artistry and political or cultural impetus.   
 
Echoing Paula Bennett’s observations on the prevailing critical postulations 
regarding the relationship between the feminine and the personal in the 1960s and 
beyond, Helen Farish argues in her 2011 essay “Faking it up with the Truth: The 
complexities of the Apparently Autobiographical ‘I’” that the work of women poets 
is often considered tainted by its association to the personal. Farish writes: 
 
women poets […] are much more likely to be dismissed as ‘merely personal’ 
or ‘purely personal’; certainly, these expressions are used to limit and dismiss 
their work. The personal has always been linked with the feminine term and 
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thereby devalued. Within the terms of the impersonal/personal opposition, this 
association of the feminine with the personal guarantees the apparent 
neutrality of its (male) opposite. Feminists long ago critiqued the historical 
containment of the feminine within the particular and the refusal to grant the 
female subject access to the universal (Farish in Gill & Waters (ed.) 2011, 
139-140). 
 
Farish’s comments highlight the continuing uneasy positioning of the female poet 
within the ‘personal/impersonal opposition’ (139). While she points to the 
‘universal’ as being a source of poetic authority not made available to women, with 
regards to the relationship between feminine subjectivity and the maternal, 
universality can function as a limiting rather than empowering designation.  
 
In the realm of the maternal, women have historically had their universality 
defined for them at the symbolic, cultural and discursive level by the same 
patriarchal controlling consciousness Farish refers to as embodying aesthetic 
neutrality. As discussed in the previous chapter, being made universal through the 
cultural construct of maternity has stripped the female subject of her status as 
autonomous, self-actualising and articulating subject, instead transforming her into a 
powerful symbol – upon which much is projected – but ultimately impotent subject. 
Farish appears here to be setting great store in the idea of universality as embodying 
cultural authority, as opposed to the particular which she dismisses (or rather claims 
feminism rejects) as pejorative and reductive. Surely the material point is that both 
modes are available to the male speaker?   
 
 We might also ask why Farish feels neutrality is still considered a superior or 
more authoritative poetic choice than the personal or the partial – what cultural code 
does invoking the first person in poetry as a female speaking subject transgress? 
Certainly, use of the autobiographical ‘I’ is not without complications that have the 
potential to distract readers from other textual strategies at play within these poems. 
Adopting the first person voice ‘remains hazardous’ for the female poet ‘because it 
risks being read as linguistically less interesting, technically less challenging (Farish 
in Gill & Waters (ed.) 2011, 139-140). Male poets, on the other hand, are assumed 
‘to be speaking for a collective humanity’ (140) while still having their poems read 
as both technically and artistically sophisticated. Farish’s comments suggest it is the 
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historical devaluing of both the female poet and female experience in the literary 
sphere that makes the use of the first person so ‘hazardous’ for women. The cultural 
authority afforded to the male poet invests their explorations of the personal with 
gravitas and complexity enabling him to inhabit both universal and specific speaking 
positions. Such is the power of the masculine in the white, Western, poetic economy 
where it is assumed the male poet/speaker is in control of his speaking position and 
subjectivity while the female subject is routinely denied any autonomy of selfhood 
through the devaluing of her use of the autobiographical ‘I’. Thus, the male poet 
maintains his subjective sovereignty as the describer - and inscriber - of culture and 
of his own subjectivity, while the female remains the described, ensuring her status 
as passive object/other. 
  
 Of course, such readings of the autobiographical ‘I’ – either reductive or 
laudatory – depend upon an acceptance of what Farish calls the ‘fantasy of the 
coherent self’. Such a reading has remained, according to Farish, remarkably 
persistent ‘despite postmodernism’s fragmented subject’ (Farish in Gill & Waters 
(ed.) 2011, 139), perhaps pointing to a lingering romanticism that prompts us as 
readers to cling to the illusion – long challenged by postmodernism and post 
structuralism - that the autobiographical ‘I’ ‘represents the poet’ who can be known 
through what is revealed in their poems (139). The idea of a revealing poetic self has 
proven a seductive lure for readers, as Rose Lucas notes when she describes the 
confessional poem as ‘a textual locus which illuminates the complex desires of both 
speaker and reader’ (Lucas in Gill & Waters (ed.) 2011, 43). This textual exchange 
of desires Lucas describes has troubling implications when considering how the 
maternal as a collective symbolic construct functions to obscure female subjectivity 
and individuation.  
 
If we are to read poems that inhabit the first person speaking position as 
representing a locus of desire for both reader and writer, we must consider the 
potential for conflict between the desire of the reader and the desire of the speaker. 
Lucas’s description of confessional poetry suggests that it engenders a heightened 
reader investment and engagement; but this amplified reader engagement does not 
necessarily privilege the textual positioning of the woman poet who is still subject to 
the weight of cultural expectations regarding the feminine and the maternal. The 
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potential for conflict between the desire of the reader and the desire embodied by the 
speaker becomes more urgent in poems which attempt to construct more 
multidimensional representations of both the maternal and female subjectivity 
because of the ingrained cultural resistance to such readings.  
 
While Rich did not identify as a confessional poet, her use of a first person 
speaking position in some of her key poems can be read as moving towards a self-
articulated vision of female experience that embraced and highlighted multiplicity. 
The association of Rich’s work with confessionalism also enmeshes and implicates 
it in the cultural and social baggage attached to the first person pronoun. To speak as 
one’s self may seem the ultimate act of self-articulation, but this is to ignore the 
uncomfortable implications Lucas’s comments about the reading experience of first 
person poetry suggest for the female poet. On the one hand, the first person speaking 
position offers all the possibilities of exploring and representing selfhood. For those 
whose voices have typically been marginalised or silenced within dominant cultural 
paradigms, it can be seen as a radical speaking position. On the other hand, to read 
such textual performances as an exchange of desire can engender the very repression 
such poems seek to disrupt if the reader brings their own biases – which can also 
function as desires - to their reading of the text, expecting to have them confirmed or 
assuaged. The initial dismissal of ‘Snapshots’ as personal and bitter is case in point. 
Critics scorned the poem for what it appeared to be doing (articulating a personal 
point of view) and how it went about it (from a radical and resistive female 
perspective).  
 
For Rich, a poet who came to see her writing as a medium for 
communicating social and political resistance, the idea of poetry being an exchange 
of desires between reader and writer further complicates her positioning as a poet 
and cultural commentator. If the ‘locus of desires’ Lucas refers to can be seen as the 
manifestation of the psychic obfuscation created by the lingering fantasy of the 
integrated self speaking from the poem, the resulting confrontation of desires 
flowing between speaker and reader has the potential to become one of clashing 
resistances. The speaker/poet seeking to disrupt entrenched social edifices is ever in 
danger of coming up against the reader determined to cling to or reinforce said 
edifices, and such confrontations are further complicated by the sense of intimacy 
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and involvement engendered by the first person speaking position. Women poets 
who write of their own experiences are especially vulnerable to such readings. For 
the female speaker remains strung between the Enlightenment ideal of universality, 
while also not admitted to the privileges of multiplicity, the designation of the 
personal becomes another way to silence and trivialise her work. 
 
Further, as Lucas points out, the ‘confessional mode also situates itself, at 
least metaphorically, within the sphere of the religious, of that formalised, literally 
boxed in relation between self and other’ (Lucas in Gill & Waters (ed.) 2011, 45). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, any association between the confessional 
poetics and western Christian symbolism does not privilege the female poet. The 
idea of a ‘boxed in relation between self and other’ has the potential to obscure the 
paternalism of said Christian symbolism by presuming that the speaker of such 
poems is afforded access to the autonomy of signification and individuation 
routinely denied to the female subject within a social framework overseen – if only 
at the symbolic level – by Christianity.  
 
Lucas’s comments that the ‘religious confessional, like the therapeutic 
relation, aims to construct a protected sphere in which the self might externalise, for 
relief if not comprehension, and in the process find/ and or forge the very terms of 
its subjectivity’ further muddy the association she makes between religious and 
poetic confession (45-46). While both religious confession and therapeutic 
revelations are protected spheres in the sense they are private exchanges governed 
by strict conventions designed to safeguard confidentiality (unlike poems which 
become public utterances once published), the ritual of religious confession involves 
both a willingness to submit to external judgment and a desire for the absolution 
afforded. The act of seeking absolution through religious confession can also suggest 
an underlying sense of having contravened moral boundaries. To see the 
confessional poem as enacting a similar process, seems to me, to strip this textual 
mode of any of the liberating potential in which the ‘self might externalise’ if that 
self is still required to submit to external judgement (46). But such a comparison 
perhaps reveals the confessional lyric as being more limiting in terms of self-
expression than the sacrament, because of the lack of protection, or sanctification 
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afforded to the poet who foregoes the consecrated privacy of the confessional box 
and exposes herself via publication. 
 
When considering the relationship of the confessional lyric to the sacrament 
of confession, it is perhaps useful to consider the other name the Catholic Church 
uses for this sacrament – Reconciliation. This reframes religious confession not as a 
submission to judgement, but as an exchange in which the person confessing is 
relieved of a psychic burden. The term reconciliation also suggests a rapprochement 
of the internalised conflict for which the applicant has sought relief, as well as 
between confessor and priest. Further, this is an exchange conducted one on one (if 
not face to face), often within the bounds of a pre-existing relationship that is 
institutionally positioned as one of trust.  In contrast, the published confessional 
lyric is written for an external audience that ultimately cannot be known, and whose 
reactions cannot be anticipated.      
 
Rather than forging ‘the terms of its subjectivity’, any act of self-articulation 
attempted within such a dynamic risks being overwhelmed by the expectation of a 
public performance of apologetic supplication and submission inherent in the 
dynamic of confession outside of the boundaries of the sacrament. As seen in the 
discussion of Sexton’s poetry, in the eyes of readers, such a dynamic renders the 
confessional lyric either an abomination better kept supressed or private (such as in 
‘For John who Begs me Not to Enquire’), or a public act of contrition offered up for 
reproval or approval. This places the emphasis squarely on the speaker – who is 
presumed to represent the poet in the most literal sense – rather than what is being 
said in the poem, making any kind of radical or subversive critique of structural 
injustices such as misogyny more difficult to communicate. This is especially so 
when the cultural landscape from which the poem emerges, and into which it speaks, 
is heavily invested in maintaining such structures by policing and silencing such 
utterances. Or when symbolic as well as cultural conditioning reinforces this 
silencing. Lucas’s comments regarding the reader/speaker relationship could be read 
as suggesting a detached knowingness on the part of both parties, but this presumes 
that this textual exchange of desire is mutual and voluntary. The reading scenario 
Lucas posits for poems which speak from the first person is more troubling if one 
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considers the intricate and deeply embedded cultural assumptions surrounding the 
maternal body and motherhood 
 
If we are to move beyond the confining auspices of the confessional lyric 
when considering Rich’s more political and polemical poetic stance, we must also 
consider how the more complex and challenging readings of the subject and 
subjectivity favoured by poststructuralist theory might disrupt the fantasy of the 
fixed and knowable self, even if retrospectively applied. Does letting go of any 
lingering attachment to the idea of an integrated, coherent and knowable poetic self 
make the multiplicity of female subjectivity Rich was striving for in ‘Snapshots’ 
more imaginable or more elusive?  
 
Further, in the case of female poets of the 1960s such as Rich, who were 
writing within a cultural moment which greatly restricted both their material and 
symbolic autonomy, would the idea of a fragmented, unknowable self have 
represented the possibility of liberation, or a different kind of cultural tyranny and 
silencing? Rich’s historical positioning is important when considering how her 
relationship to both the personal and the maternal manifested in her writing. Writing 
from a position of resistance within a society which had a very narrow definition of 
the social and symbolic signification of both the female subject and the feminine lent 
Rich’s poetics an impassioned urgency that would be carried through into her 
discursive writing.  
 
 
Discursive Incursions: Second Wave Feminist Politics and the Maternal. 
 
 
Alicia Ostriker writes that after the 1963 publication of the collection 
Snapshots of a Daughter in Law ‘nothing inhibits Rich’s intensity or integrity. The 
feeling of something inexplicably wrong has been transformed into cries that the 
house is on fire, and the mind of the poet is ablaze’ (Ostriker 1983, 108). Ostriker’s 
words situate Rich’s poetry beyond the purely personal and firmly within the realm 
of the political. Her use of terms like ‘integrity’ invest Rich’s work with the specific 
gravitas of not just political discourse, but as the anointed voice of a social 
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movement. The use of the word ‘integrity’ also encourages the reader to see Rich as 
occupying a defined moral position within her poetry. Ostriker further emphasises 
the idea of Rich’s poetry as representative of a collective female experience when 
she describes it as  ‘explor[ing] the experience of an “I” which is increasingly the 
“we” of female consciousness” (108). While Ostriker’s comments support the idea 
of the personal being political – an oft-quoted tenet of second wave feminism that 
Rich herself endorsed - we must note that such a speaking position necessarily relies 
upon the idea of a knowable integrated self, and therefore has the potential to limit 
Rich’s poetry within the same narrow and univocal readings (albeit through the lens 
of radical feminism) I have been arguing against.  
 
The contemporary reader, who is cognisant of the evolution of feminist 
literary theory over the past fifty years into a multifaceted reading and interpretive 
position that has been regularly forced to grapple with its limitations, will 
necessarily bristle at Ostriker’s use of “we” and her insistence upon the singularity 
of female consciousness. Indeed, while Ostriker’s argument is also a product of her 
historical positioning, such an assumption is problematic for the reader in 2017 for 
whom the fantasy of the integrated, locatable self who speaks through the text has 
been repeatedly challenged and – for many critics - divested of relevance.  
 
Implicit in Ostriker’s comments, and, it could be argued, in Rich’s own 
discursive and polemical writing, is the implication that this kind of essentialising, 
this distilling of all female experience into a single, unified voice, was considered by 
many feminists as being advantageous to the advancement of their political aims 
during the initial period of second wave feminist activism. In this sense, Ostriker’s 
comments can be read as echoing the post-colonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak’s pronouncements in the 1980s on the necessity of what she termed ‘strategic 
essentialism’ within movements of marginalised peoples (Ashcroft 2013, 96-98). 
Spivak, who identifies as ‘a deconstructivist’, wrote in various essays (most notably 
in ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in 1987) of the power gained from a unified voice in 
positively defining the subjugated other and providing a cohesive pushback to the 
pervasive discourses of the dominant hegemony. Spivak reasoned that aligning 
oneself with a collective movement that employs essentialist ideas of identity was 
sometimes necessary to avoid ‘the asymmetrical obliteration of [the] Other in its 
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precarious Subjectivity’ (Spivak in Nelson & Grossberg (eds.) 1988, 76). Spivak 
was referring here to the post-colonial subject, but feminist theorists have advanced 
similar arguments in their exploration of female subjectivity. 
 
The idea that the precariousness of female subjectivity can be overcome, or 
mitigated, by focussing on the collective rather than the individual, the universal 
rather than the specific, is appealing at the discursive level, if one regards feminism 
only as a political movement focussed on the social and political and economic 
liberation of women. Challenging the widespread insistent enforcement of regressive 
gender stereotypes that characterised the post-war period in America required an 
equally universal and persistent political and social resistance. Drawing upon the 
collective authority of a unified speaking position also has the potential to challenge 
masculinist assumptions of the universal. However, while there is power to be 
gained in aligning with the collective, the argument for essentialism becomes less 
persuasive or attractive when applied to the reading of aesthetic writing. How does 
the speaker of a poem ‘forge the terms of her subjectivity’ if these terms have 
already been defined for her, albeit within a sympathetic framework? And what are 
the implications for the maternal-subject for whom the means of subjective self-
determination have been further subsumed under the cultural weight of the 
designation of mother?  
 
Essentialism is affirming within discourses of the other because it provides a 
solidified if fictional base from which the marginalised subject might speak. It also 
presumably invests the subjugated other with the cultural authority of the definer 
rather than the symbolic supplication of the defined – a rejection of the patriarchal 
containment of the female subject Farish refers to. Or, in other words, 
Wollstonecraft’s ‘stay which cannot be undermined’ that Rich references in 
Snapshots (Rich 2002, 19). However, the flip side of this buttressing is the threat 
that essentialism poses to the articulation and actualisation of the individual subject. 
Presenting women-kind as a unified mass might be a politically expedient strategy, 
but does the weight attached to the idea of the commonality of all women also 
potentially act as another kind of policing of their subjectivity and ultimately a 
silencing? In matters of identity definition, essentialism, even if it sets out to subvert 
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patriarchal ascendency, still relies upon the same kind of hierarchical structural 
thinking in its execution.  
 
The construction of an immutable universal female identity that defines itself 
in opposition to patriarchal notions of the feminine still orients itself against the 
same fixed points of reference, even as it sets out to refute them. Which means we 
must ask - is the idea of a defining universal essence of womanhood ultimately any 
less restrictive or reductive if it is advanced by women on behalf of other women? 
And further, how and to whom is this authority of definition invested? Does the 
strategic deployment of essentialist notions of identity for the purposes of self-
determination also result in the asymmetrical obliteration of some women based on 
factors other than gender such as race and class? This is one of the central paradoxes 
of feminist thought - this tension arising from the navigation of a political, social and 
cultural movement focussed on the advancement of the personal as a means of 
achieving cultural agency. If essentialism is required for political cohesion, how do 
women then argue for the recognition and representation of the heterogeneity of 
female experience free of restrictive absolutes? Or for the right to a heterogeneous 
subjectivity not defined by reductive notions of feminine essence which second 
wave feminism set out to disrupt and disassemble? Claiming authority on one’s own 
terms does not necessarily negate the negative impacts of exercising said authority.  
 
Hence, it is clear that the maternal has a particularly fraught and 
contradictory engagement with authority and identity. Motherhood may be an 
experience that remains linked with female biology, and to a more complex degree, 
femininity, but it does not follow that the gendered actuality of maternity confers 
authority, or even an unshakable identity upon women; or, if it does indeed confer 
an identity upon women, that it is the affirming and positive identity to which the 
kind of strategic essentialising we have been discussing aspires. It is not axiomatic 
that the enshrinement of motherhood as the ne plus ultra of feminine achievement 
imbues the maternal subject with a heightened significance or claim to cultural 
authority, even in matters regarding the maternal. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the weight of symbolic importance attached to maternity can both silence 
and stifle individual subjectivity. Indeed, feminists, particularly Rich’s second wave 
contemporaries have often imprecated motherhood as being the source of women’s 
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symbolic and material subjugation. If we recognise that within a symbolic economy 
controlled by the phallus woman is the bearer rather than the creator of meaning, 
does this place the construction and navigation of maternal identity – or indeed any 
female identity –beyond the reach of those not admitted to the privileges of the 
phallus and the power it bestows?  
 
Again we come up against the conundrum of marginalised subjectivity. I 
have been arguing that rejecting univocal readings of motherhood enhances and 
enlarges women’s access to subjective autonomy by recognising the multiplicity of 
maternal experience and its relationship to female subjectivity. However, arguments 
such as Spivak’s for the strategic power of essentialism would seem to contradict 
this thinking, arguing instead for the benefits of a space in which identity is both 
self-defined and concrete with clearly defined borders. With regards to the 
discourses of second wave feminism this is a notion which required a radical 
reimagining of the woman’s – and the mother’s - positioning within the symbolic 
order, but how does the maternal subject wrest control of her signification within a 
cultural economy in which her status as other submerges her subjectivity? How does 
woman reconcile the contradiction attendant upon the belief that alignment with the 
collective is necessary to obtain the status of autonomous subject, especially when 
handing unchecked power over signification to the collective can encourage the 
same dangerous hegemonic certainty that feminism was first moved to reject?  
 
Butler addresses this in her essay ‘The Body Politics of Kristeva’ when she 
argues       
 
that any theory that asserts that signification is predicated upon the denial of 
repression of a female principle ought to consider whether that femaleness is 
really external to the cultural norms by which it is repressed. In other words, 
on my reading, the repression of the feminine does not require that the 
agency of repression and the object of repression be ontologically distinct. 
Indeed, repression may be understood to produce the object that it comes to 
deny (Butler in Oliver (ed.) 1993, 177) 
 
It might seem curious that Butler, whose pronouncements on the performativity of 
gender framed gender, and by extension, femininity as a cultural construct should 
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also claim that ‘femaleness’ and ‘the feminine’ are supressed within the symbolic. 
This seems to be contradicting her original contention that the external 
manifestations of the feminine are the result of a complex series of ‘stylised 
performances’ imposed upon the subject via the dictates of the symbolic (Butler 
1990, 191). This externalisation of the decreed manifestations of the feminine would 
appear to be the opposite of the kind of repression Butler speaks of here. To be clear, 
Butler is referring to Kristeva’s notion of the repression of what she sees as a more 
authentic expression of femaleness or the feminine by paternal law via the 
sanctioning of ‘the institution of motherhood as compulsory for women’ (Butler in 
Oliver (ed.) 1993, 177).  
 
Butler refutes Kristeva’s contention that the maternal body ‘prior to discourse 
which exerts its own causal force in the structure of drives’ represents a negation of 
the repression of what Kristeva sees as the more reified expression of both 
femaleness and the maternal. Instead, Butler sees ‘the discursive production of the 
maternal body as prediscursive’ as reinforcing the very power structures Kristeva’s 
theorising sets out to challenge: 
 
 Indeed, when the desires that maintain the institution of motherhood are 
transvaluated as prepaternal and precultural drives, then the institution gains a 
permanent legitimation in the invariant structures of the female body. Indeed, 
the clearly paternal law that sanctions and requires the female body to be 
characterized primarily in terms of its reproductive function is inscribed on 
that body as the law of its natural necessity. And Kristeva, safeguarding that 
law of a biologically necessitated maternity as a subversive operation that pre-
exists the paternal law itself, aids in the systemic production of its invisibility 
and, consequently, the illusion of its inevitability (177).  
 
  Butler is making some contentious statements regarding Kristeva’s theorising of 
the maternal, most notably that she [Kristeva] has endorsed the ‘law of a biologically 
necessitated maternity as a subversive process’ (177). I will examine Butler’s 
critique of Kristeva’s positioning of the maternal body in greater detail later in the 
chapter, but suffice to say, the questions raised in the passage above highlight the 
difficulties attendant upon defining and locating the mother as an autonomous 
subject within discourse. Or further, the ongoing impossibility of defining an 
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individual maternal subjectivity that draws upon the constitutive power of the 
collective without sacrificing individuation or the particular, which can in turn also 
threaten the maternal signification.        
   
As explored in my reading of Rich’s ‘Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law, for 
the marginalised other to attempt to argue for subjective multiplicity, she must also 
expose herself to the risk of further obliteration of signification within the symbolic 
order by calling into question the wholeness of her identity and signifying processes. 
The white male poet, largely secure in his phallocentric ascendency need not fear 
any similar annihilation, as his status as originator and instigator of meaning remains 
unimpeded, even when he challenges the limits of this meaning in his poetics. As 
Farish notes, even the right to challenge symbolic unity remains ‘a powerfully 
gendered’ one (Farish in Gill & Waters (eds.) 2011, 141). The subject must have a 
concrete and locatable identity in order to dismantle it, or even to cast it off in favour 
of a different iteration. Not so for the female subject, as the critical reaction to the 
becoming subjects of ‘Snapshots’ suggests.  
 
Although Butler is rejecting Kristeva’s arguments for a reimagining of 
motherhood within the symbolic, in the passage quoted above, her [Butler’s] 
comments also highlight the symbolic entrapment of the female subject that Kristeva 
seeks to push past. Amongst all this rhetorical to-ing and fro-ing between calls for 
individuation and essentialism, one begins to wonder if it is at all possible for the 
female subject to move beyond the cultural systems and impulses which keep her 
trapped in her status as other. How might we as women heed Kristeva’s call for a 
new maternal ethics beyond the phallus – the ‘herethics’ encompassing both 
reproduction and death’ she suggested in ‘Stabat Mater’ (Moi (ed.) in Kristeva 
1986)?  
 
It is at this point I must confess that steeping myself in the relentless 
dislocations and disruptions of poststructuralist theory when considering the 
positioning of the maternal in both literature and culture sometimes leaves me with a 
feeling of ontological fatalism. Beyond an epistemological frustration with the 
seemingly irresolvable tension between essentialism and individualism, with regards 
to the articulation and actualisation of subjectivity, I find myself wondering how the 
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female subject, or the female subject as mother, can achieve any autonomy of 
signification within a system of culture governed by the Law of the Father. Or, at the 
risk of reaching towards hyperbole, in the symbolic order can women – or more 
specifically mothers - be recognised as people too? Such thoughts might sound like a 
ludicrous exaggeration, or alternatively, a simplification of the complexity of female 
subjectivity, but the slipping away of any kind of surety as I strive to apply some 
kind of epistemological coherence to my argument still manages to catch me 
unawares. The more I try to know or understand the positioning of the maternal 
within the symbolic order, to inform my own reading position when considering the 
work of Rich, Sexton and Plath, the more convinced I become of the impossibility of 
such a project.  
 
It is worth pausing here, to consider why I feel the need to approach my 
reading expecting any concretisation of maternal identity. Why do I find myself 
seeking the very certainty I claim to have rejected as both illusory and limiting? 
Perhaps it is my own experiences of the material ‘reality’ of motherhood as a 
performative practice that prompt me to seek intellectual integration of the material 
and the metaphysical. I am reminded of the old poststructuralist joke – it works in 
practice, but does it work in theory? When contemplating the practice of 
motherhood does the application of theory imbue more meaning to, and enhance our 
understanding of the maternal, and of the material and symbolic limits it has 
imposed upon women, even if it risks divesting it of any knowable certainty? Having 
read Rich’s poetics as a subversive challenge to the symbolic positioning of the 
mother because of the linguistic disruptions and refusal of a integrated speaking 
position evident in ‘Snapshots’, how then do I approach her discursive work – a 
medium which necessarily invokes the textual surety of the master discourses it 
seeks to rebut in order to achieve the rhetorical cohesiveness expected by readers?   
 
Although not specifically focussed on the maternal or on poetics, Toril Moi’s 
landmark 1985 survey of feminist literary theory, Sexual/Textual Politics provides 
many useful theoretical anchor points from which to orient oneself for a 
consideration of identity and subjectivity in the interplay between Rich’s poetic and 
discursive work. Moi rejects much of the theory behind strategic essentialism as 
being antithetical to feminism because of its dependence upon ‘the male–humanist 
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concept of an essential human identity’ (Moi 2002, 10). She mounts a sustained 
exploration in Sexual/Textual Politics of the differing practices of Anglo-American 
and French feminist literary theory – a comparison in which she often finds her 
American sisters wanting because of their adherence to the idea of an essential 
human identity. Moi contends that American feminist readings of literature 
effectively recreate the very patriarchal structures they are trying to dismantle by 
limiting the female speaker and subjects of the works they analyse to an equally 
restrictive definition of subjectivity. While Moi’s consideration and rejection of the 
work of several feminist theorists is at times also disorienting for any reader who 
approaches her book expecting to come away with a definitive set of ideological 
‘rules’, she does endorse the work of Virginia Woolf, Simone de Beauvoir and 
Kristeva as providing valuable insights into the integration of the material and the 
metaphysical, the political and the symbolic for feminist theorists.  
 
In championing these particular, mostly European, feminist writers and 
thinkers who straddle both first and second wave feminism, Moi endorses the 
rejection of essentialism as being opposed to feminist reading practices: 
 
The humanist desire for a unity of vision or thought […] is, in effect, a 
demand for a sharply reductive reading of literature – a reading that, not least 
in the case of an experimental writer like Woolf, can have little hope of 
grasping the central problems posed by pioneering modes of textual 
production. A ‘noncontradictory perception of the world’ […] is precisely a 
reactionary one (Moi 2002, 11).  
 
Woolf, Moi argues, pushed beyond this conformist and ‘reactionary’ worldview by 
adopting ‘a deeply sceptical attitude to the male-humanist concept of an essential 
human identity.’ Moi points to this scepticism as being influenced by 
psychoanalytical theory ‘which Woolf undoubtedly knew’ (10). Just as 
psychoanalytic theory focusses on the complexity of the human subject and the 
influence exerted by unconscious (subsumed) drives and desires, so too Woolf 
challenged the foundations of meaning and identity in her writing, prompting Moi to 
ask: ‘what can this self-identity be if all meaning is a ceaseless play of difference, if 
absence as much as presence is the foundation of meaning’ (10). 
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 On the surface Moi’s use of the word absence appears to invoke much of the 
theoretical elusiveness I was decrying, but while absence can be read as implying a 
lack, it is significant that Moi sets it in both opposition to and collusion with the 
contrasting term presence, thus privileging a notion of subjectivity which embraces 
contradiction. This along with the recognition of difference as being integral to the 
‘foundation of meaning’ suggests an opening up rather than mystification of 
meaning. Through her reading of Woolf, Moi envisages a reading position in which 
subjectivity can encompass both difference and absence as being enlarging rather 
than reductive to symbolic positioning and signification – a reading position that I 
believe is commensurate with the speaking position Rich adopts in ‘Snapshots’. 
Similarly, Moi sees Kristeva as offering a point of difference from the readings of 
Second Wave Anglo-American feminists such as those of Elaine Shoalwater and 
Kate Millet which Moi agues often stray into essentialism and biologism: 
 
It is evident that for Julia Kristeva it is not the biological sex of a person, but 
the subject position she or he takes up, that determines their revolutionary 
potential. Her views of feminist politics reflect this refusal of biologism and 
essentialism. The feminist struggle, she argues, must be seen historically and 
politically as a three-tiered one, which can be schematically summarized as 
follows: 
 
1. Women demand equal access to the symbolic order. Liberal 
feminism. Equality 
2. Women reject the male symbolic order in the name of difference. 
Radical feminism. Femininity extolled. 
3. (This is Kristeva’s own position.) Women reject the dichotomy 
between masculine and feminine as metaphysical. 
 
This third position is one that has deconstructed the opposite between 
masculinity and femininity, and therefore necessarily challenges the very 
notion of fixed identity (Moi 2002, 12). 
 
Moi appears here to be positioning psychoanalytical theory as a mediating 
discourse between materialist and humanist readings that champion an essential, 
unimpeachable identity, and postmodernist and deconstructivist ones in which all 
identity is mutable and un-locatable. This is not to say that either Moi or Kristeva 
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believe that defining the material struggle of women is incompatible with feminist 
theory. Moi is not arguing for a de-politicisation of feminist theory, stressing that for 
her in 1985, ‘it still remains politically essential for feminists to defend women as 
women in order to counteract the patriarchal oppression that precisely despises 
women as women’ (Moi 2002, 13). But lest we think Moi is hedging her bets by 
appearing to acknowledge the political usefulness of essentialism while still 
rejecting it as antithetical to the exploration of subjectivity, she is careful to 
emphasise the ways in which Kristeva’s ‘deconstructed’ feminist politics extend our 
understanding of the feminist struggle beyond essentialist notions of gender identity: 
 
[A]n ‘undeconstructed’ form of ‘stage two’ feminism, unaware of the 
metaphysical nature of gender identities, runs the risk of becoming an inverted 
form of sexism. It does so by uncritically taking over the very metaphysical 
categories set up by the patriarchy in order to keep women in their places, 
despite attempts to attach new feminist values to these old categories. An 
adoption of Kristeva’s ‘deconstructed’ form of feminism therefore in one 
sense leaves everything as it was – our positions in the political struggle have 
not changed – but in another sense radically transforms our awareness of that 
struggle (13). 
  
Moi highlights here the transformative potential of a radical application of 
psychoanalytical concepts to feminist theory – the identification of a reading 
position in which the politics of the body and the maternal meet the politics of 
culture; or in other words, a combining of Kristeva’s nature and culture threshold 
with the second wave feminist tenet of the personal is political. Such a reading is of 
particular relevance to a writer such as Rich who engaged with motherhood through 
both the rhetoric of discourse and the metaphors of poetry. A consideration of 
Kristeva’s position as laid out by Moi allows us to approach Rich’s exploration of 
motherhood in Of Woman Born not just as a polemic text seeking to expose the 
social, political and cultural subjugation of women through maternity, but also as the 
articulation of a specific subject position which the reader might interrogate from 
both a metaphysical and a material perspective. Our exploration of this text then 
becomes one in which understanding the symbolic positioning from which it speaks 
is as important as its social and cultural positioning. 
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Defining the Location of the Subject –  
A Marrying of the Symbolic and the Material? 
 
 
Unlike Virginia Woolf, second wave Anglo-American feminists typically 
had an uneasy relationship with psychoanalysis – both Freudian and to a lesser 
extent Lacanian, rejecting it as a patriarchal discourse appropriated by politicians 
and other male authority figures to legitimise the post-war/Cold War containment of 
women in the domestic and the maternal. Friedan devoted a whole chapter of The 
Feminine Mystique (with the provocative and antagonistic title ‘The Sexual 
Solipsism of Sigmund Freud) to condemning the use of what she saw as an 
outmoded theory of human sexuality that pandered to the ‘same kind of unconscious 
[male] solipsism that made man for many centuries see the sun only as a bright 
object that revolved around the earth’ to control and dictate feminine behaviour 
(Freidan 2001, 173). Similarly, in Of Woman Born Rich criticises the oppressive 
pervasiveness of ‘the family-centred, consumer-oriented, Freudian-American world 
of the 1950s’ for pushing her towards an existence, not of her choosing, as a wife 
and mother (Rich 1995, 25). Both women present Freudian theory as a weapon of 
coercion wielded against American women in the mid twentieth century to enforce 
their domestic and maternal entrapment, rather than as theory of culture. Where 
Woolf (according to Moi) saw Freud’s work as liberating because of its recognition 
of the complexity of the subject, Friedan, Rich and other second wave feminists such 
as Kate Millet and Elaine Shoalwater, protested that it infantilised and devalued the 
female subject, denouncing what they saw as Freud’s reductive and inaccurate view 
of feminine sexuality as being structured around a traumatic awareness of difference 
and lack.   
 
Published in 1974, Juliet Mitchell’s Feminism and Psychoanalysis marked 
one of the first points of departure from the feminist antipathy towards Freud. 
Mitchell begins by acknowledging the concerns of Anglo-American feminism 
regarding psychoanalysis: 
 
The greater part of the feminist movement has identified Freud as the enemy. It is 
held that psychoanalysis claims women are inferior and that they can achieve true 
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femininity only as wives and mothers. Psychoanalysis is seen as a justification for the 
status-quo, bourgeois and patriarchal, and Freud in his own person exemplifies these 
qualities. I would agree that popularized Freudianism must answer to this description. 
 
She then turns this argument on its head by recasting psychoanalysis as interrogator 
rather than enforcer of patriarchal oppression:  
 
 but the argument of this book is that a rejection of psychoanalysis is fatal for 
feminism. However it may have been used, psychoanalysis is not a 
recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one. If we are 
interested in challenging the oppression of women, we cannot afford to reject 
it (Mitchell 1974, xiii). 
 
Mitchell’s reference to ‘popularized Freudianism’ is both an acknowledgment and a 
rejection of the specific cultural victimisation Rich and Freidan complain of. The 
implication being that while their struggle against the patriarchy is real and 
quantifiable, feminists such as Rich remain too caught up in the material reality of 
this struggle to properly understand the role psychoanalysis can play in illuminating 
an understanding - and perhaps ultimately a dismantling - of their oppression.  
 
Further, by acknowledging the shortcomings of ‘popularized Freudianism’, 
Mitchell implies that other feminists have previously lacked the insight to recognise 
the inauthenticity of this appropriated and adapted version of Freudianism which has 
been thrust upon them. Where Freidan denounced Freud’s theories as being too 
culturally specific and therefore of little relevance to American women in the 1950s 
and 60s, Mitchell again turns these views upon their head. If American women such 
as Rich and Friedan felt entrapped by the influence exerted over their society by 
psychoanalysis, Mitchell seems to be suggesting their animus was misplaced – that 
they instead needed to ask themselves if it is the theory or it’s distortion and 
misplaced application which is to blame for women’s subjugation. Almost a decade 
later, Jane Gallop takes up this argument in her book The Daughter’s Seduction, 
Feminism and Psychoanalysis calling for an engagement between the two discourses 
of feminism and psychoanalysis. Gallop posits that psychoanalysis can 
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unsettle feminism’s tendency to accept a traditional, unified, rational, puritanical 
self – a self supposedly free from the violence of desire. In its turn, feminism 
can shake up psychoanalysis’s tendency to think of itself as apolitical but in fact 
be conservative by encouraging people to adapt to an unjust social structure’ 
(Gallop 1982, xi).  
 
Like Moi, Gallop sees psychoanalysis as having a symbiotic relationship with 
feminism as discourses of disruption. While I am attracted to her proposal for the 
marrying of the two strands of cultural theory because it answers my need to 
integrate a political consciousness with one that acknowledges the fragmentation of 
the self, I am also intrigued by Gallop’s view, as expressed in the introduction of 
The Daughter’s Seduction, that this encounter involves setting aside the idea not 
only of a ‘unified, rational’ self who speaks within the text, but also of the notion of 
the wholeness of text itself:    
 
This method is a way of getting more out of the texts read, something that 
goes beyond the boundaries which an author might want to impose upon his or 
her work. The notions of integrity and closure in a text are like that of virginity 
in a body. They assume that if one does not respect the boundaries between 
inside and outside, one is ‘breaking and entering’, violating a property. As 
long as the fallacies of integrity and closure are upheld, a desire to penetrate 
becomes a desire for rape. I hope to engage in some intercourse with these 
textual bodies that has a different economy, one in which entry and 
interpenetration do not mean disrespect or violation because they are not based 
upon the myth of the book’s or the self’s or the body’s virginal wholeness. But 
rather upon the belief that, if words there be or body there be, somewhere 
there is a desire for dialogue, intercourse, exchange (Gallop 1982, xxii-iii). 
 
Gallop’s language here is both evocative and provocative with the sexual allusions 
and analogies it draws between the body and the text. The reading strategy she 
proposes represents a fundamental rejection of the essentialising of the feminine and 
female experience Moi decried in the work of Millet and Shoalwater. In shifting the 
origin of textual meaning from the monolithic concept of the author and recasting it 
as an interplay of dialogue between reader and author, Gallop rejects univocal 
readings. With her stated aim of ‘dialogue, intercourse and exchange’ Gallop recasts 
the reader as the active interlocutor rather than passive receiver of the text, thus 
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privileging the individual subjectivity of the reading process rather than the 
collective identification that discursive texts might set out to engender.  
 
 While embracing such a reading position has obvious benefits for the 
representation and reading of a maternal subjectivity that recognises diversity and 
multiplicity, it also has the potential to pose its own set of interpretive ‘risks’ to texts 
written from a marginalised subjective position, chief of which would be the ever 
present danger that challenging textual cohesion further entrenches this 
marginalisation by undermining the argument a polemic text such as Of Woman 
Born seeks to advance. Perhaps the discomfort an awareness of this risk inspires 
accounts for the somewhat adversarial stance Gallop appears to take when 
discussing the resistance she envisages her proposals will meet with. In contrast to 
Moi’s exploration of the liberating potential of Kristevian psychoanalysis for 
feminist discourse, Gallop casts her critical incursions as though she expects them to 
be hostile encounters met with resistance from both writers and critics alike. Her 
terminology, most notably her use of the word rape, is almost overwhelmingly 
aggressive. Her language can also be read as gendered in the sense that the text is 
cast as being vulnerable to the violation of forcible penetration. This makes for an 
arresting, if shocking image, but although Gallop pulls back from the image of the 
critic as rapist with her stated aim of ‘dialogue, intercourse, exchange’ (iii) 
suggesting a less contentious interaction between reader and text, this scenario of 
productive dialogue, exchange and intercourse is dependent on a reader who is open 
to, and willing to grapple with the ideas put forward by a text. Which prompts us to 
wonder how this interpretive framework might benefit or hinder discourses of the 
other which seek to construct some kind of defined and locatable identity within the 
dominant hegemony that seeks to submerge it.  
 
Gallop is arguing for a shift of power in the textual/critical economy to 
privilege interpretation over representation – or in cruder terms, the reader over 
author. Lacan famously theorised that the unconscious is structured like language; 
Gallop extends this notion to position the text, this instrument of language, as an 
autonomous entity - analogous to the body, but entirely separate from its author. 
Separating the text from its author may satisfy Gallop’s desire to liberate said text 
from any boundaries imposed by the idea of authorial ownership, but ‘entry and 
  155 
interpenetration’ would seem to me to be still predicated upon the idea of the text as 
a cohesive target, albeit one open, or at least pervious to, critical deconstruction. The 
textual/critical economy Gallop proposes offers almost unchecked interpretive 
power to the reader, but her disavowal of authorial boundaries, although freeing, can 
leave the reader of discursive and critical texts ontologically disorientated. Of 
course, this kind of ontological and epistemological disorientation can be 
challenging and renewing, and can lead to exactly the kind of theorising that opens 
up maternal subjectivity as a site of heterogeneity and multiplicity; but equally it can 
leave the marginalised subject vulnerable to the imposition of interpretations which 
reinforce hegemonic assumptions regarding the maternal.      
 
Gallop’s quarantining of texts from their authors presents us with a similar 
critical quandary to that of strategic essentialism, albeit from the opposing 
perspective. Gallop’s reference to readers and critics interpreting texts ‘beyond 
boundaries’ imposed by authors brings to mind the critical quagmire surrounding 
readings of Plath. Although in Plath’s case it was her husband who attempted to 
impose those boundaries of interpretation after her death, claiming they were 
necessary to protect her children’s privacy, the sovereignty of interpretation 
proposed by Gallop is enticing because it rejects Hughes’s attempts to dictate what 
critics and readers can say about Plath’s poetry. Such a reading position liberates 
both Plath and her readers from the weight of Hughes’s accusation that she went 
straight to the ‘central unacceptable things’ in her work (Rose 1991, xiv). It also 
serves as a negation of the opprobrium Sexton faced for her exploration of 
unacceptable topics such as suicide, abortion and menstruation in her work.  
 
In Gallop’s textual economy, who is to say – reader or critic - what is 
unacceptable?  This kind of interpretive (and writerly) freedom would appear to 
encourage readings which embrace a heterogeneous maternal subjectivity over 
essentialist notions of the mother, but Gallop’s ‘desire for dialogue, intercourse, 
exchange’, depends upon how and from what cultural, social or political position the 
reader approaches the text. This is especially so for dialogic texts such as Of Woman 
Born in which Rich explicitly states her aim in the introduction as being ‘to examine 
motherhood – my own included – in a social context, as embedded in a political 
institution: in feminist terms’ (Rich 1995, ix). How might Rich speak with any 
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authority as a mother through a text that is concerned with the patriarchal 
subjugation of maternal experience (and I would also argue, maternal subjectivity) if 
Gallop has stripped her of her right to authorial self-determination? Does Gallop’s 
emphasis upon the multiple, manipulable readings of a text make the heterogeneous 
maternal subjectivity more palpable and locatable, or does it make representing such 
heterogeneity more difficult – obscured by the many theoretical contortions 
challenging the unity and cohesion of this identity – and ultimately inarticulable? 
Does questioning the right to authorial self-determination also risk silencing women 
who speak in the first person – as Rich does – of their experiences of mothering? 
 
Rich emphasises in the updated introduction to the Tenth Anniversary 
Edition of Of Woman Born how integral the incorporation of her own experiences as 
a mother was to the shaping and articulation of her argument: 
 
Of Woman Born was both praised and attacked for what was sometimes seen 
as its odd-fangled approach: personal testimony mingled with research and 
theory which derived from both. But this approach never seemed odd to me in 
the writing. What still seems odd is the absentee author, the writer who lays 
down speculations, theories, facts and fantasies without any personal 
grounding (Rich 1995, x). 
    
 However, she reinforces Gallop’s point about the restrictiveness of boundaries when 
she attempts to erect some of her own around the use of the personal, cautioning that 
in that present moment of 1986 she felt that ‘the late 1960s Women’s Liberation 
thesis that “the personal is political” (which helped release this book into being has 
been overlaid by a New Age of the personal-for-its-own-sake, as if “the personal is 
good” has become the corollary and the thesis forgotten’ (x).  Rich’s language is 
rather loaded here; neatly illustrating what Gallop was saying about the potential 
repressiveness of an authorial insistence upon textual integrity and enclosure. 
Having claimed the personal for her own particular textual and rhetorical purposes, 
Rich then attempts to demarcate exactly how it might be used in other feminist texts. 
Use of the personal, she pronounces, must serve some higher political purpose 
(which Rich feels entitled to determine for her readers) in order to maintain its 
legitimacy.  
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Rich’s opinions on what kind of writing should be allowed to draw upon the 
personal are firmly fixed within strategic essentialist thinking, or as she terms it, ‘the 
differences between individualistic telling with no place to go and a collective 
movement to empower women’ (Rich 1995, x). As with Ostriker’s praise of Rich 
quoted earlier, Rich’s comments seem to be reaching towards some kind of moral 
imperative by invoking a hierarchy of purpose in the use of the personal. Thus, the 
use of the personal in support of ‘a collective movement to empower women’ is 
unambiguously privileged over the implied frivolity of ‘individualistic talent’ (x). 
Rich’s position here correlates most closely to the second designation in the three 
tiered schema of feminist struggle laid out by Moi in that it appears to ‘reject the 
male symbolic order in the name of difference’ (Moi 2002, 12). While this is 
affirming from a radical feminist perspective (a perspective to which Rich proclaims 
her alliance in Of Woman Born), it is somewhat less radical in its challenge to 
phallocentric hegemony because it reinforces rather than deconstructs the gender 
binary in its challenge to patriarchal attitudes towards motherhood.  
 
Further, Rich appears also to be applying her own restrictions to this 
reimagined symbolic order by laying down a particular framework for what 
constitutes proper female behaviour. In the textual, social and symbolic economy 
Rich endorses in Of Woman Born good feminist writers are serious and considered 
in their invocation and use of the personal as a discursive and rhetorical tool that 
must always serve the collective rather than the individual. As with the notion of 
strategic essentialism, it is perhaps paradoxical to insist that the personal – a word 
which suggests both private and subjective experience - must serve the collective 
rather than the individual, and the above quoted passages do suggest a degree of 
prevarication on Rich’s part.  
 
While Rich saw the targeted elevation of the personal as both freeing (‘it 
helped release this book into being (Rich 1995, x)) and affirming for women, this 
was predicated upon a conceptualising of the personal that was in stark contrast to 
dominant cultural and social discourses of the early Cold War period in which the 
personal had very different political connotations to those articulated by the feminist 
movement. These connotations were also complex and often contradictory, 
suggesting that American society has long had an ambiguous and complicated 
  158 
relationship with the personal broadly, and the concept of personal freedom more 
specifically. Particularly considering, as will be explored in the next chapter, in Cold 
War America, the politicisation of the personal was embedded in an ideology that 
was hostile to women’s personal freedom and subjectivity. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE MOTHER AS POLITICAL SUBJECT 
 
The interpellation of the becoming female subject of 1950s and 60s America 
into a socio-political narrative in which femininity was synonymous with 
domesticity and maternity was the central concern of Friedan’s Feminine Mystique. I 
use the word interpellation - a designation that posits subjectivity is formed through 
ideological indoctrination, rather than individuation - to highlight the lack of 
heterogeneous signifying potential afforded to the female subject during this period. 
In her book Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (2008), 
Emily Tyler May examines the insistent way successive American governments of 
this period championed the nuclear family model (a rather ironic descriptor 
considering the shadow cast by the arms race, which was the most urgent 
manifestation of this clash of ideology) as a means of favourably distinguishing 
capitalism from communism. Most notably, Tyler May points to a verbal stoush 
between then Vice President Nixon and Soviet Premier Khrushchev in 1959, in 
which Nixon declared ‘that American superiority in the Cold War rested not on 
weapons, but on the secure, abundant family life of modern suburban homes 
complete with modern appliances and distinct gender roles for family members’ 
(Tyler May 2008, loc 1812 of 6512).  
 
Known as ‘the kitchen debate’ because it took place in the politically 
incongruous context of a Moscow exhibition of American model kitchens, this 
infamous debate became known as ‘one of the most noted verbal sparring matches 
of the century’, not least of all because of the way in which Nixon reframed a 
geopolitical conflict of competing ideologies as a clash of values centring on 
differing notions of the family, involving the cultural positioning of women. 
Whereas communism was presented as a flawed, unnatural system in which women 
were dehumanised, and more egregiously, desexualised, by working outside the 
home, American capitalism, Nixon argued, offered both personal freedom (the right 
to choose, and to the privacy of the home), and ideological satisfaction. According to 
Nixon, this ideological satisfaction - symbolised by the virtuous consumerism of the 
suburban family in which ‘women would achieve their glory and men display their 
  163 
success’ - confirmed ‘the superiority of free enterprise over communism’ (loc 436 of 
6512). Khrushchev answered this utopian vision of capitalist female existence with 
the counter boast that communism ‘had no use for full-time housewives’ thereby 
taking the radical step of uncoupling female subjectivity and identity from the 
maternal and the domestic (loc 443 of 6152).  
 
Nixon’s comments, carrying with them the edict of the state, conflate 
American women’s cultural status with their biological status as mothers. 
Khrushchev’s dismissal of the notion of ‘full-time housewives’ – also carrying with 
it the edict of the state – positions said housewives as a capitalist, or more 
specifically, American capitalist cultural construct. This is not to suggest that 
women enjoyed more freedom and a higher cultural status in communist regimes of 
the 1950s and 60s, although many feminist theorists such as de Beauvoir and Rich 
herself have argued that capitalism is antithetical (or at the very least hostile) to 
women’s liberation. Indeed, one commonality between Nixon and Khrushchev is 
their presumption that the subjectivity of their female citizens was theirs to define. 
As Tyler May notes, although ‘the leaders did not agree on the proper social roles 
for women, they clearly shared a view that female sexuality was a central part of the 
good life that both systems claimed to espouse’ (loc 443 of 6512). By Tyler May’s 
account, Nixon and Khrushchev’s singling out of female experience in order to 
argue for the ideological superiority of their opposing political systems is yet another 
example of women being cast as the bearers rather than creators of meaning. It must 
also be noted that the American ideal of personal freedom was predicated upon the 
denial of this freedom to the female subject via the promotion of the maternal.  
 
If Nixon is to be believed, the sense of ideological and moral superiority that 
informed the American people’s rejection of communism was founded on an 
impulse towards insularity in which citizens turned to their homes and family unit 
for comfort and security against an uncertain geopolitical backdrop. The nuclear 
family was enshrined as the centrepiece of social policy, the cornerstone of 
American exceptionalism and freedom, but arguably it was (and remains) a cultural 
construct enmeshed in conflicting impulses. This privileged signifier of individuality 
is, as Rich and Friedan pointed out, based on prescribed conformity – namely the 
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interpellation of the female subject into her role as wife and mother, whose 
ambitions outside the domestic have been subjugated by the patriarchy.  
 
In this ideological environment the word nuclear became symbolic of the 
way in which the private sphere interacted with the public in Cold War America. For 
a country whose national psyche was heavily invested in international dominance, 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons signified power, while also, paradoxically, 
embodying the agent of its potential annihilation. This conflict of signification was 
mirrored at the personal level whereby, as Nixon argued, the home was the site of 
both the exaltation of the feminine and the sublimation (or symbolic effacement) of 
women’s individual subjectivity into the collective impulse of the maternal.  
     
Tyler May highlights this uneasy juxtaposition with reference to a 1959 Life 
magazine cover story in which a newlywed couple spent their honeymoon in a 
backyard bomb shelter. While obviously a stunt designed to sell magazines, it was, 
Tyler May writes, a ‘powerful image of the nuclear family in the nuclear age: 
isolated, sexually charged, cushioned by abundance, and protected against 
impending doom by the wonders of modern technology’ (Tyler May 2008, loc 99 of 
6512). The pictures accompanying the article included in Tyler May’s book invoke a 
sense of playfulness that belies the eventual enclosure awaiting the young wife 
whose fate has been set in both the literal and symbolic sense. Ensconced in the 
bomb-shelter designed to safeguard her future, her isolation from participation in the 
outside world and individual autonomy is complete. Tyler May highlights the more 
dire implications this had for women, again borrowing from Cold War rhetoric, 
when describing a cultural landscape in which ‘domestic containment mushroomed 
into a full-blown ideology’  (Tyler May 2008, loc 1812 of 6512).  
 
Tyler May depicts a world in which the word “nuclear” has become a 
metonym for the dominance of the American man - a dominance predicated upon 
the containment of external enemies via the accrual of weaponry, and women via 
their entrapment as wives. Rejecting this cultural template in favour of feminine 
solidarity, even if subject to the potentially restrictive dictates Rich articulated in Of 
Woman Born, represented a fundamental rejection of this masculine ideology of 
containment. It is no small irony that in 1950s America, educated middle class white 
  165 
women such as Rich were sold the idea of personal freedom as a means of masking 
the lack of choice available to them. In Cold War American culture, privacy and 
freedom of (professional) choice, as with so many other privileges of subjectivity, 
were privileges only middle class and wealthy white men were fully admitted to. 
 
Indeed, as feminists such as Friedan and Rich argued, the economic 
dependence forced upon women by a system which defined ‘men as breadwinners 
and women as mothers’ was the very antithesis of freedom. Similarly, the pervasive 
conditioning of both sexes regarding entrenched gender roles also suggests the 
opposite of personal choice. Comments such as those of Nixon, which carried the 
weight of a decree because of the office from which they were uttered, can be seen 
as encouraging a curtailing of personal freedom in their dogged endorsement of 
familial domesticity as being the only acceptable mode of living. In this regard the 
domestic was both weapon and tool – a weapon in the sense it was presumed to 
safeguard western society against the lure of communism; and a tool in the sense the 
government was manipulating it in order to subdue women and alienate them from 
the professions and economic independence. 
 
 
Material and Symbolic Regulation of the Maternal 
 
 
Interpellation, it is worth noting, relies upon the Althusserian and 
Foucauldian idea that the subject is produced by social forces, becoming the vehicle 
through which State sanctioned ideology is embodied and embedded. Originally 
posited in the early 1970s by the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, this 
account of subject formation theorises that ‘subjects of experience are ideologically 
produced and thereby equipped to perform the roles to which they are allocated in 
the division of labour’ (Payne M (ed.) 1996, 258). This theory largely strips the 
subject of individuality by denying the constitutive role of the human subject, 
instead attributing the shaping of consciousness to the ideological environment the 
subject is born into. It is a theory that upon further examination appears also to be 
grounded upon a maddening circularity.  
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To focus on the ways in which the subject is effectively ensnared in, or 
enslaved by, the authority of ideology is to assume that ideology springs into culture 
without any human involvement. Such thinking invests all cultural and psychic 
power in the idea while refusing to acknowledge the source of the idea. Further, it 
assumes that ideology, and therefore identity, is fixed and unassailable. As such, it is 
a theory that would seem at odds with the lens of personal freedom through which 
Americans were encouraged to view their subjectivity. And yet, while the 
apparatuses of ideological dissemination envisaged by Althusser were faceless 
institutions, we cannot escape the fact that all ideology must originate from both 
within and outside human consciousness. The need to control individual subjectivity 
via the faceless, dehumanised machinations of some authoritarian body has across 
history been demonstrated to be a deeply rooted human one. One, which, as the 
comparison between gender roles in the ‘free’ democratic America and the 
supposedly more totalitarian, repressive regime of communist Russia shows, is not 
contingent upon any one particular ideology. Despite what Nixon would have had us 
believe, competing ideologies cannot be conveniently summed up along Manichean 
notions of good and evil particularly with regard to their cultural impact upon 
women.    
 
Rather, a common thread observable in most ideological dissemination (with 
the exception of feminism), be it via politics, economics or religion, would appear to 
be the investment of power in the male subject at the expense of the female. Further, 
as examined in previous chapters, woman’s relationship, both symbolic and 
material, to the maternal has often been the facilitator of her disempowerment 
despite the powerful cultural investment western society continues to have in the 
idea of motherhood.  An examination of mid twentieth century American society 
from a Marxist perspective might highlight the ways in which some men were 
economically, socially and politically disadvantaged by other factors such as race 
and class, but this doesn’t, I argue, elucidate a profoundly different explanation of 
sexual politics and the interplay of gender and power than that which Lacan 
proposed with his theory of the symbolic order.  
 
This is particularly true when considering the division of labour within 
capitalist societies such as America, in which individualism and freedom, or 
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subjectivity, has typically been understood in relation to the subject’s interaction 
with the masculine dominated market. In their landmark study of the ways in which 
women have been infantilised in post-industrial western capitalist societies For Her 
Own Good: 150 Years of the Expert’s Advice to Women, Barbara Ehrenreich and 
Deirdre English argue that despite a national ethos which favoured the individual, 
from the earliest days of American nationhood women’s right to individuation and 
heterogeneous subjectivity was sacrificed for the collective good of the nation 
building project. Seen from a materialist perspective, women were reduced to their 
role as providers of human capital. The Market, it can be argued, is as tyrannical as 
the State in dictating the conditions of human subjectivity, but this pragmatic view 
of the division of labour in a market driven capitalist society, does not account 
entirely for the oppression of woman. 
 
 Rather, we must look to the ways in which the symbolic order - which 
remained the dominant organising principle of culture in the wake of the industrial 
revolution – has interacted with the Market to ensure the continued dominance of the 
patriarchy. Logic would suggest that, left to its own devices, the Market does not 
differentiate between the sexes in its demand for labour. Therefore, all distinctions 
between male and female used to justify the organisation of gender roles within 
capitalist societies are artificial cultural constructs, as Butler was later to argue, 
designed to perpetuate woman’s oppression in the chauvinistic guise of protecting 
them from the rigours of a world not of their making. Nixon was right to point out 
the privileging of the home (the private sphere) as a distinguishing principle of 
American life, but his insistence that American women benefitted from their 
banishment from public life overlooks how this ideological framework denied them 
equal subjective status. It also fails to acknowledge that this particular concept of 
individual freedom was built upon, as Ehrenreich and English argue, the economic 
exploitation and political exclusion of half of the population.       
 
Ehrenreich and English contend that the cultural impulse of western capitalist 
societies towards the mystification of the feminine (also known as ‘the Woman 
Question’) gave rise to a system of obfuscation designed to distract women from 
their submissive status while reassuring the patriarchy of its continued ascendency in 
a world thrown into chaos by industrial revolution – ‘a historic transformation’ of 
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labour, economic and familial relations ‘whose scale later generations have still 
barely grasped’ (Ehrenreich & English 1978, 3).  While the unprecedented economic 
and social disruptions of the industrial revolution may have dismantled the ‘old 
order’ of agrarian dominated society, the symbolic order continued to assert 
phallocentric hegemony by refusing to admit women to the full privileges of 
subjectivity.   
 
This produced what Ehrenreich and English describe as a complex set of 
cultural manoeuvrings designed to maintain women’s status as second sex. Any 
notion of sexual equality, or as Ehrenreich and English refer to it, sexual rationalism, 
was rejected in favour of a manufactured – or constructed - sense of femininity 
which Ehrenreich and English refer to as sexual romanticism. Sexual rationalism 
echoes the Kristevan and other feminist challenges to the symbolic by rejecting the 
metaphysical differences between the genders, and in many ways anticipates 
Butler’s deconstruction of gender as performativity.  
 
Sexual rationalism does not remove all potential for oppression, particularly 
economic oppression; as Ehrenreich and English note, this kind of rationalism is 
‘overly accepting of the “free” interactions of the Market’, but it does at least place 
women on equal sexual and symbolic footing, presumably with equivalent chance of 
validation, or risk of victimisation, by the Market. However, Ehrenreich and English 
break from Kristeva by framing sexual rationalism as a kind of material realism that 
acknowledges ‘the social world the Market has created’ and ‘does not turn coyly 
away from facts which happen to be unpleasant’ (Ehrenreich & English 1978, 26).  
In this sense, rationalism sounds as monolithic as essentialism and my 
deconstructuralist critical lens prods me to question the notion of ‘facts’ as 
impenetrable units of meaning, even if said facts are being held up to critique 
essentialist (if metaphysical) notions of the feminine which I also recognise as 
limiting and damaging.    
 
In contrast, the opposing force to sexual rationalism, sexual romanticism, is 
dismissed as outrageous subterfuge: 
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Sexual romanticism, on the other hand, is by its nature committed to lies and evasion. The 
glorified home allows the sexual romantic to escape from the Market, and his intense need for 
that home – precisely as an escape – forces him to lie about the realties of the human 
relationships within it. […] Sexual romanticism befogs the senses, draws lace curtains against 
the industrial landscape outside, and offers a cozy dream in which men are men and women 
are – mercifully – not men’ (Ehrenreich & English 1978, 26).  
 
It is a curious sensation to find myself moved to resist what is essentially a rejection 
of the same restrictive notions of gender roles I have been chafing against, and 
which, I read as being argued from the same critical place of wanting to challenge 
the damaging impact of these regressive notions that I read in Rich’s work.  
 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that Ehrenreich and English are 
unreasonably dogged in their analysis of sexual politics. Their presentation of this 
argument is presented as exactly that – an analysis of the specific conditions under 
which they believe women have been oppressed within both the material and 
symbolic realms, but the language they use evokes a sense of righteousness in its 
favouring the idea of sexual rationalism even as it acknowledges the limitations of 
this thinking. While I don’t disagree with their assessment of the damaging 
absurdities inherent in sexual romanticism with its emphasis on the domestication of 
the feminine, I would also ask what space the mother occupies within a sexual 
rationalist framework. Sexual romanticism may emphasise the mystification of the 
feminine which has resulted in a similar mystification of the maternal, but sexual 
rationalism with its emphasis on the commonality of subjectivity between the sexes 
affords no recognition of the complex specificity and differences of maternal 
experience, leaving me to ask if it is in fact possible to deconstruct the cultural 
constructs of gender without erasing the maternal?  
 
It must also be noted that while Rich regarded For Their Own Good as a 
valuable contribution to feminist scholarship, she also felt it suffered from its lack of 
consideration of lesbian experience. In her famous 1980 essay, ‘Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Experience’, in which she argued against the notion of 
heterosexuality as the default sexual and social identification for women, Rich writes 
of her disappointment at this exclusion: ‘So much of this book is so devastatingly 
informative and is written with such lucid feminist wit, that I kept waiting as I read 
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for the basic proscription against lesbianism to be examined. It never was’ (Rich 
1986, 29). Regarded as one of the first cohesive and comprehensive feminist 
repudiations of heteronormative social hegemony, Rich’s essay reminds us of the 
ways in which maternal subjectivity interacts and intersects with female subjectivity.   
 
Sexual rationalism may endeavour to remove the kind of distinctions that I 
have been arguing act as barriers to women achieving full autonomy of subjectivity, 
but does this levelling of the symbolic playing field, so to speak, also have the 
desired effect of opening up this autonomy for the female subject who also identifies 
as a mother? Indeed, while the control exerted by the symbolic over representations 
of the maternal does act as a regulatory and constricting force, it does not follow that 
a disavowal of this authority will result in an understanding of maternal subjectivity 
that allows for greater complexity if acknowledgment of the particularity of 
maternity as a subjective condition is also abandoned. Alison Stone takes up this 
concern in her book Feminism, Psychoanalysis and Maternal Subjectivity, calling 
for a recognition of maternal subjectivity as distinct from female subjectivity. Stone 
sees maternal subjectivity as ‘a variation on female subjectivity’, arguing that it ‘is 
important to treat the two as distinct, otherwise we lose sight of what is peculiar to 
maternity’ (Stone 2012, 4).  
 
Stone’s argument here is more radical than it might appear at first glance 
because she is arguing for a recognition of the maternal not as an irreducible aspect 
of female subjectivity, but as a separate mode of being. While not explicitly 
decoupling the maternal from female experience or the feminine, Stone nevertheless 
positions motherhood as a distinct subject position. The binary of sexual 
rationalism/romanticism provides no space in which this distinction might be 
recognised, as both modes of conceptualising female subjectivity assume that female 
experience can be understood as homogenous rather than heterogeneous. Therefore, 
in both modes, motherhood is figured as only a part (albeit of great consequence) of 
the sum and total of female experience. Stone’s reimagining of maternal subjectivity 
insists upon the particularity of maternal experience at the metaphysical and 
symbolic level thus also allowing for individual signification free of the confining 
weight of the maternal as a cultural construct.  
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Looking Beyond the Rationalism/Romanticism Dichotomy 
 
While much of Of Woman Born can be read as arguing, if not for sexual 
rationalism, certainly against sexual romanticism, Rich’s work does not proclaim 
that the reduced political and social status of women can be explained entirely by the 
dichotomy posed by Ehrenreich and English. In her chapter on the domestication of 
motherhood, Rich notes that Fredrich Engels ‘identified father-right and the end of 
the matrilineal clan with the beginning of private ownership and slavery. He saw 
women as forced into marriage and prostitution through economic dependency, and 
predicted that sexual emancipation would come with the abolition of private 
property and the end of male economic supremacy’ (Rich 1995, 111).  
 
From a materialist perspective, Engels’ words support many of the 
arguments against motherhood as a patriarchal institution Rich develops in Of 
Woman Born, but Rich stops short of endorsing Engels’ assertion that women’s 
subjugation can be explained entirely in materialist terms, accusing him of allowing 
what contemporary parlance would term his male privilege to overwhelm his 
reasoning: 
 
Materialist analysis and masculine bias allow Engels to assume that an economic 
solution will cleanse false consciousness, create a new concept of gender, purge the 
future of the pathologies of the past. But he fails to understand that it is the mother-
son and mother-daughter relationship, as much as, perhaps more than, that between 
man the buyer and woman the bought which creates the sexual politics of male 
supremacism (Rich 1995, 111-12). 
 
In highlighting the error of assuming gender politics are informed entirely by the 
Market (a limitation also noted by Ehrenreich and English), Rich rejects the idea that 
male hegemony is specifically a capitalist instinct, noting that 
 
Even under the pressures of growing, worldwide, women’s consciousness, the 
overwhelming bias of socialists and revolutionary movements is male, and reflects a 
wish to have a social revolution which would leave male leadership and control 
essentially untouched (Rich 1995, 111-12).  
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Rich exposes the ontological failings of dichotomous thinking which pits 
ideological concepts in opposition to one another to account for what appears to be 
the symmetrical subjugation of women across cultures at the symbolic and structural 
level. As was seen with Nixon and Khrushchev’s kitchen cabinet posturing, 
regardless of the ideological paradigm a government observes, in societies that 
invest both material and symbolic power almost exclusively in male hands, the 
female experience is one of diminished subjectivity. This is not to suggest that the 
experience of women is analogous across cultures, but rather to reinforce the point 
that at the most intrinsic level the dominant organising principle of various societies, 
even those which purport to reject romantic notions of femininity, remains 
phallocentric. 
 
 Rich’s position here appears similar to that which Simone de Beauvoir 
evolved over the course of her writing career through her various discursive 
interactions with both Marxist and existentialist theory. In Sexual/Textual Politics, 
Moi tells us that despite pioneering a vision of the female condition which exposed 
and interrogated many of the hindering and degrading cultural assumptions 
surrounding the feminine that would later form the basis of much of second wave 
feminist theory, Beauvoir (who she lauds as ‘surely the greatest feminist theorist of 
our time’) did not identify as a feminist when she published The Second Sex in 1949. 
Rather, Moi writes, Beauvoir was ‘convinced that the advent of socialism alone 
would put an end to the oppression of women and consequently considered herself a 
socialist’ (Moi 2002, 89). But while Beauvoir’s faith in the power of socialism to 
deliver gender equality echoes that of Engels, her exploration of the female 
condition laid out in The Second Sex looks beyond economic and political structures, 
as Moi notes 
 
In spite of its commitment to socialism, The Second Sex is based not on traditional 
Marxist theory, but on Sartre’s existentialist philosophy. Beauvoir’s main thesis in 
this epochal work is simple: throughout history, women have been reduced to 
objects for men: ‘woman’ has been constructed as man’s Other, denied the right to 
her own subjectivity and responsibility for her own actions. Or, in more 
existentialist terms: patriarchal ideology presents woman as an immanence man as 
a transcendence. Beauvoir shows how these fundamental assumptions dominate all 
aspects of social, political and cultural life and, equally important, how women 
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themselves internalize this objectified vision, thus living in a constant state of 
‘inauthenticity’ or ‘bad faith’, as Sartre might have put it (Moi 2002, 90). 
 
The shift in Beauvoir’s view that Moi notes from her position when writing 
The Second Sex suggests that just as economics alone could not explain the complex 
cultural compulsions behind the domestic and sexual commodification of women, so 
too market-based materialist solutions were not the panacea that Beauvoir imaged 
them to be. Although the quote Moi includes, in which Beauvoir details her evolving 
thinking on feminism, concludes that she is ‘a feminist today because I realised that 
we must fight for the situation of women, here and now, before our dream of 
socialism come true’ sounds sanguine enough, I wonder if this was perhaps a painful 
revelation for her (Moi 2002, 89). Transforming the outward manifestations of an 
unfavourable economic and political system is surely a more tangible aim than 
rewiring the internalised desires and drives that form the basis of the symbolic order. 
Analysis of the various structural manifestations of the subjugation of women is 
obviously important, but if one sees these manifestations as symptoms rather than 
the root cause, any attempts to address them will be necessarily limited by the 
continuing dominance of the word of the Father within the symbolic. Or rather, one 
might be tempted to view the symbolic as a Hydra-like manifestation of dominant 
cultural impulses that continue to replicate and reappear even as feminists wield 
theoretical axes to cut the problematic ones off. 
 
 Significantly, Rich attributes the failure of sexual rationalism to account for 
the ‘false consciousness’ of difference generally, and femininity specifically, to the 
cultural shadow cast by the mother. This positions maternity as the mainstay of the 
gender binary and by extension, sexual romanticism. The two great twentieth 
century theorists of human behaviour, Lacan and Freud, both identified the 
awareness of the mother as other or object as the key facilitator of the separate 
subjectivity of the child. Freud placed emphasis (many feminists have argued unduly 
so) on the male child’s recognition of sexual difference between himself and his 
mother as both a traumatic disruption to the mother son bond and necessary enabler 
of the autonomous male subject. Feminists from Beauvoir to Freidan, Rich and 
beyond have singled out Freud’s theory of the Oedipus Complex as profoundly 
lacking in an understanding of feminine subjectivity or sexuality. Kristeva, who has 
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perhaps articulated a less combative view of Freud’s analysis of sexual politics than 
Friedan and Beauvoir, nonetheless observed that the Oedipal process he theorised 
casts the mother in the impossible position of being expected to completely immerse 
her identity into her child (more specifically her son) and to sacrifice any claim to 
subjective autonomy in order to support her son’s entry into the symbolic.  
 
To further compound the demand placed upon the mother, any attempt to resist 
this transition, which is tantamount to her symbolic obliteration, becomes mired in 
the pathology  Kristeva identified as abject in her 1982 treatise The Powers of 
Horror. In this volume, Kristeva explored the psychic violence occasioned by the 
disturbing disruption of the border between subject and other, arguing that we first 
experience abjection ‘with our earliest attempts to release the hold of maternal 
entity’ (Kristeva 1982, 13). The mother-child relationship becomes the site of 
conflict and thus abjection when the mother resists the child’s attempts to break 
away: 
 
The child can serve its mother as token of her own authentication; there is, however, 
hardly any reason for her to serve as go-between for it to become autonomous and 
authentic in its turn. In such close combat, the symbolic light that a third party, 
eventually the father, can contribute helps the future subject, the more so it happens 
to be endowed with a robust supply of drive energy, in pursuing a reluctant struggle 
against what, having been the mother, will turn into an abject. Repelling, rejecting; 
repelling itself, rejecting itself (Kristeva 1982, 13).  
 
Kristeva’s description here casts the mother as a conduit, whose role within the 
symbolic is only to enable the child to take their place within the symbolic, at which 
point, presumably, the mother, having served her purpose, has been effaced, and 
symbolically erased. While it could be argued that sexual rationalism can disrupt this 
process by removing essentialist notions of gender from the triad of mother, child 
and father Freud envisaged, as Rich reminds us, ignoring or denying the maternal 
does not empower the mother, but rather is another form of erasure. Sexual 
romanticism may be all the things Ehrenreich and English decried, and few feminists 
would dispute that this kind of thinking is largely responsible for the ‘false 
consciousness’ of sexual difference used to deny women the full privileges of 
subjectivity, but it does at least acknowledge the importance and distinctiveness of 
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the mother. In some ways, a sexual romanticist view of motherhood paradoxically 
invests the mother with just the kind of significance (although, crucially, not 
emancipation or agency) that carves out her place in the symbolic. In a world in 
thrall to sexual romanticism, the mother may remain trapped in her status as symbol, 
denied control over her signification, but the point is that she does signify, and 
continues to signify through this romantic sanctification of the maternal, even after 
her submission to the process described above.  
 
I do not wish to suggest that sexual romanticism is a desirable cultural 
organising principle. Rather, it strikes me that both sexual romanticism and sexual 
rationalism suffer from similar limitations, albeit from opposing perspectives, in that 
neither view is able to encompass the ambiguities and elusiveness Kristeva invoked 
when she spoke of the nature/culture threshold of the maternal. Kristeva recognised 
the problematic nature of this complex interplay of the material and the 
metaphysical, pointing out that the maternal subject cannot be contained purely by 
romantic imaginings or paternal dictates, because birth, the physical process from 
which the mother draws her symbolic significance also serves as a visceral reminder 
of the biology underpinning the mystification of the maternal. Birth, she tells us, is 
‘the height of bloodshed and life, [the] scorching moment of hesitation (between 
inside and outside, ego and other, life and death), horror and beauty, sexuality and 
the blunt negation of the sexual’ (Kristeva 1982, 155). But we must also ask if by 
highlighting the transformative power of the birthing process Kristeva invokes the 
same essentialist reading of female subjectivity that Moi claimed she scorned with 
her rejection of the male female dichotomy as metaphysical.  
 
It does not follow that birth is integral to maternal subjectivity, given the 
ongoing performative processes that make up one’s experience of maternity. To 
limit our understanding of the maternal to this one physical process is to exclude 
those such as lesbian and adoptive parents whose entry into motherhood is not 
linked to biology. The challenge for feminist theorists in their ongoing project of 
defining and understanding maternal subjectivity lies in finding ways in which such 
experiences might be encompassed without diminishing the material and biological 
reality women must confront when exposed to the risks of pregnancy and birth.      
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Kristeva’s description might sound horrific, but her frank discussion of the 
primal physicality of giving birth also confers a remarkable degree of power upon 
the mother, at least in the first instance during the ‘scorching moment of hesitation’ 
in which the mother embodies the threshold between the extremes of human 
existence. Despite the myriad medical and technological advances which have 
transformed our relationship to human reproduction over the past half century, to 
this day pregnancy and birth remain inextricably linked with biological femaleness. 
However, while women may have a tangible relationship to childbirth, this is also a 
site of contradiction, conflict and ambivalence, as bearing responsibility for this 
physical process is as much of a burden as it is a signifier of feminine power. Rich 
acknowledges this conflict at various points in Of Woman Born. In the introduction 
written for the first edition in 1976, Rich asserts somewhat dramatically that ‘under 
patriarchy, female possibility has been literally massacred on the site of motherhood’ 
because ‘women are controlled by lashing us to our bodies’ (Rich 1995, 13).   
 
Later in the text, she allows that that while childbirth ‘may be painful, 
dangerous and unchosen’, it has also been ‘converted into a purpose, an act of self-
assertion by a woman forced to assert herself primarily through her biology’ (Rich 
1995, 160). Imbuing childbirth with this kind of significance gives rise to a 
potentially troubling juxtaposition of the biologic and symbolic. While emphasising 
the physical and performative aspects of motherhood arguably recuperates the 
agency of the maternal subject from the effacement of the symbolic, tying a 
woman’s purpose and ‘self-assertion’ to their reproductive function is also limiting 
and antithetical to much of the radical feminist ideology of the second wave which 
sought to liberate women from the physical and cultural entrapment of/in the 
maternal as the preeminent socially sanctioned outlet of female possibility.  
 
Additionally, although childbirth, which it must be noted is not a synecdoche 
for the maternal, remains unassailably and viscerally a female experience, here too, 
women have been forced to cede their authority and bodily sovereignty. Rich argues 
that the intrusion of the male ‘expert’ into the birthing room and the creation of 
obstetrics as a profession, which began in the eighteenth century, was a patriarchal 
incursion into this one gynocentric sphere of influence and a subversion of any 
power women might have gained from giving birth. Rich sees this intrusion as 
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tapping into a feminine compulsion towards passivity that keeps women alienated 
both from their bodies and the birthing process, and which is yet another example of 
the devaluing of female experience which operates at the most instinctive levels of 
our culture. Or, in other words, the apposition of the active labour of childbirth with 
the ‘“courage” of passive suffering’ it requires women to willingly endure represents 
an uneasy confluence of the jostling demands of nature/biology and culture.  
 
While male intervention certainly exacerbates the psychic fallout from this 
confluence (and it must be remarked that the patriarchy has much to gain from 
encouraging any hesitation into physical or emotional passivity on the part of 
woman), it is not Rich argues, the primary instigator of it. She writes: 
      
I began thinking about childbirth with the hypothesis that men had gradually 
annexed the role of birth-attendant and thus assumed authority over the very sphere 
which had originally been one source of female power and charisma. But for many 
reasons – the advent of the male midwife and obstetrician being one – passive 
suffering and the archetypal female experience of childbirth have been seen as 
identical (Rich 1995, 129). 
 
This transposing of passivity on the intense activity of labour is both alienating and 
disorienting. The pervasiveness and potency of the image of woman’s willing 
submission to the suffering of childbirth encourages a false idea of female docility 
and martyrdom which the patriarchy exploits:    
 
Passive suffering has thus been seen as a universal, “natural,” female destiny, carried into 
every sphere of our experience; and until we understand this fully, we will not have the self-
knowledge to move from a centuries-old “endurance” of suffering to a new active being (129). 
 
For Rich, the mechanical instruments of labour invented by male obstetricians 
to control the pacing and outcome of labour– most notably the forceps - are forceful 
embodiments of the passivity imposed upon women. Describing them as ‘“hands of 
iron”’ which ‘are often used with mechanistic brutality’, she positions them as 
potent symbols of the alienation of women – both as patient and practitioner - from 
the birthing process (Rich 1995, 142). The very word ‘forceps’ invokes the images 
of mechanistic force which these ‘hands of iron’ impose upon the labouring woman, 
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but Rich’s contrasting image of the female ‘hands of flesh’ of the midwives who 
have ‘delivered millions of children and soothed the labor of millions of mothers’ is 
perhaps straying into sexual romanticism and essentialism with its implication that 
all female intervention in the birthing process is synonymous with nurturing. (142).  
While Rich is concerned here with separating what she sees as the co-opting of the 
maternal by the patriarchy, from the lived experience of motherhood – or in the 
words of her title the institution from the experience, her phrasing inevitably risks 
falling back on the same gendered assumptions which keep women imprisoned in 
the kind of restricted subjectivity with maternity as its only outlet.    
 
However, separating the maternal from female subjectivity brings with it other 
complications, especially in an historical moment, such as that inhabited by 
American women at the time Rich was writing, in which the social and political 
positioning of women was undergoing such a dramatic upheaval. Rich notes that the 
dismantling of the cultural institution of motherhood undertaken by her second wave 
feminist sisters placed the initial inheritors of this ideology – women who came of 
age in the 1970s and 80s - in a ideological and social bind, in which they found 
themselves beset by diverging compulsions regarding the maternal. She writes that 
‘the sense of producing a necessary person, or persons and of carrying out one’s 
destiny as a woman,’ coupled with ‘the ambivalence toward, or rejection of 
motherhood’ stirred up in the wake of feminist challenges to the patriarchal 
institution of maternity gave rise to a ‘continuing thread of unexamined emotions’ in 
which these women struggled to reconcile any maternal longings they may have felt 
with their subsequent immersion in feminist ideology which prompted them to either 
reject or question these longings as being acculturated compulsions towards their 
submission. As a result, Rich continues, the ‘twentieth-century, educated young 
woman, looking perhaps at her mother’s life, or trying to create an autonomous self 
in a society which insists that she is destined primarily for reproduction, has with 
good reason felt that the choice was an inescapable either/or: motherhood or 
individuation, motherhood or creativity, motherhood or freedom’ (Rich 1995, 160).  
 
The reader will note that Rich’s focus here appears to be upon women whose 
circumstances – educated and creative – mirror her own. The reader will also note 
that while Rich believes these women have been allowed a choice regarding 
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motherhood which was not available to previous generations, this choice takes the 
form of the same rigid ‘inescapable either/or’ dichotomous thinking which casts 
women as ‘other’ in the gender binary. Is choice, when defined in such stark, un-
nuanced terms, ultimately illusory? Rich would appear to think so, given she frames 
the parameters of this choice in terms which place motherhood in opposition to the 
main tenets of subjectivity – individuality and freedom. It is important to note that 
Rich’s argument here is not with the idea of motherhood, but rather the way in 
which it has been codified within her culture. In presenting the choice offered to 
women in a post-second wave world between motherhood and childlessness as being 
so inflexible, Rich is not arguing against motherhood, but rather against the 
circumstances in which, as she sees it, neither state of being – motherhood or 
childlessness – is particularly appealing, or freeing. In this social economy, the 
woman who chooses motherhood must do so in the knowledge she is foregoing her 
individuation and freedom at the personal level, while the woman who decides 
against it must run the gamut of a society and culture in which she has rejected 
access to the only structural and symbolic power afforded to her.        
 
This dilemma posed by Rich is further proof that a rationalising of sexual 
difference is beyond the reach of cultures in which notions of the feminine are 
sublimated under the maternal. In this regard it can be said that the mother and our 
awareness of her as a separate entity is both predicated upon and complicated by 
expectations surrounding gender. These complications were very much evident at 
the time Rich was writing Of Woman Born as ratification of the Equal Rights 
Amendment was being debated in several state legislatures around the country. 
Originally proposed in 1923 by one of the leading activists in the struggle for 
women’s franchise, Alice Paul, the Equal Rights Amendment, or ERA as it came to 
be known, was controversial and contentious amongst women, feminists and 
legislators alike for over 50 years, because of its emphasis upon equal rights, was 
also seen as an attempt to enshrine sexual rationalism into law. Given the bill 
ultimately failed, it would seem that the discomfort inspired by the idea of removing 
all gender distinctions remained persistent, despite all the discursive and material 
efforts of feminists to dismantle gendered stereotypes.  
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Power In Language 
 
 
Much of this chapter has centred on the idea of power, and the question of 
how, or if, this power is available to the mother. Power and powerlessness is a 
dominant theme in much of the writing about motherhood, both in popular culture 
and discursive texts. Feminist theorists have typically tended to emphasise the lack 
of power afforded to women as mother, by contrasting this individual 
disempowerment with the monolithic symbolic power of the mother. Rich references 
this in her introduction to Of Woman Born when she describes the cultural gap 
between the institution and experience of motherhood as being typified by the  
‘peculiar tension between an old idea system from which the energy is gone but 
which has the heaped up force of custom, tradition, money and institutions behind it’ 
(Rich 1986, ix). Similarly, in her foreword to Badinter’s Mother Love: Myth and 
Reality: Motherhood in Modern History, Francine du Plessix Gray, observes how 
unsettling the notion that mother love can be separated from instinct is: 
 
 ‘To be told that mother love is not an innate impulse but a free choice, a gift that 
can be given and withdrawn at will, confronts each of us with the fearsome 
possibility that we might have been born into a void of indifference. (du Plessix 
Gray in Badinter 1980, xi)  
 
In her 1980 essay ‘Maternal Thinking’, Rich’s American contemporary Sara 
Ruddick describes ‘the poignant conjunction of power and powerlessness’ as being 
‘[c]entral to our experience of our mothers and our mothering’ (Ruddick 1980, 
343). I question the emphasis Ruddick places on the idea that ‘maternal practices 
begin in love’ with its intendant implication that love is always the instinctive 
feminine response to maternity, even if that love sometimes manifests destructively. 
However, her observation that ‘[p]owerless mothers are also powerful’ (343) 
because for a ‘child a mother is the primary, uncontrollable source of the world’s 
goods; a witness and a judge whose will must be placated’ recognises the complex 
interplay of power and responsibility within the mother/child dyad. Locating this 
‘conjunction of power and powerlessness’ within the mother/child relationship 
rather than in the interplay between cultural institution of motherhood and the 
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patriarchy, which is also Rich’s project in Of Woman Born, does not liberate 
women from confines of the gender binary, nor does it place the mother/child 
relationship entirely outside the parameters defined by Freud, but it does, at least, 
recover motherhood as an active, performative process. This is an important 
distinction because it emphasises the presence of the mother - both physically and 
psychically – rather than her presumed symbolic effacement. 
 
Contemplating the power dynamics of the mother/child dyad is also fraught, 
as can be seen in the quotes above, all of which exhibit a large degree of 
ambivalence regarding the complex interplay of emotions and authority flowing 
between mother and child. Rather than being presented as a loving exchange, 
Badinter and Ruddick’s descriptions evoke the imagery of an ongoing psychic battle 
in which neither mother nor child emerges victorious. The mother may imprint her 
authority irrevocably on the child, but this is also an act of submission as she must 
then bear the weight and responsibility of this authority, and both parties remain 
locked in this relationship indefinitely. Where Freud sees the vanishing of the 
mother in order to facilitate the subject formation of the child, Badinter and 
Ruddick’s descriptions of the overwhelming significance of the performance of 
maternity emphasise the inescapable ossification into the role of mother that a 
women undergoes when she gives birth.  
 
Rich also stresses the definitive significance of this relationship: 
  
Because young humans remain dependant upon nurture for a much longer period than other 
mammals, and because of the division of labor long established in human groups, where 
women not only bear and suckle but are assigned almost total responsibility for children, most 
of us first know both love and disappointment, power and tenderness, in the person of a 
woman (Rich 1995, 11). 
 
Rich brings us to the place that is also Kristeva’s nature/culture threshold, exposing 
how these twin pressures have combined to place a burden of responsibility upon 
women which society has little interest in interrogating or understanding 
 
 We carry the imprint of this experience for life, even into our dying. Yet there has 
been a strange lack of material to help us understand and use it. We know more 
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about the air we breathe, the seas we travel, than about the nature and meaning of 
motherhood (11). 
 
This lack of understanding, and more significantly, the lack of desire to understand 
the specificity of maternal subjectivity and our experience of this subject position 
(our experience of being mothered), further mystifies the cultural positioning of the 
mother.  
 
 Many feminist theorists and writers have struggled to bridge this gap of 
understanding, not only of what it is to be a mother, but also of her positioning and 
resonance within society. Notably, Kristeva, proposed in Revolution of Poetic 
Language (1974) her theory of semiotics, which she saw as the ‘precondition of the 
symbolic’ (Kristeva in Moi (Ed) 1986, 103). Kristeva’s positioning of the semiotic 
chora outside the dictates of the symbolic order, or social censure, has made it an 
elusive and difficult theoretical concept to grasp for some feminists. Toril Moi notes 
that Kristeva herself is ‘acutely aware of the contradictions involved in trying to 
theorize the untheorizable chora’, because semiotic theory is ‘always already caught 
up in a paradox, an aporia which is the same as that of the speaking subject: both 
find themselves in a position which is at once subversive of and dependent upon the 
law.’(Moi (Ed) 1986, 13) This impasse encapsulates the wider dilemma of 
individuation versus essentialism I have observed at play within feminism. While 
‘the Kristevian subject is a subject-in process’, as Moi observes, with her theorising 
of the semiotic, we find Kristeva ‘carrying out once again, a difficult balancing act 
between a position which would deconstruct subjectivity and identity altogether, and 
one that would try to capture these entities in a humanist mould’ (13). What, then, 
are the implications of Kristeva’s semiotic theory for her understanding of 
motherhood, given her efforts to deconstruct subjectivity and reconfigure a language 
outside the phallocentric confines of the symbolic?  
 
In her essay ‘The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva’, Judith Butler describes the 
relationship Kristeva envisages between the semiotic and the maternal as one of 
mutual subversion of phallocentric hegemony: 
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 Kristeva challenges the Lacanian narrative which assumes that cultural meaning 
requires the repression of that primary relationship to the maternal body. She 
argues that the “semiotic” is a dimension of language occasioned by that primary 
maternal body, which not only refutes Lacan’s primary premise, but also serves as 
a perpetual source of subversion within the symbolic. For Kristeva, the semiotic 
expresses that original libidinal multiplicity within the very terms of culture, more 
precisely, within poetic language in which multiple meanings and semantic non-
closure prevail. In effect, poetic language is the recovery of the maternal body 
within the terms of language, one that has the potential to disrupt, subvert, and 
displace the paternal law. (Butler in Oliver (Ed) 1993, 164) 
 
Identifying poetic language as the means of recovery and liberation of the maternal 
body has obvious significant implications for any study of poetry, such as this thesis, 
which takes as its subject the maternal and the poetic.  
 
Seen in this light, language, specifically poetic language, becomes the 
medium through which the maternal subject is actualised by the poet/speaker and 
then recognised by the reader. This is a view that empowers the maternal subject 
with its emphasis on articulation as an act of subversion in which maternal identity is 
claimed as a speaking position that rejects the parameters of the word of the father. 
Articulation of a position opens this position up to interpretation by the reader (or 
receiver) of this articulation. Indeed, the very act of articulation, or in the case of 
poetry, publication has the immediate effect of making this actualisation of 
subjectivity external to the speaking subject and thus beyond the speaker’s 
definition. This is further complicated by the notion, long accepted by critics and 
theorists, that the speaker of a poem is a constructed subject, not necessarily 
analogous to, or identifiable with the poet.  
 
On the other hand, the tension between the idea of the constructed poetic self 
which must be read as separate from the poet, and the confessional lyric as the space 
in which the poet’s self might externalise has often resulted in the diminishment of 
the personal as both a speaking and interpretive position. Feminist writers, theorists 
and critics alike have resisted this diminishment, and Kristeva’s theorising of poetic 
language as a site of maternal subversion would appear to offer solid theoretical 
grounding for this resistance. However, Butler argues that while Kristeva’s semiotic 
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theory relies on ‘undecidability’ as ‘its disruptive function’ in which poetic language 
‘thus suggests a dissolution of the coherent, signifying subject into the primary 
continuity which is the maternal body’, this dissolution is ultimately self-defeating 
because ‘poetic language erodes and destroys the subject, where the subject is 
understood as a speaking being participating in the symbolic’ (Butler in Oliver (Ed) 
1993, 168).  
 
Butler’s critique of Kristevan semiotic theory rests on the premise that 
because Kristeva does not seek ‘to replace the symbolic with the semiotic,’ or to 
‘establish the semiotic as a rival cultural possibility, but rather to validate those 
experiences within the symbolic that permit a manifestation of the borders that 
divide the symbolic from the semiotic’, that the poetic-maternal practices she 
advocates as disruptive to paternal law, in fact ‘always remain tenuously tethered to 
that law’ (Butler in Oliver (Ed) 1993, 170). For Butler, Kristeva’s failure to 
challenge the ‘structuralist assumption that the prohibitive paternal law is 
foundational to culture itself’ leaves the maternal subject diminished rather than 
liberated by the dissolution of the coherent subject enabled by poetic language.   
 
Butler’s focus on the challenge to the coherent self is shared with other 
prominent poststructuralist critics such as Foucault and Derrida. However, her 
critique also seems somewhat defeatist, given she appears to abandon Kristeva’s 
attempts to articulate a definable maternal linguistic alternative to the paternal 
codification sanctioned by the symbolic, on the basis that the father will always have 
the last word. This prompts me to consider if discursive responses such as Of 
Woman Born which critique the patriarchal foundations of culture, while still 
embedding themselves in the master discourses of the symbolic in order to facilitate 
their critique from a solid subject position, represent a different, more effective, kind 
of subversion of paternal law. Or if, to paraphrase Audre Lorde, the use of the 
master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house is ultimately also as self-defeating as 
Butler accuses Kristevan semiotic theory of being.  
 
With regards to the notion of the master’s tools, or in this case the 
master’s discourse, we might also look to the work of Irigaray as offering the 
potential to resist and subvert the structures of the master discourse by offering a 
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different kind of disruption to the word of the father. This was Sabine Sielke’s 
argument in her discussion of Rich’s ‘Snapshots of a Daughter in Law’ in which she 
invoked the example of Irigaray’s essay ‘When Our Lips Speak Together’. Sielke 
sees Irigaray’s theorising of a feminine language as embodying the radical potential 
that allows for a different articulation and actualisation of maternal 
subjectivity. Where Kristeva argues for a reconceptualising of the maternal 
experience in language that still acknowledges the phallocentric economy of the 
symbolic, Irigaray proposes a circumvention of the master’s tools via the recognition 
of a separate language in which femaleness, femininity and the maternal are 
embodied. Where Kristeva argues for space within language to recognise the 
particularity of maternal subjectivity, while still remaining homologated within the 
symbolic order, Irigaray urges women to create their own symbolic positioning. Or 
in other words, to paraphrase Rich’s ‘Snapshots’, Kristeva’s semiotic seeks to cast a 
bolder shadow within the symbolic, while Irigaray looks to ‘smash the mold straight 
off’ via language (Rich 2002, 20). 
 
With it’s refusal of this paternal power, Irigaray’s linguistic strategizing has 
the ostensible advantage of preventing the enclosures of the symbolic overlaying its 
own structures of meaning, thereby avoiding the self-defeating logic Butler reads in 
Kristeva’s semiotic theory. Butler contends that by continuing to acknowledge the 
authority of paternal law, Kristeva allows the symbolic to act as saboteur to her 
disruptive project.  Thus semiotic theory is rendered effectively meaningless because 
it treads too softly. This ‘source of libidinal subversion cannot be maintained within 
the terms of culture, that its sustained presence leads to psychosis and to the 
breakdown of cultural life itself’ (Butler in Oliver (Ed) 1993, 164). Irigaray’s 
feminine language suffers no such fate. Rather, it challenges her ‘famous 
formulation’, as noted by Alison Stone, that subjectivity is always understood to be 
(or is appropriated as being) masculine (Stone 2012, 3).  
 
In setting up her own exploration of maternal subjectivity, Stone looks to 
Irigaray’s writings as opening up the terms of reference of this investigation.  She 
notes that ‘Irigaray concludes that an exclusion of women, and a devaluation of all 
things actually and symbolically female, have become built into the conception of 
the subject.’ Therefore, ‘ethical critiques of the subject such as Irigaray’s are most 
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coherently read’ are required to reconfigure notions of subjectivity to encompass 
female subjectivity broadly, and specific iterations, such as the maternal, particularly 
(4). Irigaray’s approach to female and maternal subjectivity distinguishes itself in its 
refusal to recognise paternal control of the symbolic as immovable or immutable. In 
this sense, her writing is a discourse of the possible as well as a resistance to the 
historical diminishment of the female subject.  
 
 Irigaray opens ‘When Our Lips Speak Together’ (1974) declaring  
 
[i]f we keep on speaking the same language together, we’re going to reproduce the 
same history. Begin the same old stories all over again. […] 
  
If we keep on speaking sameness, if we speak to each other as men have been 
doing for centuries, as we have been taught to speak, we’ll miss each other, fail 
ourselves again. Again … Words will pass through our bodies, above our heads. 
They’ll vanish and we’ll be lost. (Irigaray 1985, 205). 
 
Referred to by Sabine Sielke as an attempt to ‘reinvent mother-daughter relations 
and their particular economy of desire and discourse’, ‘When Our Lips Speak 
Together’ is remarkable for the playful and sensual way Irigaray presents her 
argument. The promise of abundance and multiplicity is evident: 
 
  Kiss me. Two lips kissing two lips: openness is ours again. Our “world.” And the 
passage from the inside out, from the outside in, the passage between us is limitless. 
Without end. No knot or loop, no mouth ever stops our exchanges (Irigaray 1985, 
210). 
 
Also manifest is the article’s critique of a phallocentric symbolic economy 
structured to repress this female abundance, sensuality and multiplicity: 
 
[w]e haven’t been taught, nor allowed, to express multiplicity. To do that is to speak 
improperly. Of course, we might – we were supposed to? – exhibit on “truth” while sensing, 
withholding, muffling another. Truth’s other side – its complement? its remainder? – stayed 
hidden. Secret. Inside and outside, we were not supposed to be the same. That doesn’t suit 
their desires. Veiling and unveiling: isn’t that what interests them? What keeps them busy? 
Always repeating the same operation, every time. On every woman (210). 
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In both of these excerpts we can see Irigaray’s refusal of the enclosures of the 
grammar and syntax of the master discourse. Which is not to say her fluid, 
deconstructed prose sacrifices meaning. Rather, she presents us with a different kind 
of meaning-making in which the particularity of female and maternal subjectivity is 
not repressed or sanctioned. Sielke observes that, for Irigaray ‘the language of 
sameness […] originates in the absence of the maternal’ (Sielke 1997, 98). The 
alternative discourse proposed in ‘When Our Lips Speak Together’ is ‘suited to 
delineate the dyadic relationship of mother and daughter [Irigaray] suggests, should 
be fluid, multidimensional’ This ‘expanding’ language, Sielke contends, will 
‘dissolve truth, unity, and exchange, disintegrate ego-boundaries, and relocate 
mother and daughter in a space of endless embraces’ (98).  
 
Sielke’s descriptions are unequivocally laudatory, but she identifies aspects of 
Irigaray’s delineation of language and subjectivity that have the potential to be as 
problematic as Butler believes Kristeva’s semiotic theory to be. Firstly, in order to 
embrace Irigaray’s language of difference, one must believe that wilful rejection of 
paternal law is possible. That the female subject can turn her back on the dictates of 
the patriarchal symbolic order – while still necessarily making use of said social, 
cultural and linguistic structures when required, - simply because she wishes it so. 
While I find myself seduced by the curious mix of sensuality, defiance and what 
Irigaray along with her fellow French feminists (including Kristeva) would call 
jouissance, I must also confess to some scepticism that this wilful rejection of the 
phallocentric is possible to the extent Sielke envisages. Secondly, while dissolution 
of truth and unity can be seen as facilitating the kind of liberating subjective 
multiplicity Sielke details, it can also have the effect of making the maternal subject 
so fragmented as to be un-locatable. Lastly, Irigaray’s demarcation of female and 
maternal subjectivity may be ‘unlimited’, but her linking of this subjectivity to 
physicality also conflates femininity with anatomy, and thus invokes the limits of 
biology.  
 
Further, while Irigaray sets out to create a discourse privileging female 
anatomy, many feminists remain ambivalent towards such a project, whether 
because of the internalised shame wrought by centuries of cultural conditioning, or 
in response to new discourses decoupling gender from biology. As Rich notes in Of 
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Woman Born, motherhood has often been the means by which women’s bodies have 
been weaponsied against them to narrow their potentialities.  She writes 
 
The woman’s body, with its potential for gestating, bringing forth and nourishing 
new life, has been through the ages a field of contradictions: a space invested with 
power, and an acute vulnerability; a numinous figure and the incarnation of evil; a 
horde of ambivalences, most of which have worked to disqualify women from the 
collective act of defining culture (Rich 1995, 102). 
 
The hesitancy with which I find myself approaching Irigaray’s reframing of the body 
within her discourse perhaps speaks to my own internalising of the attitudes Rich 
details here. Again, I feel a disconcertingly reflexive scepticism – which bears 
examining - prompting me to question if Sielke’s descriptions of Irigaray’s writings 
might be straying into utopian magical thinking. I note this reaction not to diminish 
or dismiss Irigaray’s contributions to the theorising of maternal subjectivity, but 
rather to recognise that in my own explorations of the discursive responses to the 
maternal, it is Rich’s observation that the ‘body has been made so problematic for 
women that it has often seemed easier to shrug it off and travel as a disembodied 
spirit’ that resonates with me (40).        
 
 
Navigating the Maternal Gaze 
 
 
Having spent much time framing the formation of maternal identity and 
subjectivity as a disruptive, and also defensive practice, I wish now to propose the 
maternal gaze as a different, perhaps less combative means of recognising maternal 
subjectivity. The gaze, or in psychoanalytical terms, the scopophilic drive, has been 
understood by theorists, most notably Laura Mulvey (1975) as objectifying, but I 
think there is space to construct an argument that recovers the maternal gaze as a 
means of exchange and recognition between mother and child. Lacan’s ‘mirror 
stage’, posits that subjectivity is dependent upon our recognition of our mother as a 
separate entity. Defining subjectivity as relational to one’s mother would appear to 
both empower and diminish the maternal subject, as the mirror itself functions as 
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circular symbol in which the mother is present, but only as a reflection that is 
dependent upon the child’s recognition.  
 
Jacqueline Rose points out that this moment of recognition is also fraught 
because it exposes the fragility and elusiveness of subjectivity. To recognise oneself 
as a subject is also to recognise oneself as external to one’s mother, and hence is also 
a moment of alienation: 
 
This image is a fiction because it conceals, or freezes, the infant’s lack of 
motor co-ordination and the fragmentation of its drives. But it is salutary for 
the child, since it gives it the first sense of a coherent identity in which it can 
recognise itself. For Lacan, however, this is already a fantasy – the very image 
which places the child divides its identity into two. Furthermore, that moment 
only has meaning in relation to the presence and the look of the mother who 
guarantees its reality for the child. The mother does not (as in D.W 
Winnicott’s account (Winnicott, 1967)) mirror the child to itself; she grants an 
image to the child, which her presence instantly deflects. Holding the child is, 
therefore, to be understood not only as a containing, but as a process of 
referring, which fractures the unity it seems to offer. The mirror image is 
central to Lacan’s account of subjectivity, because its apparent smoothness 
and totality is a myth. The image in which we first recognise ourselves is a 
misrecognition. (Rose in Mitchell & Rose (ed.) 1982, 30) 
 
My first reaction upon reading the above was to see it as yet another theorising 
which sees the symbolic effacement of the mother as the primary requirement of 
subjectivity. However, upon further reflection, it occurs to me that it is possible to 
reframe this moment as a reciprocal exchange in which the child reflects the 
mother’s gaze, enabling the mother to retain her agency. Thus the mother remains 
the facilitator of the child’s individuation without extinguishing her own in the 
process.  
 
 Being the object of an external gaze has the potential to be alienating, 
particularly if that gaze is felt as being censorious, or even demanding, both of 
which are common sentiments associated with the mother/child relationship.  Much 
of the discussion in this thesis has centred on the emotional and physical burden of 
motherhood. This is a discussion that often emphasises the demands felt by the 
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mother without considering the reciprocal nature of this relationship, in which 
children also feel subject to the desires of their mothers. In the introduction to their 
book Representations of Motherhood, Donna Basin, Margaret Honey and Meryle 
Mahrer Kaplan discuss their reactions to a picture printed on the facing page from 
the 1940s, depicting a shrunken mother strapped in an infant swing being 
overlooked by the imposing figure of a toddler blown up to gigantic proportions.  
 
It is an image heavily suggestive of the submissiveness of motherhood, 
provoking, as Basin, Honey and Kaplan admit, strong reactions to the sheer volume 
with which the toddler’s demands have been embodied in both his size and gaze. 
However, this initial reaction is followed by an acknowledgement that the image 
‘perhaps goes too far’ in its depiction of motherhood as a submissive state rather 
than a relationship:       
 
The mother is so infantilized and subjected that looking at the picture is 
painful. [...] While the picture presents an infantile wish to be in charge, it re-
presents that wish and shows that the absence of a mother as a person big 
enough, with enough agency to be a real participant in a relationship, is a 
nightmare (Basin, Honey & Kaplan (eds.) 1994, 1). 
 
Basin, Honey and Kaplan’s comments recognise that such a view of motherhood is 
dystopian because all emphasis is on the child’s power. Exaggerating the power of 
the child to such a degree removes all possibility of exchange within the 
relationship. The mother is not only cowed, but is fixed irrevocably in this status, 
thereby erasing all other subjective positions she may have once occupied, including 
that of daughter. Seeing mothers as discrete entities only made concrete under the 
gaze of their child overlooks the cyclic nature of female subjectivity whereby the 
female subject can be simultaneously both mother and child. 
 
 The need to understand the integrated yet distinct experiences of mothering 
and being mothered is very much evident in the poems of Sexton, Rich and Plath in 
which the figure of the mother is in crucial ways external to the speaker, and to the 
poet; in particular, Sexton’s ‘Double Image’, where the speaker is positioned as a 
switching point between daughterhood and motherhood, unmoored by her inability 
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to peacefully inhabit either status. Perhaps it is this imprinted memory of having 
been a daughter that finally makes maternal subjectivity so complicated, 
representing as it does, a different kind of splitting of the subject. It is this splitting 
of the subject, this relationship, that Irigaray recognises as crucial to understanding 
the marginalising of female subjectivity within the symbolic via the maternal. This is 
seen in her rejection of the language of the same in favour of finding the ‘body’s 
language’ which she offers as an antidote to the alienation from the feminine 
experienced by both mother and daughter in the separation the symbolic demands of 
them: 
 
You/I become two, then, for their pleasure. But thus divided in two, 
one outside, the other inside, you no longer embrace yourself, or me. 
Outside, you try to conform to an alien order. Exiled from yourself, you 
fuse with everything you meet. You imitate whatever comes close. You 
become whatever touches you. In your eagerness to find yourself again, 
you move indefinitely far from yourself. From me. Taking one model 
after another, passing from master to master, changing face, form and 
language with each new power that dominates you (Irigaray 1985, 
210). 
 
But this complex dance of agency and identity does not necessarily result in an 
effacement of the mother. Irigaray also argues that a reimagining of this relationship 
is central to the recovery of both female and maternal subjectivity as abundant and 
plural subject positions. Recovery of the ‘body’s language’ is also a resistance of the 
objectification and subjugation Irigaray sees as being attendant upon both mother 
and daughter in their homologation into the paternal law of the symbolic which 
separates them. This can also be seen in Of Woman Born in which Rich devotes a 
whole chapter to the dual experience of motherhood and daughterhood which opens 
by acknowledging the power her mother still holds over her: 
 
This is the core of my book, and I enter it as a woman who, born between her 
mother’s legs, has time after time and in different ways tried to return to her 
mother, to repossess her and be repossessed by her, to find the mutual 
confirmation from and with another woman that daughters and mothers alike 
hunger for, pull away from, make possible or impossible for each other (Rich 
1995, 218). 
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While this passage is an affecting evocation of the mother/daughter relationship, it is 
expressed in terms that are heavily invested in an essentialist, biologically 
determinist view of motherhood. Rich appoints herself as spokesperson for all 
‘daughters and mothers alike’ (218) which has the effect of defusing the 
confessional nature of her words, rendering her view of her mother both personal 
and impersonal.  
 
In contrast, the passages in which Rich turns her maternal gaze on both herself 
and her children in the reproduced extracts from her journal are raw and immediate: 
 
September 1965 
Degradation of anger. Anger at a child. How shall I learn to absorb the violence and 
make explicit only the caring? Exhaustion of anger. Victory of will, too dearly 
bought – far too dearly (22). 
 
There is no essentialising here, no attempt to moderate her words with any of the 
absolutist detachment that can be read in the previous quote. This is as one would 
expect from a journal entry written in the heat of the moment with no expectation of 
being ‘overheard’. In comparison, the other passage is written with the explicit 
assumption of speaking to an audience, which would account for its more measured 
tone. Yet, in both Rich’s selfhood is foregrounded. Both passages are articulations of 
Rich’s split selfhood as daughter and mother, and in both she is the facilitator of the 
gaze which recognises the mother and the child, but it is the written word, in 
particular poetic language which is the means of communicating and actualising the 
imagery captured in her gaze.  
 
The spontaneity and freedom of confession without expectation of judgment 
evident in Rich’s journal writing is suggestive of the fluidity and resistance to the 
dictates of rationalism championed by Irigaray. That this freedom and spontaneity 
can also result in the airing of the painful realities of motherhood rebuts my earlier 
stated scepticism regarding the material plausibility of Irigaray’s separation of 
language. Rich’s contrasting of these two linguistic modes, albeit in what remains a 
single, unified text, foregrounds the heterogeneity of her selfhood without requiring 
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the reader to privilege either mode.  Access to a variety of linguistic and stylistic 
modes serves as a key facilitator to the expression of the multiplicity that 
marginalised subjects have struggled to articulate. While the playfulness and 
jouissance permeating Irigaray’s articulation of the feminine may also be somewhat 
utopian, taking Rich’s contrasting of linguistic modes as an example highlights the 
ethical project underpinning Irigaray’s attempts to redefine subjectivity. As Stone 
notes, one’s account of one’s subjectivity may expose ‘the social conditions of 
exclusion and repression’ upon which it is predicated (Stone 2012, 4). This 
exposition may encompass various iterations of language, including that of the 
master discourse. 
 
Finally, perhaps we can conclude that in the complex mass of exchanges that 
constitute subjectivity, in which the mother is always at risk of erasure and 
effacement, writing, be it the poetic disruptions Kristeva champions, Irigaray’s fluid, 
multidimensional language of the feminine, or the more structured communications 
of the master discourse, language is one of the most powerful tools of self-
articulation available to women. To write as a mother is to enter into one’s maternal 
subjectivity, and, more broadly, to contribute to the cultural transformation and 
dissemination of this new, still becoming subjectivity.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
RECONCEPTUALISING THE RELATIONSHIP  
OF THE PERSONAL AND THE MATERNAL 
 
 
Having situated maternal writing as a site of resistance to the barrage of 
social, cultural and symbolic modes of obliteration of maternal subjectivity, thus far 
this thesis has explored this premise primarily via poetic language and the rhetorics of 
critical and theoretical discourse. Each of these forms have been positioned as, if not 
diametrically opposed to each other, then certainly as distinct and often contrasting a 
mode of writing. In these final two chapters we now turn our attention to other forms 
of writing, namely the first person narrative and personal blogging, modes which 
have risen to considerable popular cultural prominence in the first two decades of this 
century. We will be considering the ways in which the maternal manifests within 
these new cultural spaces. Much theorising about the maternal attempts not only to 
argue for the signification of the maternal within the symbolic, but also to understand 
complicated relationships with the maternal subject, a project that is as implicitly and 
necessarily personal as it is abstract and cultural.  
 
 If the personal is inescapable, and especially so when contemplating the 
maternal, it is equally evident we cannot escape the cultural. Or more specifically, the 
weight of the cultural positioning of the maternal, for it is here that the maternal 
subject, and those in relation to maternal others, must confront the uneasy schism 
between experience and expectation. Theorists such as Irigaray, Kristeva and 
Jacqueline Rose have conjectured that it is in the realm of the maternal that female 
subjectivity reaches the limits of understanding and of language and discourse. 
Similarly, Butler (1990) argued that Kristeva’s attempts to push past this psychic 
roadblock with her semiotic chora ultimately fails because it remains trapped inside 
the phallocentric parameters of the symbolic order.  But if we accept that the cultural 
construct of maternity may always defy our attempts to understand or define it, what 
does this mean for the mother who navigates her maternal subjectivity through the 
written word? Or for the mother who looks to maternal writing for discursive and 
aesthetic reflections of her own maternal subjectivity - how might such an exchange 
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be facilitated if the maternal is deemed unknowable? It is possible to argue that a 
confluence of technological and cultural shifts have reframed the personal in 
discourse and opened up spaces in which the maternal subject might speak in 
different ways and articulate a different understanding of maternal subjectivity 
 
In her 2009 book Maternal Encounters: The Ethics of Interruption, Rose’s 
compatriot and fellow psychoanalytical critic Lisa Baraitser, asks: 
 
What is this longing for motherhood to hold the generative, surprising and 
unexpected? Why not allow it to be a diverse yet patterned experience, both 
individually located and yet differing historically, culturally and particularly in 
relation to class, ‘race’ and ethnicity, constantly in play with dominant and 
normative discourses, traditionally those of patriarchy, and more recently those of 
our post/neo-colonial culture?  Why not let motherhood alone as a particular or new 
experience, and join with those who now speak generically of ‘parenting’ […] Why 
allude to a potentially transhistorical, transcultural notion like ethics in relation to 
one of the most locally produced, specifically experienced, and simultaneously 
heavily regulated practices of all? (Baraitser 2009, 4) 
 
There is much to unpack in this set of arguments, which read as offering a conflicted 
and contradictory, always mobile take on maternal subjectivity. Much of this conflict 
seems to reside in the tension Baraitser reads between the idea of motherhood as a 
personal performance ‘locally produced, specifically experienced’, and the broader 
concept of the maternal as a ‘heavily regulated’ cultural practice available for more 
universalizing, ethical interpretation (4). Barrister’s signalling of the divide between 
the personal and the cultural expressions of maternity recalls Kristeva’s 
nature/culture threshold. It is significant she distinguishes between the idea of 
parenthood and the maternal. This suggests a particularity, both embodied and 
metaphysical, to maternity. The term parenthood may encompass the non-gendered, 
actualised reality of life with children, but the maternal represents the monolithic 
cultural construct. It is this seemingly irreconcilable contrast that renders the quest to 
understand and articulate maternal subjectivity so elusive. As Baraitser notes, ‘‘The 
mother’ after all, is the impossible subject par excellence’ (5). 
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 Baraitser’s statement is of a piece with the argument that has been developed 
in this thesis regarding the difficulty of “the mother” within the symbolic order. She 
articulates this further, stating that the mother remains caught ‘in an ever widening 
gap between her idealization and denigration in contemporary culture, and her 
indeterminate position as part object, part subject within Western philosophical 
tradition, the mother has always been left hopelessly uncertain’ (Baraitser, 2009, 4). 
As was the case with Rich in Of Woman Born, Baraitser’s project in Maternal 
Encounters is primarily personal. She writes that in part her ‘longing for, and wish to 
articulate the generative, surprising and unexpected in relation to the maternal is a 
deliberate strategy at both a theoretical and personal level. This can be understood as 
a kind of ethics in itself, an aspirant reaching out towards the good (the difference 
that is, between what is and what ought to be) (4).  
 
Like Rich, Plath, Sexton before her, Baraitser puts her faith in the power of 
the written word to mediate and convey her experience of the maternal, but the 
sticking point continues to be reconciling of the theoretical and the personal. There 
can be no contemplation of the maternal or of maternal subjectivity without an 
engagement with the personal, but how does this contemplation of the personal, 
which can also be understood as the performative actuality of motherhood, recover 
the maternal subject if not with some engagement with the theoretical or cultural? 
Or, to paraphrase, Baraitser, how does the mother-writer reconcile ‘what is and what 
ought to be’? (4) And really, isn’t this the crux of what the maternal subject 
confronts generally within discourse and culture, this uneasy confluence of 
expectation between actuality and symbolism? Certainly it is evident to me at this 
point of my enquiry that this conflict has been at the heart of every question posed in 
this thesis.  
 
Like Baraitser, I acknowledge that my intellectual project in this thesis 
operates ‘at both a personal and theoretical level’ (Baraitser 2009, 4). However, 
unlike Baraitser, I cannot claim this to be a ‘deliberate strategy’, but rather one that 
has gradually revealed itself. I set out to investigate how Rich, Plath and Sexton 
represented motherhood in their poetry, assuming – naively it now seems - that a 
close, detailed textual analysis of the poems would be enough to understand the 
‘truth’ of these maternal performances. Or that, (and this was perhaps an even more 
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ill-formed assumption), motherhood can be surmised or contained in textual 
performances. Which is not to diminish the impact of the poetry and its 
representation of the maternal, but rather a recognition that an analytical reading of 
these poems as isolated, discrete enactments of motherhood is not enough to account 
for the cultural and symbolic implications of their representation of maternal 
subjectivity. In my attempts to locate these aesthetic performances of the maternal 
within their historical context it became evident that my project was both more 
specific and more expansive than I realised when I began.  
 
In exploring the maternal writing of these poets I have been working my way 
towards an understanding, like Baraitser, of my own maternal subjectivity that is 
both embedded within the historical discourses, and situated within the present 
moment. Mentally reaching, one might say, for a way to reconcile the cultural and 
the personal implications of maternal subjectivity – a designation I have observed as 
a daughter and now navigate as a mother. It may seem like stating the obvious to say 
my motivations in examining the theorising and aesthetic representation of the 
maternal sprang from an intellectual curiosity inspired and nurtured by own personal 
circumstances, but it is also obvious to me now that my understanding of the 
maternal and of where my interest in it would lead me was comparatively nebulous 
when I set out on this study.  
 
This of course is not an unusual outcome for any post-graduate study, but the 
very personal ways that this has in turn shaped my thinking have been unexpected. In 
short, in all my reading and contemplation of the maternal I have been confronted 
with the unexamined implications of my own maternal subjectivity. I do not refer to 
my own existential grappling with maternal subjectivity to suggest that only those 
with a lived experience of motherhood should comment on it. At the risk of 
trafficking in essentialist pronouncements, it can be argued that all of us have some 
interaction with and experience of the maternal. However, I will own that in my 
experience of studying the historical discourses on maternity, expounding on the 
intangible phenomenology of the mother and her difficult symbolic positioning can 
be ontologically disorienting precisely because of the personal associations. Or, more 
plaintively, such a study prompts me to wonder what my membership amongst the 
designation of ‘impossible subject par excellence’ portends?  
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Theorising the Impossible Subject 
 
 
The designation of ‘impossible subject par excellence’ can be understood as 
referring to both the effacement and the amplification of the maternal. In her essay 
‘Of Knowledge and Mothers: On the Work of Christopher Bollas’, Jacqueline Rose 
argues that this paradox of signification renders the maternal subject both 
inescapable and un-locatable. Rose describes the anxiety expressed by a student 
taking her course on ‘Freud and feminism’ at what she saw as the encompassing 
pervasiveness of the mother in psychoanalytical discourse. Far from seeing the 
maternal subject as a spectral figure, it seemed to this student ‘from her reading that 
psychically speaking there were only mothers in the world.’ Or, ‘to put it more 
crudely, there is no getting away from mothers. They are there where you least 
expect them, most troublingly when you thought you had left them behind’ (Rose 
2003, 149). The idea that there is ‘no getting away from mothers’ is not a positive 
recognition of the maternal subject. If the mother is afforded any power in this 
scenario, it is of an unpleasant hectoring kind, begrudgingly acknowledged alongside 
the repulsion her persistent presence inspires. Rose’s detailing of her student’s 
unease with the maternal recalls Kristeva’s descriptions of maternal abjection 
whereby the mother is made problematic when she refuses to assume her proper 
place in the symbolic – which is to say her non-place.  
 
Rose argues further that the continued psychic presence of the maternal 
subject within the collective consciousness of the symbolic, the ‘sinking, sense of the 
utter unmovability [sic] of the mother’ (Rose 2003, 150), much like Kristeva’s 
untheorisable semiotic chora, threatens our limits of understanding. She asks: 
 
[w]hat happens to our relationship to knowledge when mothers are around. […] 
Can we think about mothers and keep an open mind? Can we think ironically 
about mothers? […] 
 
 What does thinking about mothers do to thinking? If you make the mother the 
unconscious object, what hermeneutic arrest have you stumbled into, what 
violence have you committed to the unconscious as process, or to use one of 
Bollas’s most famous formulas, to the category of the ‘unthought’? (151).     
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Rose’s comments go beyond framing maternal subjectivity as impossible, to 
theorising it as having the potential to be psychologically damaging, but they also 
imbue the mother with a fearsome power. In the symbolic landscape Rose envisages 
here, the mother is impossible because she is unavoidable. Rather than fading into 
oblivion upon facilitating the child’s entry into the symbolic, the mother remains as 
an arresting and unsettling presence. Or in short, Rose theorises abjection as the 
default status of maternity rather than the pathological condition of exception. While 
this vision of maternal subjectivity may appear to afford the mother with an 
abundance (or indeed over abundance) of signification, she remains trapped in her 
status as symbol rather than subject. Therefore, any power she might exert is in fact 
entirely outside of her grasp. In Rose’s vision of maternal subjectivity, the mother 
remains a disembodied conduit for a disquieting power that she herself has no 
control over.  
 
In fact, the pervasiveness of this power, which resides in its cultural 
resonance, only serves to underscore how disempowered the maternal subject is in 
the symbolic order where ‘Mother’ is a status thrust upon her that allows for no 
recognition of her individual subjectivity. In this economy, the personal and 
particular have been completely collapsed into the cultural, and the mother is a silent, 
distant figure whose impact rests entirely in the reaction of others as opposed to her 
inter-subjective interactions. Consider Rose’s question ‘can we think about mothers 
and keep an open mind?’ On the one had this could appear to be suggesting that the 
maternal as a cultural institution is so authoritative it is able to sanction our thoughts, 
and by extension shape our subjectivity. On the other, it underscores how fixed in 
our consciousness, and therefore contained, this disembodied figure of the symbolic 
mother is. If it is indeed impossible to keep an open mind about mothers, does it 
follow that it is also impossible to recognise them as individual subjects? Or - and 
this is where my anxiety regarding my own maternal subjectivity intrudes into my 
consideration of the questions Rose poses – does the assumption of the impossibility 
of keeping an open mind about mothers absolve us of any need to try? More 
troublingly, this places the maternal subject in a permanent state of abjection because 
she is always understood as a troubling or disruptive presence; either in her silent, 
symbolic state, or if she intrudes further into our consciousness by attempting to 
assert her individuation.  
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Baraitser takes up this point, arguing that to ‘escape the tendency for 
abjection to cling to the maternal we may need to deliberately approach maternal 
subjectivity from a position that engages with the generative, surprising and 
unexpected, a strategic valorization of what is excessive (but not monstrous) in 
maternal experience in order to counteract a discourse so mired in loss, murder and 
melancholia’ (Baraitser 2009, 7). Baraitser’s project in Maternal Encounters is 
ambitious. With this ‘strategic valorization’ of the maternal she sets out to achieve 
what has eluded Kristeva: namely a new discourse on maternal ethics and 
subjectivity. For Baraitser, ‘Kristeva’s position seems to destroy the potential for 
maternal subjectivity at the point that it appears to rescue mothers from their silence. 
All that may be left to us is a strenuous ‘leap’ of the imagination’ (7). Advancing a 
new maternal discourse is surely a ‘strenuous ‘leap’ of the imagination’, but 
advocating a valorisation of the maternal, even with the addendum of ‘strategic’ is 
not without it’s own troubling implications, as Baraitser acknowledges: 
 
This deliberate valorization of the generative potential of maternity may appear to 
be a rather alarming aim; a reductive or cheerful attempt to celebrate motherhood 
despite the profound psychological, emotional, relational, and financial crises (to 
name a few) that it so clearly provokes in so many of our lives, a return to the 
rather jubilant maternalist sensibilities of some feminist writers of previous 
generations. However, my aim is certainly not to write an account of the joys of 
motherhood. Nor do I advocate elevating the maternal as a specifically feminine 
bodily or socio-sexual experience, the ultimate sign of sexual difference. Nor am I 
attempting to chart in any global sense the ways motherhood changes our lives – 
though I would not deny that it does so. Instead my aims are deliberately more 
myopic. If we shift from a female subject position to encompass a maternal one 
when we have a child (be that an adoptive, birth, foster, community or surrogate 
child, or any other relationship in which one comes to name another as one’s 
child), then we must surely contend with the notion that motherhood produces 
something new. The questions that concern me are about how we might theorize 
this newness as a way to claim back something for the maternal that escapes the 
melancholia-murder binary (Baraitser 2009, p7-8). 
 
Note how Baraitser emphasises the materiality of maternal experience. Her 
project of strategic valorisation is an animating one that attempts to recover the 
mother not just from silence, but also from her disembodiment and ossification 
within the symbolic order. The maternal subject is made palpable by her interaction 
  204 
with experiences that embed her both in the idea of maternity (‘in which one comes 
to name another as one’s child’) and the material world of ‘financial crises’ (7). 
Thus, maternal subjectivity is generative rather than stultifying because it ‘produces 
something new’ (7). Further, in stating that her focus is ‘deliberately myopic’, 
Baraitser recovers the maternal as particular and personal. While myopic is 
commonly understood in a pejorative sense, Baraitser’s use of it here, coupled with 
the defiant sounding qualifier of ‘deliberate’, reads as a bold declaration of maternal 
individuation. Without denying that the maternal also is necessarily a relational 
designation, Baraitser positions it as an inward looking, self-determining subject 
position not wholly dependent upon an external focus on the mother-child 
relationship for its signification and relevance.  
 
 
Writing as Resistance 
 
 
In her essay ‘Maternal Writing and the Narrative of Maternal Subjectivity’ 
(2003) Suzanna Juhasz also looks to the personal as a means of actively 
subjectivising maternity, but unlike Baraitser with her more multi-faceted 
epistemology, Juhasz focusses on maternal writing as the primary facilitator of this 
subjectivity. Juhasz notes that psychological theory ‘generally talks about identity, 
subjectivity, recognition and maturation from the perspective of the child’ (Juhasz 
2003, 397). The focus on the child as the becoming subject is, of course, replicated 
throughout culture to the detriment of the mother. Juhasz suggests this 
overshadowing of maternal individuation can be overcome by recognising the 
processual nature of maternal subjectivity whereby ‘a mother is simultaneously a 
mother and a daughter; a mother and a (social) woman; a fantasy Mother and an 
everyday mother; a body and mind connected to but now separate from another 
person’ (398). While I have alluded to the cyclical nature of female and maternal 
subjectivity in the previous chapters, Juhasz’s comments further tease out how 
maternal subjectivity might be amplified rather than subsumed, emphasising the 
constant flow of exchange between mother and child. Indeed, it is this ebb and flow 
of shifting identities that highlights rather than forecloses the ‘inherent multiplicity’ 
of the maternal (398). However, giving reign to a multiplicity wherein subjectivity is 
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understood to consist of a complex mass separate, if similar, selves rather than an 
overarching whole, also exposes the maternal subject to the risk of ‘ambivalence or 
fragmentation’, wherein as Juhasz notes, ‘she might resort to “splitting off” and 
repressing some of those “selves” in order to function in accordance with others’ or 
her own expectations or fantasies about herself as a mother’ (398). 
 
Juhasz argues that it is in maternal writing that the potentially disparate and 
discrete aspects of maternal subjectivity are integrated and concretised: 
 
I propose that, when a mother-writer writes from all these subject positions, she 
demonstrates, first of all, that, contrary to popular opinion, they all exist. If so 
much maternal ambivalence derives from the external and internalized pressure to 
disavow one or the other of these identities – indeed to disavow subjectivity itself 
– then their very linguistic embodiment brings them into being and into the same 
textual space. Second, writing can potentially create a connection between 
maternal identities, so that each can be related to and enhance the other (Juhasz 
2003, 399).  
 
Curiously, Juhasz goes on to say this revelatory vision of maternal writing she is 
proposing is more successful when ‘it is not the lived experience of the writer’. I say 
curious because I am also interested in exploring here how exploration of maternal 
identities frames maternal subjectivity when it is the lived experience of the writer 
and is explicitly communicated as such. Which is not to say I intend to argue that 
maternal writing can only be successful in its articulation of maternal subjectivity 
when it is an expression of lived experience. I do not suggest that to write of 
maternity one must be a mother, but I do wonder how the opposite of this premise 
could be more ontologically defensible. As with any marginalised subjectivity, with 
regards to maternal subjectivity the question of authorial perspective is also one of 
voice and agency.  
 
So while any attempts to quarantine the maternal from non-mothers are 
unsound, there is merit in considering the space available in which the maternal 
might be represented as lived experience. It is clear that, amongst the complex 
interplay of power relations and signification percolating around the cultural 
positioning of the maternal subject, maternal subjectivity is still a marginalised and 
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often problematic speaking position. If the maternal is tainted by its association with 
abjection, which as Kristeva tells us, is the place where meaning collapses (Kristeva 
1983, 2), then articulating maternal subjectivity from a solidified, locatable speaking 
position can be understood as a powerful rejection of maternal abjection. And also as 
a counter-discourse to the damaging and grotesque caricatures that persist in popular 
culture to stigmatise the mother as a source of monstrosity, and the equally 
stultifying enshrinement of the maternal as a place of silent, untouchable 
beatification or martyrdom.  Therefore, it would seem that the textual performance 
of motherhood takes on a particular set of resonances if it is the result of lived 
experience. Or at the very least, such textual performances can be understood as 
having a distinctive significance if they are representative of lived experience.  
 
 The struggle to give voice to maternal experience was at the centre of this 
exploration of the poetry of Sexton, Plath and Rich, but it was my reading of the 
historical discourses of maternity which illuminated the specific conditions under 
which maternal writing is read and received, and the psychic barriers erected against 
recognising the multiplicity of the maternal subject. In a cultural landscape so 
heavily invested in denying this multiplicity, or even recognising the individual 
autonomy of the maternal subject, it becomes more urgent to consider the ways in 
which maternity is communicated textually? By this I mean, should we see the first 
person narrative as a more powerful vehicle for disseminating maternal experience, 
or does relying on whatever authority and authenticity that might be associated with 
the personal also risk boxing these cultural performances into narrow, specific 
textual structures which foreclose the abundance of poetic language championed by 
Kristeva, or of Irigaray’s more fluid, feminine language? And if we can say that the 
linear first person narrative narrows the possibilities of embodying identity as 
multiple and manipulable, does this risk reinforcing the powerful, deeply entrenched 
stereotypes and assumptions that operate to deny the possibility of multiplicity to the 
maternal subject? 
 
 These questions cut to the heart of the ways in which the maternal subject 
interacts with language, and is seen as a subject in language within the confines of 
the symbolic order. If there can be no contemplation of the maternal without the 
personal, then there must also be a contemplation of how the personal interacts with 
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the maternal in language and culture. Juhasz argues that accessibility in and of 
language is crucial to the dilemma of maternal representation. Accessibility of 
language in texts can be understood as important to the embodiment of subjectivity 
both from an authorial and an audience perspective. Or in other words, accessibility 
is a consideration of who is speaking and who is listening, of how the writer is 
speaking and how the audience is receiving it.  
 
To this end, Juhasz rejects what she describes as the ‘post-Lacanian French 
feminist theory’ of Kristeva and Irigaray because of their ‘discussion of l’écritute-
feminine’ (Juhasz 2003, 397n). While it might seem somewhat contradictory for 
Juhasz to reject a theory focused on reading the performance of femininity and 
womanhood in language, she argues against this strain of feminist theory because 
she reads in it the same self-defeating logic of challenging the phallocentrism of 
symbolic order while still deferring to the containment of language in that 
phallocentrism that Butler sees in Kristevan semiotics. Like Butler, Juhasz accuses 
Kristeva (and Irigaray) of not going far enough in her rejection of the masculinist 
biases which set up the category of the symbolic. She denounces what she sees as 
Kristeva and Irigaray’s endorsement of ‘Lacanian assumptions that the symbolic, a 
register of language and meaning, is the realm of the oedipal father’ (397n). In 
essence, Juhasz reads the work of these theorists as a negation rather than an 
affirmation of maternal subjectivity because of their adherence to Lacanian 
principles: 
In this theory the feminine is a negative, unconscious and bodily exclusion – 
outside culture, representation and sanity. Neither Kristeva’s semiotic nor 
Irigaray’s unrepresentable feminine imaginary give women access to the symbolic 
as it functions in culture. Such an approach resolutely ignores the elements of 
lived experience – for example, that language learning occurs during, not after the 
pre-oedipal period, or that women do, in fact, write (397n). 
 
 While I do understand Juhasz’s impatience with abstract theorising that 
ignores lived experience, I am not convinced that Kristeva and Irigaray are 
comprehensively guilty of this charge. Nor do I believe that Kristeva in particular 
ignores or distorts the pre-Oedipal period and its significance to maternal relations. 
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Rather than denying the language learning that occurs during the pre-Oedipal period, 
Kristeva’s semiotic focuses on this language and attempts to recover it as a site of 
maternal abundance and signification, only to come up against the pathologising 
parameters of the symbolic order Juhasz (and Butler) accuse her of being too 
deferential towards. It is reasonable to say that Kristeva’s semiotic fails to rescue 
maternal subjectivity from sliding into neurosis, but this is not so much a failure of 
the soundness of her theorising, or even of the boldness of her ideas, as it is a 
testament to the pervasive power of the symbolic order an argument which Juhasz 
rather sanguinely overlooks. Perhaps this is fatalistic, but it seems to me that the 
uncomfortable ‘truth’ behind feminist (and indeed broader cultural) theorising is the 
enduring inability of any these theories to fully breach the parameters of the 
symbolic, or to land the knockout blow that would prove fatal to the patriarchy. As 
such, I’m not ready to condemn Kristeva or Irigaray for their failure to do what has 
so far eluded so many other theorists; as with Juliet Mitchell’s contention that 
feminists see psychoanalysis as an explanation of, rather than a justification for, their 
subjugation, Kristeva’s struggle against the limits of language and its inability to 
accommodate maternal multiplicity can be seen as exposing the hostility and power 
of the symbolic order rather than endorsing it.  
Juhasz’s alternative to Kristevan semiotics is to look to Donald Winnicott’s 
version of object relations theory as a means of making maternal subjectivity more 
palpable: 
The line of object relations theory that stems from Winnicott challenges this 
ideology by situating the mother in culture—Winnicott’s “object mother,” who 
exists alongside the “environment mother”—and by finding both difference and 
language arising in the preoedipal period. From this perspective it can be argued 
that women do have access to the symbolic and that language as a symbolic 
structure is pliable; it can be used to produce forms and ideologies that challenge 
as well as replicate dominant masculinist systems of thought (Juhasz 2003, 397n) 
       
Juhasz is suggesting that the maternal subject can circumvent her erasure in the 
symbolic by prolonging, psychically privileging, or even returning to, the pre-
Oedipal period. But how might this work in language and culture? Her assertion that 
the mother might assume some control over her ‘access to the symbolic’ by 
engaging with ‘both difference and language arising in the preoedipal period’ (397n) 
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assumes that the mother, or indeed any subject in language is able to wilfully control 
their positioning in the symbolic, but the specifics of how this might work are not 
explicated. The focus on the pre-Oedipal phase as a site of power for the maternal 
subject echoes Kristeva’s positioning of the semiotic as being the precondition of 
language, but as Butler’s analysis of Kristevan semiotics argued, this is a ‘kind of 
language which can never be consistently maintained’ without risking a drift into 
‘psychosis and the breakdown of cultural life itself’ (Butler in Kelly (ed.) 1993, 
165).  
 
Again, Juhasz doesn’t explicate how she envisages the maternal subject 
might place herself outside the dictates of the symbolic, or how she might subvert 
the processes of the symbolic which control the positioning of the mother. Given 
that Juhasz ties her theorising of maternal subjectivity to a reading of object relations 
theory that enables the mother access to a pliability of ‘language and difference’, and 
given these processes rely on certain fixed points of recognition in order to function, 
then Juhasz’s assertions would require a shift in inter-subject agreements regarding 
the maternal in order to operate without occasioning the breakdown of cultural life 
Butler envisages in Kristevan semiotics. A shift, I might add, occasioned and 
controlled by the maternal subject, who Juhasz imagines as the active shaper rather 
than passive bearer of meaning. 
 The particulars of how such a scenario might work both materially and 
psychically are what fascinate me, and inform this thesis. Given so many theorists, of 
which Kristeva is among the most notable, have tried to posit an alternative 
understanding of maternal subjectivity only to be confronted by the nature/culture 
conundrum of the symbolic mother, how does the maternal subject achieve the kind 
of controlled plasticity of signification Juhasz describes? Much of Juhasz’s faith 
resides in maternal multiplicity being made tangible in maternal writing, but her 
rejection of what she terms Irigaray’s ‘unrepresentable imaginary’ suggests that for 
her, the maternal subject is only made tangible in the linear structures of the master 
discourse. Here Juhasz comes up against the twin dilemmas of signification and 
reception in language Kristeva and Irigaray have wrestled with in various ways. 
Kristeva sought to articulate a new maternal language from within the symbolic but 
sacrificed the possibility of placing the mother beyond the processes of the symbolic, 
  210 
while Irigaray rejected the limits of the master discourse entirely but risked being 
read as fragmented and ‘unrepresentable’ (Juhasz 2003, 397n). Might Juhasz’s 
emphasis on object relations theory then offer a third, mediating way for the maternal 
subject to escape obliteration or abjection while still remaining integrated within the 
symbolic order? 
 Object relations theory positions the mother as object/other to the child’s self, 
but in ways that differ to the Lacanian and Freudian models of infant development.  
Rather than subordinating the mother’s subjectivity to that of the child’s, the 
emphasis on the positive presence of the mother foregrounded in this theory has the 
potential to enhance the mother’s position within the symbolic by enlarging and 
empowering the maternal as a designation. By this I mean, given this is a theory that 
relies upon the continuing participation of the mother to facilitate the child’s 
individuation by a process of gradual withdrawal grounded in mutual exchange, the 
threat of abjection is mitigated by the necessary presence of the mother which 
enables her extended access to the pre-Oedipal period. Thus, the mother does not 
threaten the limits of knowledge because she becomes a vital and generative part of 
that knowledge. Rather than Winnicott’s ‘good enough mother’ which is a tepid 
descriptor of the productively homologated maternal subject, we might see this as 
conducive to Baraitser’s ‘strategic valorization’ of the maternal (Baraitser 2003, 7). 
The maternal becomes not the catastrophe of identity that Kristeva speaks of in 
‘Stabat Mater’ (1977), but a site of symbolic, cultural and material power centred 
upon a mutually satisfying intersubjective exchange between mother and child. 
Although Juhasz disavows Irigaray’s fluid, multidimensional feminine writing, I 
would argue that her (Juhasz’s) conception of maternal subjectivity with its focus on 
maintaining the mother’s access to the pre-Oedipal period can be seen as an 
endorsement rather than rejection of Irigaray’s attempts to linguistically reimagine 
the mother-daughter relationship. 
 
 Of course, just as strategic valorisation of the maternal can be seen as 
problematic, so too can the schema of maternal subjectivity proposed above with its 
emphasis on the generative potential of a prolonged pre-Oedipal period may have 
troubling implications for the female subject. It is one thing to rescue the mother 
from symbolic obliteration and silencing, and quite another to situate the maternal as 
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the source of all female and/or feminine power. Broadly speaking, the female subject 
does not benefit socially, politically, or materially, from a cultural compulsion 
towards maternity, as it arguably did when the mother was seen as the generative 
source of inheritance by virtue of her ability to birth sons. However, if we take 
Baraitser’s approach and see maternal subjectivity as ‘something new’ rather than an 
extension of female subjectivity then the amplification, or valorisation, of 
motherhood as a speaking position is less troublesome.  
 
Seen in this light, a depiction of maternal subjectivity as powerful and 
embodied via an engagement with the personal is net positive for both reader and 
writer who wish to engage with their own maternity. By ‘net positive’, I mean that 
both in culture and the symbolic the mother’s subjectivity is enlarged rather than 
diminished by an unambiguous (which is not to say non-ambivalent) performance of 
motherhood, even if that requires a forsaking of other subject positions. This, again, 
is not to preclude the possibility of multiplicity within maternal subjectivity, but 
rather to situate the maternal as separate, but self-defining subject position. However, 
the positivity with which such textual performances are received is dependent upon 
the rehabilitation of the embodied autobiographical ‘I’ as a legitimate speaking 
aesthetic and discursive speaking position. An evolving ontology of the personal, one 
might say. 
 
 
Conceptualising New Spaces For The Maternal Subject 
 
 
How might this new ontology of the personal help us understand 
contemporary maternal subjectivity? The cultural status of the personal has been a 
consistent - and persistent - theme throughout my explorations of motherhood and 
maternal subjectivity in both poetry and discourse in this thesis. Thus far, my 
analysis has suggested that the personal has been viewed as a lesser, or somewhat 
degraded mode of writing, particularly within poetics. As Helen Farish writes, within 
the ‘terms of the impersonal/personal opposition, this association of the feminine 
with the personal guarantees the apparent neutrality of its (male) opposite’ (Farish in 
Gill & Waters (ed) 2011, 140). But this bias has also been challenged by feminists 
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who have not only sought to expose its cultural roots, but who have also contested 
the authority of neutrality in both aesthetic and discursive writing. As with Irigaray’s 
feminine challenge to the linguistic parameters of discourse, Rich’s uncensored 
personal diary entries included in Of Woman Born suggest the possibility of a 
different kind of maternal writing. Although not initially written for publication, the 
explicit and unapologetic way in which Rich inhabits the autobiographical ‘I’ 
speaking position marks them as a different kind of confessional writing. Their 
inclusion in Of Woman Born – a text which otherwise prosecutes its argument from a 
more dispassionate and detached, if not entirely impersonal perspective is significant. 
A diary entry, if presented as such, strips the author of access to any constructed 
persona into which she might disappear, thus shifting reader responses and 
expectations by foregrounding the selfhood of the author. While many readers have 
approached the confessional poetry of Sexton and Plath as if they offered the same 
kind of insights and supposedly verifiable personal information as a personal diary, 
critics have typically been at pains to emphasise the separation of author and speaker 
in their readings of these poems.  
 
 The interpretive separation of author and speaker may be one powerful tenant 
of literary theory, but does the resulting fictionalisation of self that this separation 
creates confer more or less authority on said author? Critics such as Jane Gallop with 
her rejection of ‘feminism’s tendency to accept a traditional, unified, rational, 
puritanical self’ caution against the idea of affording the author any kind of authority 
over the way in which reader’s interact with and take meaning from the text. (Gallop 
1982, xi). As stated previously, Gallop’s proposal of interpretive interpenetration and 
exchange privileges the individual subjectivity of the reading process over that of the 
author. This strategy is in step with much of contemporary critical and cultural 
theory of the past 30 plus years which has successfully sought to challenge notions of 
a ‘traditional, unified, rational’ or definable self. However, as alluded to briefly in 
the previous chapter, this thesis asks what are the implications of this interpretive 
process for the representation – and reception – of maternal subjectivity.  
 
Gallop’s use of terms such as ‘traditional’ and ‘puritanical’ lends the concept 
of the unified self an air of out-dated priggishness. Further, her claim that the 
feminist view of the self is one ‘supposedly free from the violence of desire’ 
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positions this view as an ossification in which the female (and therefore maternal) 
subject is not only free of ‘violence of desire’, but is also, presumably, asexual and 
apolitical. But what if the unified self could be strategically purposed as a radical 
speaking position for the maternal subject? How might this speaking position work 
in the postmodern literary landscape in which, as Farish argued, the coherent self has 
been rejected as ‘fantasy’ – albeit a fantasy that ‘has remained remarkably 
persistent’? (Farish in Gill & Waters (ed.) 2011, 139) Would such a project recover 
an authoritative speaking position for the maternal subject that encompasses 
multiplicity, or would it involve a reinforcement of the reductive and restrictive 
constructs of maternity that have traditionally entrapped and effaced the maternal 
subject?         
 
If indeed such a speaking position is possible (imaginable) for the maternal 
subject, how might this work in discourse? Farish also cautioned that it is harder for 
women to speak with authority when invoking the first person than it is for men. For 
the female poet, Farish argued, to inhabit the personal was to risk diminishing her 
work because of the containment of the feminine within the personal. Historically, it 
would not be inaccurate to say, as Farish does, that women artists have found 
themselves on the wrong side of the personal/universal dichotomy. The association 
of the feminine with the personal has often resulted in the diminishment of both in 
the eyes of literary critics specifically, and western culture more broadly. This 
diminishment rests upon what Farish presents as the widely held belief that the 
personal and the universal can be understood as opposites, and that, in this 
dichotomy, universality has been anointed as the designation of higher artistry.  
Farish’s comments refer to the way in which poetry is read, but how does this 
dichotomy fare when applied to specifically personal, non- poetic writing which 
relies on the notion of a coherent, locatable (and some might say ethically 
accountable) self as its linguistic lynchpin? And further, in an age in which the rise 
of digital technology and social media has transformed the way we interact with and 
inhabit the autobiographical ‘I’ and the personal, is this tension between the personal 
and the universal still understood in the same adversarial way?  
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Both Farish and Paula Bennett have argued that in the era in which Sexton, 
Plath and Rich were all writing poetry, the personal was understood as a constricting 
and effacing descriptor. Bennett writes  
 
[f]or a good part of this century, advocates of the “new criticism” encouraged 
students of literature to ignore or diminish biographical and gender elements in 
art. Literature, we are told, should strive for the universal, and great art should 
transcend both the author’s life and such ultimately temporal concerns as “he” 
and “she”. The major writer spoke not for his or her sex but for all people and 
as well as for all time (Bennett 1986, 10) 
 
Bennett’s detailing of how literature was read and analysed for much of the twentieth 
century invokes yet another dichotomy that postmodernism has sought to dismantle – 
that of high and low culture. The preceding chapters of this thesis have focussed on 
the ways in which the maternal subject is erased from discourse because of her 
uneasy positioning within the symbolic. In this economy I have understood the 
symbolic to be the organising principle of western culture. Further, I have argued, as 
have so many feminist theorists and critics before me, that because the phallus is the 
privileged signifier within this economy, woman is forever subjugated in the position 
of other within the master discourse, unable to control how and why she signifies. 
While the challenge to phallocentric ascendency remains an exigent concern for 
feminists, unsettling the binaries of personal/universal and high/low culture can be 
understood as an enlivening and enlarging discursive project for the female subject.  
 
 Having grappled with the ambivalent subjectivity of the mother within a 
symbolic order that demands her effacement so as to facilitate the individuation of the 
child, framing the act and agency of writing as mother as an act of self-articulation 
and definition represents a radical reconceptualising of phallocentric ascendency and 
maternal subjectivity. But tying this reconceptualising of maternal subjectivity to the 
written and published word implies a required standard not only of literacy, but also a 
mastery of language that might be considered prohibitive for many women. Further, 
dissemination of this writing to a wider audience has historically been reliant upon 
submission to the judgement of the gatekeepers of the master discourse, in this case, 
the publishing industry. Although the period of activism that characterised second 
wave feminism did see a rise in feminist-run, women-focussed presses during the 
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1970s and 1980s, such as Virago and The Feminist Press, Rich, Sexton and Plath all 
ran the gamut of traditional – mostly male-centric - publishing houses when 
submitting their work for publication. That is, prior to the feminist interventions into 
this process, all writing about motherhood – discursive or aesthetic - necessarily 
interacted with and was filtered through, institutional apparatuses steeped in the sort 
of masculinist assumptions regarding both subjectivity and maternity this writing 
would ultimately disrupt. While acknowledging the important and ground-breaking 
framework laid by Rich, Sexton and Plath, et.al in foregrounding maternal 
subjectivity in the Cold War period, any discussion of their writing in relation to 
contemporary maternal writing must also focus on the transformational impact of 
access to digital technology and the resulting electronic revolution of the publication 
process and marketplace.  
 
 The ‘democratisation’ of culture that has resulted from the rise of the internet 
as a writing and publishing platform has been, I will argue, of particular benefit to the 
woman writer in offering the space, and bestowing the authority from which she 
might speak. The opening up of cultural space to women writers via technology, and 
the corresponding transformation of the personal within contemporary discourse is of 
particular relevance to the maternal subject. As has been argued in the preceding 
chapters of this thesis, it is impossible to separate or exclude the personal from 
maternal writing for readers or writers. Just as the female writer uses her work as a 
means of mediating upon and externalising her maternal subjectivity, our readerly 
interest in the maternal subject and our textual interactions with her, are influenced by 
our own complex relationship with motherhood and the maternal. Given the 
precariousness of the maternal subject in both discourse and culture, it would seem 
that in our textual encounter with the maternal subject via the various iterations of 
maternal writing, the individual subjectivity of the reader has often overwhelmed any 
consideration of that of the writer, even in texts which invoke the autobiographical 
‘I’. Indeed, if we accept the precariousness of the maternal subject and her 
positioning as an elusive, but ultimately effaced presence, then we might also 
conclude that readers have approached maternal writing expecting – even if not 
consciously - to impose their own understanding of maternal subject upon the text. 
Or, to return to Gallop’s notion of interpenetration, beyond the processual potentiality 
she envisages in the exchange between reader and text, we might also see maternal 
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writing as an inescapable site of conflict in which maternal subjectivity is always in 
danger of being overwritten by the receiver of the text.    
 
As noted in the previous chapter, Gallop’s textual economy offers almost 
unchecked interpretive power to the reader. But this power is predicated (or perhaps 
more pertinently, can only be understood) on the basis of rejecting the notion of a 
monolithic, knowable author whose presence as the controlling consciousness of the 
text is unchallenged. I don’t propose to re-prosecute here the arguments for or against 
the idea of a unified self, which have long been considered largely settled by many 
literary critics. However, it is pertinent to my project of uncovering the discursive, 
aesthetic and cultural space in which maternal subjectivity might emerge, to consider 
how our understanding of the unified self might be revisited in the light of the shifting 
ways readers (or as contemporary parlance would have it, consumers of content) 
interact with the written word and writers. Exploring how (maternal) subjectivity 
might manifest in digital spaces such as weblogs, online discussion forums, and 
online magazines and publications requires a reconceptualising of the relationship 
between author and reader that that grapples with the inflated digital presence the 
authors of these blogs are able to cultivate.  
 
Any contention that the internet as a communication platform has 
foregrounded or rehabilitated the personal narrative must be accompanied by an 
exploration of how the immediacy afforded by digital publishing has transformed the 
relationship between writer and reader. In many ways, blogging – a medium that 
offers writers potentially limitless space within which to publish – represents the 
ultimate textual venue for the kind of interpenetration and exchange Gallop 
envisaged, but with one crucial difference. The interpenetration and exchange made 
possible by blogging is inherently reciprocal (and arguably thus democratized) in 
ways that reader interaction with traditionally published texts is not.  The mechanisms 
built into the format which encourage seemingly direct communication between 
author and reader – most notably the ability to read and comment on web publications 
(known as ‘posts’) in real time, and to receive responses – ensure that both readers 
and writers must confront each other’s subjectivity, at least to some extent, when 
interacting with the text. This is an important distinction because it forecloses in a 
very concrete way the possibility of removing all traces of authorial presence and by 
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extension, authority from the text. In this respect, digital publishing exists on a 
different physical and temporal plane, allowing for an altered experience of authorial 
subjectivity. This re-affirmation and reanimation of the authorial presence has 
obvious implications for the textual navigation of maternal subjectivity in the twenty-
first century   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
NAVIGATING THE NEW TEXUAL SPACES OF THE DIGITAL MOTHER 
 
 In her book exploring these new forms of maternal writing Mommyblogs and 
the Changing Face of Motherhood (2013), May Friedman writes that 
‘[m]ommyblogging, as a practice, has shifted understandings of motherhood’ 
(Friedman 2013, 29). While there isn’t space here to explicate the particulars of the 
digital revolution at length, for the purposes of this study it can be argued that the 
Internet and associated digital technology have profoundly transformed our 
relationship to the written word. Friedman’s statement makes evident the impact 
blogging has had upon the representation of motherhood in culture. It is an impact 
she locates specifically in the realm of the personal. For Friedman, blogs depicting 
motherhood offered a new kind of maternal writing that resonated precisely because 
it was personal and immediate. Expounding further on Friedman’s conceptualising of 
the digital space as a site of new maternal and personal writing, can these blogs be 
seen as contemporary confessional poetics? Are these women the inheritors of the 
maternal traditions of Sexton, Plath and Rich? Or has this new site of maternal 
representation fundamentally changed our understanding of maternal subjectivity?  
 
Friedman describes the experience of discovering this new format as a first-
time expectant mother: 
 
Thus began the first blog I ever read, on my travels towards motherhood. In my 
pregnant and slowly expanding state, the words of a woman I didn’t know seemed 
to hold the key to the secret reality that awaited me. I couldn’t imagine the shift in 
identity that lay before me, and as an apprehensive traveller to this uncharted 
territory, I looked to blogs – part welcome mat, part travel guide – to ease my 
trepidation. But I did not yet understand how central blogs written by mothers 
would be to my development, as both a person and a parent. I read these texts 
alongside more traditional pregnancy and parenting books, while dutifully 
attending prenatal classes (3). 
 
Friedman’s first experience of a mummy blog is as a place of reassurance in the face 
of the ambiguous liminality of pregnancy. At the moment she finds herself adrift, 
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facing an uncertain future in which she is about to enter into a place which tests the 
limits of knowledge and identity, she discovers a place ‘part welcome mat, part 
travel guide’ to welcome her into this ‘secret new reality’ awaiting her (3). The 
immediacy of recognition Friedman describes is striking, but there is also a sense 
that this is a recognition of something intangible, unquantifiable, and still 
unrecognisable. And further, that this new medium exists outside of traditional 
discourse, almost as if it disrupts these other texts with its very presence.  
 
In fact, Friedman goes on to say that much of the appeal of this new maternal 
writing she discovered on the cusp of her own motherhood lay in the ways in which 
it confounded not only traditional texts about motherhood, but also her own 
academic and political sensibilities. This is coupled with a realisation that her lived 
experience of motherhood has shifted the ways in which she approaches these texts: 
 
As a feminist academic I sought out feminist writing on motherhood so I could 
begin to understand the seismic shift that was occurring, and read work by 
Adrienne Rich (1976), Sara Ruddick (1980), and Naomi Wolf (2001). While 
much feminist writing had resonance […] it did not yield the intimacy and 
dialogue that I craved. Even the best academic writing had a conclusion, which – 
in keeping with all expert literature on motherhood – was often presented as a 
“right” way to mother. Now, in addition to being bewildered, I was also frustrated 
that I could not maintain my feminist idealism when it came down to the messy, 
real-life work of parenting (Friedman 2013, 3-4).     
 
Friedman sets up an intriguing contrast here between the feminist writing, which she 
positions as representing her academic and professional background, and blogging 
which represents her new existence as mother. If we can say that Friedman is 
describing her entry into maternal subjectivity here (perhaps a bold claim), what is 
the significance of her impulse to disavow the political and academic sensibilities of 
her previous life for the ‘intimacy and dialogue’ she feels she has found in mummy 
blogs?  This suggests that maternity as a separate subject position also engenders a 
different reading position, the needs and desires of which cannot always be 
accommodated by traditional discursive maternal writing.  
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The most significant aspect of Friedman’s unease with conventional 
(historical) maternal texts is what she sees as their tendency to offer prescriptive 
observations on ‘the “right way to mother’ from an assumed position of authority 
(4). Thus, for Friedman, the printed text appears in comparison to the open fluidity 
of the digital space as a closed entity, fixed in its opinions and pronouncements, 
resistant to exchange or dialogue with readers; and in Friedman’s estimation, hostile 
to her burgeoning maternal subjectivity. But does the dichotomy between traditional 
texts and digital spaces proposed by Friedman hold up in analysis? Can we see the 
different textual economies engendered by the digital space as entirely resistant to 
the articulation of fixed opinions? While the interactivity made possible by the 
digital space, and the corresponding sense of connectivity it can foster between 
reader and writer opens up a new set of reader expectations, it does not follow that 
these textual interactions will always be free of any authoritative pronouncements. 
The interactive potentiality of blogging may leave such authorial pronouncements 
open to challenge, but equally it makes it possible for readers who are so inclined to 
externalise their agreement with and reinforcement of these pronouncements. So 
while the digital space may resist previously entrenched textual hierarchies, we 
might also say that this new cultural space fashions its own kind of power that can 
be as radical or as reactionary as those found in traditional texts.     
 
Friedman’s reading experience of mummy blogs is echoed by Megan Rogers 
(2015) who writes: 
 
When I first became a mother I was ravenous for information about the emotional 
transformation I was experiencing. With the birth of my first child, I was catapulted 
into a new world of bodily fluids, intense emotions, and aching guilt. Like many 
maternal studies academics such as May Friedman, I came to read blogs on 
motherhood as a new mother first and as an academic second (Friedman 2010). 
Now, having had a second child and having moved on from the rawness of those 
first new experiences, I cannot remember most of the writing I read online at that 
time (Rogers 2015, 250) 
 
Like Friedman, Rogers cites the psychic immediacy and emotional intimacy of the 
reading experience they offer as the attraction of mummy blogs. However, her 
description of her reading experience is tempered by a sense of ambivalence. While 
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mummy blogs served as a source of textual exploration of the ‘rawness’ of new 
motherhood, Rogers’ claim of forgetfulness sounds rather dismissive, suggesting 
that this writing, for all its emotional and sensuous immediacy, did not resonate 
beyond Rogers’ initial moment of readerly recognition. 
 
It is evident from the above description that Rogers, like Friedman, also regards her 
maternal subjectivity as a reading position as much as it is a speaking one. One can 
read in Rogers’ words the desire for a reading experience which reflects back her 
lived experience of her present moment, but this reading experience does not 
engender any lasting impact. This desire is as myopic as Baraitser describes her 
project as being. Under most circumstances, a desire to read only that which reflects 
one’s personal, lived experience can be seen as insular, especially for an academic. 
Even more so if the reading one engages with and seeks out is uninterested in 
exploring or unaware of its own larger political context. It is also clear that the 
reading position Rogers describes is transitory, and entirely embedded in one very 
specific moment – namely her entry into the pre-oedipal period of mothering an 
infant. The maternal writing Rogers found in mummy blogs compelled her attention 
during this first, intensive immersion into motherhood, after which point ‘having 
moved on from the rawness’ of her early experience of mothering, her focus shifted 
until eventually she no longer remembered ‘most of the writing [she] read online in 
that time’ (250). Rogers’ response (or rather lack of enduring response) to this 
textual exploration of motherhood suggests there is an element of ephemerality to 
the digital space, or at least to the maternal writing found on mummy blogs. Can this 
be seen as inherent to the temporality of blogging in which textual productions take 
the form of regular instalments that readers are able to follow along with in real 
time? Does the constantly updated and evolving archive of writing found on mummy 
blogs discourage the sort of reflective reading response discursive texts, with their 
prosecution of a unified argument within clearly delineated confines, encourage? 
 
Of course, the lack of enduring resonance of the blogs Rogers read in her 
early days as a mother can also be attributed to a more prosaic cause - the fog of new 
motherhood, but there is a curious readerly dynamic at play here. Rogers 
acknowledges that her forgetfulness ‘could partly be due to the time at which I was 
reading it, feeding in the middle of the night’, only to summarily dismiss this 
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explanation saying ‘but it is more than likely due to the nature of the writing’ 
(Rogers 2015, 250). Rogers notes in this essay that academic writing on blogging 
has so far focussed on ‘the act of blogging from the perspective of blogging’, 
contending that there ‘is much to be explored and discussed in relation to a blog’s 
effect upon a reader’ (250). The implications of Rogers’ desire to explore blogging 
from a reader’s perspective are made more urgent both by her readerly investment 
and her stated aim of re-categorising ‘writing about motherhood in digital 
environments’ in order ‘to understand, communicate and prove its true potential’ 
(250) (emphasis mine).  
 
Having already identified the personal importance of these blogs to her, 
Rogers’ desire to prove their potential sounds oddly defensive. Her proposal that this 
re-categorisation involve renaming mummy blogs as ‘maternal essays’ suggests an 
astute recognition of the diverse audiences involved. However, when read in 
conjunction with Rogers’ earlier dismissal of blogging as unmemorable, this 
suggested rebranding could also be indicative of a lingering unease with the 
high/low culture distinction. Rogers is not alone in expressing discomfort with 
negative connotations of vacuity and self-absorption associated with the neologism 
mummy blogging (or in American English, mommy blogging), but her impulse to 
recast them as the, presumably, more respectable ‘maternal essays’, warrants 
examining. What does Rogers hope to achieve by exorcising the more informal term 
‘mummy’ from this writing?  Perhaps as a term associated with childish echolalias, 
mummy can be seen as an infantalising designation that Rogers wishes to avoid? But 
in jettisoning a signifier that can be seen as symbolising the threshold between the 
pre and post Oedipal periods, is Rogers also prohibiting in her reading (consciously 
or unconsciously) these texts from inhabiting and exploring the liminal potential of 
that threshold and its implications for the maternal subject? 
 
It is hard to shake the sense that in suggesting a more detached and formal 
descriptor as a way of proving its potential to readers, Rogers is also disavowing the 
very rawness and immediacy of language and form that originally attracted her to 
the format. Rogers’ suggestion of reframing blogging as maternal essaying also 
reads as an attempt to place it more firmly within the masculinist confines of the 
master-discourse. What is striking about this interpretive sanctioning is that it 
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appears to be aimed as much at rehabilitating the reader’s status, as it is the writer’s. 
Both Rogers and Friedman’s descriptions of their initial interactions with mummy 
blogs sound almost ecstatic in that they are primarily reactive rather than reflective. 
There is a sense of having stumbled upon a potent representation of maternity that 
answers their need to see their own inarticulable immersion into the experience of 
motherhood reflected in writing. Neither woman is sure how to respond either as 
reader, or as critic, or how to integrate these reading and critical positions – a 
disorienting experience, one imagines, for critics and readers alike. This can be seen 
as evidence of the altered temporal and psychic space the mother inhabits in the pre-
oedipal phase.  
 
Baraitser notes that when one enters into maternal subjectivity ‘[r]eflective 
space is obliterated. This relentless and infinite present destroys all that is subtle, 
indeterminate, unknowing in one’s thinking’. She concludes that it is ‘not that 
mother’s stop being able to think. It’s that we think in another order – the order of 
immediacy’ (Baraitser 2009, 48). This consideration of the immediacy of maternal 
experience prompts Baraitser to muse wryly ‘[i]s this what is meant by maternal 
instinct? That we are forced into a kind of survival mode, a chronic crisis, the 
endless horror of Groundhog Day?’ (48). Baraitser’s mischievous reframing of 
maternal instinct as the psychological (and by extension physiological) response to 
the material pressures of motherhood, strips this concept of its stultifying cultural 
weight, and instead locates it in a similar sort of performative ‘reality’ to that which 
readers encounter in mummy blogging.  Which is to say she attempts to make 
tangible what the symbolic order has made intangible about motherhood. Might we 
then conclude, based on Baraitser’s comments, and based also on Rogers and 
Friedman’s experience, that reading a blog is a different ontological experience to 
that of reading a poem or a discursive text? Rogers’ contention that even though she 
found them compelling in the moment, she has forgotten the content of most of the 
blog entries she read while pregnant, suggests that this mode of writing embodies 
such specificity of experience that only those experiencing similar upheavals can 
relate to it, and even then, only in that moment. Can it be said that mummy blogging, 
with its lure of seeing motherhood performed ostensibly in real time and in the 
present tense, with all the urgent immediacy Baraitser speaks of, and which proves 
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to be an ultimately unsustainable reading position, represents a textual enactment of 
the gradual symbolic obliteration and effacement of the maternal subject?  
 
I offer my own experience of reading mummy blogs as further explication of 
the strange phenomena of maternal blogging: like Rogers and Friedman, I 
discovered these online journals of mothering when I was myself the mother of an 
infant, and was drawn into this new online milieu because it mirrored my own daily 
routines. As was the case with Rogers, I also no longer remember the content of 
much of what I read during that time, but the routine I developed around this reading 
remains vivid. From the distance of over a decade it seems strange to me that I 
devoted so much of the precious free time I managed to carve out for myself – my 
escape from the ‘pitilessness of the present tense’ of motherhood, to reading blogs 
that were also firmly situated in that pitiless present tense I was experiencing. 
(Baraitser 2009, 48). In the quiet moments when my son slept, releasing me from his 
demands, I often spent my time in front of a flickering computer screen reading as 
women (most of whom were on the other side of the world) performed their 
motherhood for me.  
 
As with Friedman I found myself turning to the online world ‘looking for a 
representation of my experience’ (Friedman 2010, 4). I don’t know that I was 
consciously seeking ‘intimacy and dialogue’, but can recall being struck by the 
conversational tone of these bloggers. While it didn’t necessarily feel as though they 
were speaking to, or for me, there was something reassuring about being able to read 
these maternal enactments in almost daily instalments; there was a comforting, if 
paradoxical, sense of distance and immediacy to them. I found the digital space 
occupied by these blogs welcoming because it was – at that point in time twelve 
years ago – largely all voice and no distracting body. By this I mean these were 
voices I read as almost entirely devoid of any context– at least initially - other than 
their engaging depiction of their daily lives as mothers of children of a similar age to 
mine, which was my singular focus at the time. The locus of the narrative appeal 
they held was in the degree to which I felt their words gave some kind of intangible 
reinforcement to my own struggles to adapt to my new life as mother.  
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Like Rogers and Friedman, I did not look to these texts for any explicit 
political or social analysis of motherhood. In fact, apart from a blog called Dooce, 
which stands out as notable for its lively prose, and which is also one of the most 
enduring and famous mummy blogs, in large part because of the literary strengths of 
its author Heather Armstrong, I doubt I chose the blogs I was reading for their 
literary merits. In short, I was less concerned with the lasting style or quality of the 
content than I was with how it made me feel in the moment. As such, even though 
many of the bloggers I was reading continued to blog as their children grew out of 
the infant stage, I found my own interest in them largely waned once I was past that 
hectic, bewildering phase of my own life.  
 
It was the most solipsistic and reactive type of reading I can ever recall 
doing, not to mention the least intellectually challenging. I say that not as a 
reflection on the depth of the blogs, or of the intelligence of their authors, although I 
can see how it may regrettably read as such, but rather as an indictment of my own 
reading position, which at that point was incapable of seeing past the surface.  As 
such, the blogs I read tended to be those which not only mirrored my own specific 
stage of mothering, but those written by women of a class and ethnicity similar to 
my own. Now I can see I scarcely did the authors of these blogs any justice as 
writers, but rather regarded them as convenient proxies who helped ease my way 
into motherhood free of the inconvenient hectoring tone that Friedman notes in other 
maternal literature, only to be discarded once they had outlived their usefulness. I 
cannibalised their experiences in order to make sense of my own. 
 
The reading experience I am describing here is very different to that of the 
poetry or discursive texts discussed in earlier chapters. There is an interesting 
contradiction at play regarding the authorial voice in each of these textual mediums. 
The parameters of literary theory and critique which require that we read the poems 
of Sexton, Plath and Rich as divorced from their authors are often complicated by 
the cultural and biographical footprint left behind by these poets. Meaning, many 
critics, myself included, have struggled to separate their readings of the poetry from 
our second-hand knowledge of the personal lives of the poets garnered from various 
biographies. I note the opposite effect at play in my reading of mummy blogs, a 
medium in which authors almost exclusively inhabit the autobiographical ‘I’, but 
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from a position of relative anonymity. Most bloggers use, at least to begin with, 
online pseudonyms for themselves and their family. This appearance of anonymity 
gives bloggers almost free reign over the initial construction of their online identity. 
It can also paradoxically enable these very specific accounts of personal experience 
to function as, if not blank slates, then certainly as manipulable textual locations 
upon which readers might also project their own desires.  
 
 
The Digital Proxy 
  
 
The notion of the mummy blogger as digital proxy can perhaps suggest a new 
roadmap to maternal subjectivity. Baraitser writes in Maternal Encounters of the 
transformation into mother as a crisis of identity in which, caught between the notion 
of the feminine and the maternal as separate and distinct subject positions. In this 
conflict, the maternal is experienced as disruption and loss. 
 
My concern, however, is this: if the old independent self/new messy maternal self are 
refigured as two poles of the same unity/fluidity dialectic, it is the maternal, instead 
of the feminine, that is now relegated beyond unity. Maternity, containing the messy 
and unthematizable excess signified by femininity, produces retroactively the old 
(feminine) self as a fictional unitary subject that must be mourned and then given up. 
Contemporary accounts of motherhood that articulate the confused and painful 
movement from one state to the other, do so by (perhaps necessarily) misrecognizing 
the feminine as a lost unitary fiction. (Baraitser 2009, 50) 
 
This feeling of loss and disruption is heightened by the knowledge of what has 
been lost and sacrificed for this transformation: 
 
The ‘unified capable’ self is retroactively glimpsed only to be lost again under the 
weight of the child’s demands. Ah, we seem to be saying, only now can I see, too, 
what I was, now that I must give up this version of myself for a more interdependent 
version, one that is premised on being able to make room for another. Ironically, here 
the feminine takes up a position under the unified sign of the masculine, at the point 
that the mother gives way to the true demands of the other – her child. Imbued with 
both loss and shock, the maternal emerges in these popular accounts as the most 
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confusing of subjective positions, full of fissures and splits, illusions and hopes, 
broken apart by violent emotions. (51) 
 
As with Rose, Baraitser seems to be positioning the maternal not just as a disrupting 
transformation, but also as a potentially degrading one. Maternity pulls apart the 
female subject, with no little violence, and remakes her into a different image. The 
most painful irony of this transformation, Baraitser argues, is that just as the power 
of her signification, both as female and maternal subject, appears most palpable to 
her, her maternity forecloses her access to it. Blogging offers a unique, interactive 
forum for this crisis because it functions as an evolving enactment of the 
transformation from female to maternal subject.  
 
 Blogs which focus on the intense infant phase of mothering can be seen as 
opening up a dialogue about maternal subjectivity and demystifying what has 
previously been considered both untheorisable and unknowable about the pre-
oedipal stage. Crucially this demystification is achieved both by the paradoxical 
juxtaposition of the blogger as narrator of her experiences alongside her willingness 
to enter into conversation with her readers, whom she is always explicitly addressing 
with each post she makes. Unlike poems or discursive texts, which are open to 
interpretation, but remain fixed and discrete entities, blogs are porous, continuous 
texts that are often shaped by a blogger’s interaction with her readers. Much of the 
power of the mummy blogging lies in its textual hybridity whereby the author is able 
to inhabit the autobiographical ‘I’ while still engaging with her readers.  
 
Consider this post titled ‘It all Depends on Your Definition of Better’ by 
Heather Armstrong of Dooce (https://dooce.com/) regarding advice she has received 
from readers in the aftermath of the birth of her daughter. Here Armstrong appeals to 
her readers’ recognition of motherhood as a shared intersubjective experience, by 
inhabiting the personal so evocatively: 
 
Many of you have sent encouraging emails guaranteeing me that things will get 
better, and I really appreciate your thoughts. However, I have to believe that perhaps 
what you really mean is that things get better only in the sense that you sort of 
become used to living this way. Parenthood turns your whole body into one giant 
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callus. The past five days have been unbelievably hard, harder than when I thought 
things couldn’t get harder (Armstrong 2004) 
 
 
Contrast this with an earlier entry in which Armstrong details the 
particularity of her maternal transformation, standing in as digital proxy for her 
readers, rather than positioning herself in conversation with them: 
 
So I think I’m getting the hang of this thing, this thing being my new job as mother of 
a two month old baby. I haven’t mastered this thing by any means, but I’ve at least 
come to a point where I don’t panic when Jon leaves for his job in the morning, and 
I’m faced with spending the next 10 hours ALONE WITH A BABY. For a while it 
felt like he was leaving me alone with a bomb, and if I turned away from it at any 
point during the day it would explode and destroy the whole world. Now it feels more 
like a hand grenade, and I just have to resist the urge to yank out its safety pin, which 
in Leta’s case would be picking her up while she’s perfectly content on her back and 
attempting to cradle her. There is no cradling of the hand grenade in this household, 
because the hand grenade will look at you like What do you think I am, a baby? I am 
not a baby! I am a hand grenade! (Armstrong 2004). 
 
Armstrong uses a combination of humour and hyperbole to detail the painful 
transition Baraitser describes above. While both rhetorical devices can be seen as a 
form of deflection, they also combine to powerfully embody Armstrong’s maternal 
subjectivity.  
 
Armstrong deploys metaphor in a darkly humorous way (comparing her baby 
to a grenade) to articulate the upheavals of new motherhood and her subjective 
transformation. But there is an arresting candour nestled amongst Armstrong’s 
humorous observations, in which she lays bare, without any deference to the 
experience of others, her struggles to adapt to her new maternal subjectivity. The 
reader will note that although Armstrong is apparently writing about her newly 
interdependent self who has had to make way for the needs of another, it is her 
(Armstrong’s) thoughts and feelings that are foregrounded. This may seem like 
stating the obvious when referring to what is effectively the online version of a diary 
entry, but this frank articulation of the ‘loss and shock of the maternal’ is an 
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arresting enactment – and refusal of - the obliteration of self the maternal subject 
experiences (Baraitser 2009, 51).  
 
Much of this power stems from Armstrong’s use of self-mockery as a 
humorous coping mechanism. While self-mockery may not suggest authority, in the 
context of the personal narrative its power lies in its ability to disarm, beguile and 
charm readers with a sense of confessional intimacy and a seeming willingness to 
humble oneself. This sense of confessional intimacy is further heightened by the 
personal candour Armstrong invokes, which encourages her readers to identify and 
empathise with her. However, Armstrong’s deft combining of self-mockery and 
candour also exposes the constructed nature of her blogging persona. This is not to 
accuse her of insincerity, but rather to recognise that in revealing to readers her 
struggles with the upheavals of new motherhood, Armstrong has made some 
deliberate stylistic choices in order to control the tone and tenor of this confession.  
 
Armstrong responds to the challenge to her identity by privileging her own 
subjectivity throughout, while her infant child is reduced to the status of destructive 
metaphor. In providing such an explicit representation of her maternal subjectivity, 
Armstrong also becomes digital proxy to her readers, the witnesses of her enactment 
of this transformation. The openness of space afforded to the maternal writer, 
constructing her depiction of her maternal development, sets blogging apart from 
other forms of writing. The interactive nature of blogging which encourages readers 
to see themselves as being in dialogue with bloggers, perhaps obscures the 
constructed nature of the textual narrative by overlaying it with the appearance of an 
intimate conversation. Baraitser argues that contemporary maternal literature 
‘unwittingly figures the feminine as the lost unified subject, and maternity as the 
messy interdependent excess, with transformation producing both a ‘new self’ as 
well as prompting a kind of mourning for the ‘lost self’ (Baraitser 2009, 62). 
Certainly Armstrong’s words give voice to the ‘messy interdependent excess’ of 
maternity, but as each blog post, like the one quoted, offers us glimpses of her daily 
life that are articulated as being in the present moment, readers are encouraged to 
feel as though they are being brought into Armstrong’s world.  
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In this sense, ‘interdependent excess’ could also be used to describe the 
textual relationship blogging entices readers to participate in, whereby the maternal-
reader might be encouraged to feel she can recognise both her lost and new selves in 
this version of maternal writing. However, the term ‘excess’ also hints at the 
constructed nature of this textual identity, in that the feeling of recognition and 
intimacy is also itself engineered by deliberate choices of style and content deployed 
by bloggers. Blogs such as Dooce, which are structured to bring readers into their 
confidence (or at least to give the illusion of such an exchange), encourage a 
different kind of intersubjective exchange, in which readers can imagine themselves 
in direct communion with said blogger; although, it must be noted that this sense of 
intimacy and dialogue can also encourage readers to see themselves as arbiters of the 
blogger’s personal narrative.     
 
Armstrong’s disarming use of humour makes her more accessible and 
desirable as a proxy by relieving her readers of the burden of any of the unpleasant 
emotional fall out from her maternal transformation. As Baraitser observes, being ‘a 
‘subject-in-process/on trial’, to borrow Kristeva’s term is not exactly pleasant’ (63). 
Armstrong manages here to inhabit her complicated becoming maternal subjectivity 
without flinching from its more portentous implications, while still managing to 
entertain her readers.  
 
Which brings us to the crux of the appeal of the mummy blog as a platform 
that embraces the personal as entertainment and cultural commentary. Friedman 
notes a potential for fluidity and hybridity in blogging which ‘allows for the 
interruption of patriarchal tropes of motherhood, replacing them with a greater 
degree of heterogeneity and confusion. Such an interruption is sorely required as an 
antidote to the essentialising and minimizing rhetoric around motherhood elsewhere’ 
(Friedman 2013, 47). While the seemingly inexhaustible space provided by the 
internet from which the maternal subject might speak is conducive to the 
heterogeneity and multiplicity Friedman envisages, I would argue that the personal 
focus of this kind of blogging makes it equally susceptible to the kind of self-
selecting reading I found myself doing when my children were infants. This can be 
seen as a consequence of the particularity of the depiction of maternal subjectivity as 
lived experience 
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Maternal Ethics in the Digital Space 
 
 
 It is my contention that the mediation of the identity crisis of maternity found 
in blogs like Dooce is ultimately unsustainable as a reading and writing position. 
The longer a mother goes on writing (or in this case blogging) about her maternal 
transformation, the more she risks rendering herself as abject. Whereas Armstrong’s 
infant daughter, Leta, was a silent, if disruptive, presence in the entry quoted above, 
as she grows out of this silence, Armstrong and her readers will be forced to 
confront and acknowledge Leta’s separate subjectivity, and to examine Armstrong’s 
role as narrator (which is not synonymous with authority or reliability) of not only of 
her life, but also her child’s. This poses a series of ethical and metaphysical 
dilemmas for both blogger and reader. As the child ages into her own subjectivity, 
the mummy blogger’s authorial authority is challenged by the difficulty of 
maintaining a subject position in relation to her child. The reader who has, even 
partially, been relating to (or using) the blogger as a digital proxy must now look on 
as that proxy moves from what Juhasz saw as the abundant possibilities of the pre-
oedipal period, through the traumatic disruption of the child’s separation and 
individuation, a process in which the maternal subject finds herself confronting the 
limits of her signification. 
            
It could be argued that by continuing to write her way through this process 
the maternal subject pushes back against dominant narratives of the symbolic order 
which demand she sacrifice her subjectivity for her child’s. Certainly this thesis has 
situated maternal writing as an important resistance to maternal effacement and 
silencing. However, if the resistance to patriarchal paradigms of maternity found 
within blogs is articulated from within the confines of the master discourse – and in 
my reading experience this has largely been the case – then it is reasonable to expect 
that these blogs will come up against the same immovable boundaries of the 
symbolic order Kristeva was unable to overcome. Juhasz’s theorising of a 
harmonious integration of heterogeneous maternal subjectivity is predicated on the 
maternal subject’s continued access to the language and processes of the pre-oedipal 
stage.  
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It is hard to envisage how this might work in a medium such as mummy 
blogging in which the child often emerges as a speaking subject whose ongoing 
development has been vividly rendered. How does the mummy blogger navigate the 
traumatic disruption necessarily occasioned by her child’s movement towards 
individuation (or her refusal of it) without invoking the spectre of abjection? 
Winnicott’s object relations theory, with its emphasis on the more gradual 
withdrawal of the mother from the intense dyadic relationship of the pre-oedipal 
period, still requires that the mother be object to her child’s subject and that she hold 
up her end of the mother-child relationship by eventually fading into irrelevance. 
 
Examining the dilemma of maternal subjectivity and the abject through the 
lens of the mummy blog prompts me to consider this as an issue of agency and 
representation as much as one of language, signification and symbolic positioning. 
By this I mean, blogging about one’s child makes maternal abjection seem 
inescapable. The paradox being that in embracing the disruptive technology that 
gives her the voice and agency to embody her maternal subjectivity so definitively in 
defiance of the restrictions placed on her by the symbolic, the maternal subject is 
allowed just enough leeway to become the agent of her own abjection. It would 
seem that even in the digital sphere, the mother cannot escape the implications of her 
maternal subjectivity. But this is to suppose that abjection is always an undesirable 
state. Certainly this has been the primary understanding of Kristeva’s theorising of 
abjection as it relates to the maternal, but Kristeva also leaves open another 
possibility in which we might see a paradoxical kind of power evoked by the willing 
release into this state, a power occasioned by the owning of, rather than a surrender 
to, one’s maternal abjection via the external censuring force of the symbolic.  
 
The remedy for a foreclosure into abjection is not to be found in the 
reimagining and repurposing of language undertaken by Irigaray. Baraitser points 
out that ‘Irigaray does not address the process of become a mother from the 
perspective of the mother (hers is mostly a daughter’s perspective)’, so that 
‘something is left unspoken in her work about maternal subjectivity, about transition 
to motherhood and about loss’ (Baraitser 2009, 63). The co-opting of the intimate 
details of a child’s physical and emotional development for public consumption also 
poses ethical questions, which much of the writing about blogging often fails to 
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address. In her essay ‘Maternal Silence’ (2012), Miri Rozmarin writes of the conflict 
she felt at the thought of recording details of her children’s lives in a journal for 
posterity. ‘I felt like I was faking something,’ she writes, ‘like I was doing it for 
some future trial. Especially, I was bothered about addressing my experience of my 
children to their future selves. I felt bad about deciding what’s important enough, 
smart or sweet enough to document, as if I would be editing their past and by that 
narrowing their future’ (Rozmarin 2012, 4).  
 
Rozmarin is concerned that the act of narrating her children’s lives, even if 
not for public consumption, will infringe upon their autonomous subjectivity. Her 
concern may seem overstated for a private journal, which she herself admits would 
also serve the benefit of recording for her children ‘authoritative knowledge’ of their 
past, but her feeling that she would be ‘narrowing their’ future by writing about 
them bears examining (4). Rozmarin is pinpointing here the place where she feels 
her maternal subjectivity should give way to her children’s subjectivity, but in doing 
so does she preclude the possibility of any maternal writing? Rozmarin does not 
offer a definitive pronouncement on this, but rather prevaricates saying in the one 
instance that recognising the child’s ‘open future’ means that ‘maternal subjectivity 
can never be fully narrated’, while also acknowledging that as mother she ‘holds a 
unique epistemological position to provide my children access to their past’ (4). 
Which prompts the question: how does Rozmarin’s envisaging of mothers as 
uniquely positioned to provide their access to their past preclude the recording and 
archiving of life that bloggers undertake? Is this recording of a child’s past only to 
be undertaken verbally and privately so that no external trace is left behind? 
 
The key part of Rozmarin’s musing regarding the interaction of her 
subjectivity with that of her children is her separation of past and present. In 
Rozmarin’s considerations, the child embodies an ‘open future’ upon which the 
mother should not intrude, while the maternal subject occupies the past. Relegating 
the mother to the past tense, as Rozmarin is aware, has the potential to enclose her in 
exactly the kind of ossification that inhibits her autonomous, multi-faceted 
subjectivity. Consigning the mother to the past in order to preserve the potentiality 
of the child’s future can be seen as further entrenching the phallocentric symbolic 
economy that demands silence and effacement as the end point of maternity. Put 
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simply, it is difficult to see how the maternal subject might articulate the specificity 
of her experiences as a mother without trespassing on the open future of her 
children.  
 
Rozmarin’s discomfort with maternal narration echoes the disquiet inspired 
by maternal abjection in that both scenarios posit maternal subjectivity as having a 
transgressive potential that needs to be contained. Both proceed from the fear that 
the recognition of the mother’s unique subjectivity can only be to the detriment of 
the child. Certainly, Rozmarin appears to advocate maternal deference when she 
argues that: 
 
in order to safeguard the child’s Otherness as an open future, and in order for 
mothers to find in the relations with the child-as-Otherness their own way to 
embrace transformation and disruption as a path of becoming toward an open 
future, one ought to give up the wish to posit oneself as the authoritative narrator 
of this transformation (Rozmarin 2012, 9). 
 
It is important to note that Rozmarin is not advocating maternal silence as means of 
restricting or restraining the maternal subject. Rather, she aims to construct an 
argument for maternal ‘witnessing’, which she sets in opposition to ‘recognition’ 
that escapes the negative connotations of silence, but it is a concept that appears to 
me to rely heavily on the concept of maternal sacrifice. Of course, sacrifice, like 
abjection and also silence, when knowingly chosen can also arguably be seen as 
positive manifestations of maternal devotion.   
 
Witnessing, Rozmarin argues, allows the mother to recognise and observe 
her child as a separate subject without impinging on her child’s singularity. 
Rozmarin sees witnessing as a more ethical form of exchange between mother and 
child because it recognises the responsibility of the mother to make way for her 
child’s subjectivity. In this exchange, 
 
[b]eing acknowledged by an addressee as a witness affirms both the addressee’s 
subjectivity, as one who is responsible for the Other’s subjectivity, and the 
addressor’s subjectivity, as one who is a source of an intelligible account of reality 
(Rozmarin 2012, 10). 
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In positing the above as a productive mode of exchange between mother and child, 
Rozmarin asks much of the maternal subject as ‘addressor’. Her emphasis on the 
mother’s responsibility to make way for her child – to take up her position as 
witness to her child’s ‘otherness’ while also serving as an ‘intelligible account of 
reality’ reinforces the maternal paradigm of sacrifice and self-abnegation, both of 
which are ambivalent designations in that they can be either affirming or restricting 
depending upon how they are navigated or thrust upon the maternal subject.  
Rozmarin sees witnessing as source of ‘maternal potency’, but again this potency 
asks that the mother be willing to commit to a model of sacrifice, wherein she ‘finds 
herself committed to the well-being of another, who calls her to step outside herself, 
obligating her in ways that challenge any previous definition of her boundaries and 
coherence as a self. She acts out of hope and anticipation vis-a`-vis an Other, whose 
Otherness cannot be resolved’ (Rozmarin 2012, 11). Sacrifice, it is important to 
note, can also be seen as an empathetic and powerful maternal position. 
 
Reading Rozmarin’s article I find myself again pushing against the 
boundaries of my thinking. Where earlier I had come to regard the explicit 
confessionalism of mummy blogging as straying into ethically murky territory, I 
now find myself moved to reconsider my stance in light of my reading of 
Rozmarin’s article. Which is not to say that my concerns regarding the ethics of 
exposing the life of one’s child to public scrutiny have dissipated, but rather that 
Rozmarin’s theorising appears to me to leave the mother in a somewhat restricted 
position with regards to her self-representation that I can understand anew the desire 
to have access to digital proxies that animate maternity without making it a 
proscribed speaking position. Baraitser is similarly troubled by Rozmarin’s 
interdiction of maternal narration, noting that it ‘allows the familiar trope of 
‘‘stepping aside’’ to resurface in relation to maternal subjectivity’ (Baraitser 2012, 
18).  Baraitser reads in Rozmarin’s essay of Rozmarin’s desire to ‘to uncouple 
maternal subjectivity from masochism, disappearance, and silence at the level of 
cultural representation and move us toward more generative accounts in which 
maternal subjects can be thought ‘‘otherwise’’ than she who graciously and 
generously, indeed humbly, steps aside directed towards a marginalised subject’ 
(18). Conversely, we might also say that Baraitser is too focussed on the negative 
impacts of maternal silence and deference, and thus neglects the constructive 
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implications of a maternal subjectivity that foregrounds the becoming subjectivity of 
her child. 
 
Does a call for maternal silence in deference to the child always have 
connotations of the masochism that Baraitser says haunts attempts to position the 
‘maternal subject as ethical subject’? (Baraitser 2012, 18) Masochism is not 
necessarily synonymous with marginalisation. Indeed, it could be argued that in 
maternal child relations, masochism makes the mother loom larger in the child’s 
consciousness, therefore precluding the empathetic possibilities of maternal silence 
that Rozmarin highlights. So we see here that maternal silence carries a burden of 
ambiguity and ambivalence. On the one hand, Rozmarin’s framing of this silence as 
an ethical gesture the mother chooses positions it as an act of maternal devotion. 
Sacrifice, in Rozmarin’s theorising is not a site of loss or suffering, but rather a 
positive manifestation of one’s maternal subjectivity. On the other hand, the notion 
that maternal ethics and maternal silence are somehow inextricably linked has 
potentially troubling implications for maternal writing as a site of self-representation 
and resistance to restrictive cultural paradigms of the maternal. The linking of 
silence and ethics also plays into regressive constructs of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
mothering which strip maternal subjectivity of nuance or heterogeneity. Therefore, I 
agree with Baraitser that the ‘ways of understanding maternal subjectivity that rely 
on this ethical gesture of choosing not to say’ need careful consideration with 
regards to the impact upon the mother’s ability to represent and delineate her own 
subjectivity (19).  
 
In fact, Baraitser goes on to argue that this reading of maternal subjectivity 
may not be theoretically sound:    
 
Furthermore, we could say that a discourse of staying stum as an ethical response to 
the developing child creates the child’s past as an untrammeled area of experience, 
rather than simply responds to it, through this appeal to a child’s ‘‘open future.’’ The 
mother is posited as the custodian of this pure past, prior to adult intrusion, and 
compelled to remain silent in order to protect it. This, I believe, is linked with a 
fantasy of a bounded and unitary subject, a separate subject prior to entanglement 
with others that may be a necessary and structuring fantasy in psychic life but is 
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probably untenable to sustain as a theory of subjectivity for either mother or child 
(Baraitser 2012, 19). 
 
I note that Baraitser’s objection to Rozmarin’s theorising of maternal silence seems to 
stem from the idea that silence is always a negative, marginalising state. Does this 
perhaps take the notion of silence to extremes? While this thesis has framed maternal 
writing as an important site of self-representation, any consideration of maternal 
writing should also ask what the limits of self-representation are. If silence is 
marginalising to the maternal subject, how does she pursue a refusal of this silence 
without enacting a similar marginalisation of the subjectivity of the child?  
 
It would seem that despite Baraitser’s (and Rozmarin’s) best attempts, the 
mother remains as impossible subject, or rather, an impossible subject to theorise. For 
it seems, that each attempt to strengthen her positioning will always require that she 
sacrifice something in the process. In Rozmarin’s vision silence is the ethical choice 
for the mother, which problematizes maternal writing, while in Baraitser’s it is the 
fantasy of the unitary subject, often so crucial to maternal narration, which must be 
surrendered to multiplicity. Or, if we pursue the idea of multiplicity in subjectivity 
further, a heterogeneous view of maternity might also recognise motherhood as one 
part of female experience, thereby opening up the possibility that writing by mothers 
need not always be solely preoccupied with an intersubjective exchange with the 
child.   
 
 
Motherhood Inc. 
 
 
 Expressing a sense of unease with some of the implications posed by ethical 
readings of maternal subjectivity should not be regarded as an endorsement of the 
abandonment of ethics as a consideration when analysing maternal writing. Baraitser 
agrees, as do I, that Rozmarin is right to call for an examination of the ‘obsession with 
maternal narrative in the various cultural forms she alludes to’ (Baraitser 2012, 19). 
Further, it seems to me that the balancing of ethical considerations with those of 
representation and agency in relation to maternal writing is an even more complex 
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undertaking when it comes to the digital sphere  - a narrative space that is in a 
constant state of flux and that has altered our perception of subjectivity in ways we 
have yet to fully understand or examine. In the course of writing this chapter I 
revisited the world of mummy blogs and discovered a very different world to the one I 
remember from a decade ago. Technological shifts such as the now ubiquitous smart 
phones that function as portable cameras/computers and the rise of image sharing sites 
such as Instagram have dramatically altered the look, tone and general feel of blogs. 
Where once they functioned as an archive of digital diary entries, now the most 
prominent blogs appear to be repositories for beautifully lit images of photogenic 
children artfully posed against expensive backdrops. Again, this appears to be a 
milieu most viscerally and visibly inhabited by white, middle class American 
bloggers.  
 
As I clicked through these newer, glossier and more professional-looking 
blogging iterations, I noticed a different phenomenon at play. Unlike the earlier blogs 
I read that advertised their maternal focus with titles that made playful references to 
motherhood like A Little Pregnant, Uncommon Misconception and The Naked Ovary, 
these new bloggers do not wear their maternal status on their sleeve (so to speak) for 
anyone who stumbled across them via a Google search. Rather, many of them have 
titles that appeared to be either affectionate nicknames like Love, Taza, or playful 
references to physical appearance, like Barefoot Blonde. But a glance at any one of 
these blogs soon reveals them to be devoted to the depiction of motherhood. Or, 
perhaps it would be more accurate to describe them as being almost entirely devoted 
to the photographic cataloguing of the lives of said blogger’s small children in minute 
detail. Whereas the first blogs I encountered were structured as personal essays or 
diary entries which largely eschewed the use of pictures, these newer blogs are 
calibrated to appeal to readers’ visual sensibilities, with the text that is present serving 
as little more than banal captioning for the photos which dominate each entry. 
Illogically, I found reading them to be at once more soothing and more disquieting 
than my previous regular reads. The source of this conundrum seemed to lie in what 
appeared to me as a paradoxical engagement with regressive tropes of white, middle 
class motherhood, packaged and disseminated via a nominally transgressive medium. 
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If Rozmarin found the idea of written maternal narratives uncomfortable, then 
one imagines the explicit co-opting of the ‘open future’ of blogger’s children in visual 
form would further disconcert her. As an onlooker without any of the emotional 
investment I felt towards the earlier blogs, I found the endless swathes of imagery 
these newer sites housed visually appealing, but intellectually troubling. The liberal 
dispersion of photos of one’s child across a forum that places the further 
dissemination of these photos out of the blogger’s control seems to me a greater and 
more reckless violation of their autonomous subjectivity and open future than any 
published journal entry could be. A photograph makes the image of the child more 
physically tangible, thereby precluding the anonymity available to the constructed 
textual self.  
 
Writing about one’s child may indeed represent an unwarranted intrusion on 
their individuation, but from a privacy perspective, the written word affords more 
space in which, and distance from which, the child may still be seen as a constructed 
character in the narrative, rather than the embodied and inescapably identifiable 
presence captured in photographs. Indeed, many of the earlier blogs I was familiar 
with used pseudonyms for both themselves and their children to protect their 
anonymity. This had the effect of creating a textual environment in which the mother 
was able to write more freely while still creating a layer of obscurity for their 
child(ren). The digital footprint being created by the current crop of mummy bloggers 
for their children is of an altogether different magnitude. All claims to anonymity 
have been discarded by the mother, on behalf of her children who amass sizeable 
followings on the internet via cross posting of their image to other social media sites 
such as Instagram and Facebook. Indeed, given the sprawling and perpetual nature of 
the internet it would be impossible to gauge exactly how far these photos figuratively 
travel, or how many times they are viewed, and by whom.  
 
As disapproving as my description of this new version of blogging may sound, 
I note that it offers the mummy blogger a unique – if disquieting - platform in which 
to inhabit her maternal subjectivity. The new mummy blogger is not a digital proxy in 
the sense that her readers might expect to identify with her, and in the process 
overwrite her subjectivity with their own, but rather she might be seen as a digital 
subject. By this I mean she inhabits the digital world she has created for herself with 
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what seems to me an almost unimpeachable singularity. So concretised and pervasive 
is this form of maternal subjectivity, many bloggers have found ways to profit from it, 
turning their blogs into lucrative sources of income capable of providing for the 
abundant lifestyles they so assiduously catalogue. The contemporary mummy blogger 
has commodified and corporatised her maternal subjectivity, and in the process, it 
must be noted, also her children’s subjectivity.  
 
The two bloggers mentioned earlier, Love, Taza and Barefoot Blonde stand out 
as among the most successful in this area. Both Naomi Davis of Love Taza 
(http://lovetaza.com/) and Amber Fillerup Clark of Barefoot Blonde 
(http://www.barefootblonde.com/) have created their own influential online brand 
(which in Fillerup Clark’s case includes her own line of hair extensions and ambitious 
plans to ‘monetise’ the building of her new family) that proceeds directly from and is 
predicated on their maternal subjectivity. Whatever misgivings one might harbour 
regarding the rights of children to privacy, it must also be acknowledged that this is a 
remarkable example of a depiction of maternal experience, seemingly controlled by 
and under the aegis of the maternal subject herself, that foregrounds motherhood to an 
extraordinary degree while reinforcing the dictates of the symbolic order.  
 
A culturally resonant depiction of maternal subjectivity, even when controlled 
by the maternal subject, does not guarantee it will be a heterogeneous representation 
that encompasses multiplicity. Rather, I would argue, the maternal subjectivity 
embodied by Davis and Fillerup Clark resounds so pervasively because it is 
homogenous and non-threatening to her readers. Indeed, the content they produce for 
their blogs is notable for the ways in which it works successfully within the dictates of 
the symbolic order to produce textual performances of maternity that are wholly 
sanctioned by the symbolic. This prompts the question – can representations of 
maternal subjectivity be considered radical or transformative if they don’t seek to 
disrupt or push past the limits and boundaries of patriarchal discourses that keep the 
maternal, and the feminine, contained? However, such a question presupposes that 
any challenge to the silencing of the maternal subject must be framed as a radical act. 
Judging from the ontological disorientation I feel when regarding these blogs and in 
analysing where they fall within the spectrum of both feminist and maternal discourse, 
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perhaps a new epistemology is required to interrogate the impact of these new modes 
of maternal representation upon discourses of maternal subjectivity.  
 
With these glamorous, fetishised depictions of white middle-class motherhood 
we have come almost full circle from Friedman’s descriptions of 1950s housewives in 
The Feminine Mystique. Where Friedman described a generation of women 
constrained by their gender, now femininity and maternity, and even domesticity, 
have been reconfigured as aspirational and generative. The key argument here is that 
in this contemporary discourse of the maternal it is women themselves, rather than the 
faceless apparatuses of political and cultural discourse, who are the active and 
engaged disseminators of this representation of maternal subjectivity. Friedman’s 
argument against the over valuing of the maternal in the 1950s and 60s centred on her 
belief that maternity had been forced upon her contemporaries, that social and cultural 
pressures combined to keep women contained in the domestic and excluded from 
participation in the professions.  
 
Given Friedan’s arguments are widely credited with helping animate the 
movement that profoundly shifted assumptions regarding women’s relationship to 
femininity and maternity, what then do we make of what appears to be the 
repackaging of the elevation of motherhood as sanctioned by the patriarchy that 
Friedan found so damaging to female potentiality? Do we take this as evidence of a 
cultural regression, or do we see it as enacting the kind of strategic revalorisation of 
the maternal that Baraitser argues for? From one feminist perspective it is easy to 
dismiss these blogs as encouraging the kinds of retrograde stereotyping decades of 
feminist activism and analysis has sought to counter politically, aesthetically and 
discursively, but the popularity of these blogs requires we consider their influence 
upon popular discourse. Clearly the message disseminated by Davis and Fillerup 
Clark is a well-received one. The staggering impact and reach of their blogs is 
undeniable. In her profile of Fillerup Clark for The Atlantic Bianca Bosker writes that 
Barefoot Blonde attracts an estimated 250,000 readers per month. It is also a lucrative 
message – lucrative enough to require the services of professional management, 
whom Bosker quotes as estimating that bloggers in this stratum ‘can earn between $1 
million and $6 million a year’ (Bosker 2017). This astonishing figure suggests there is 
an extraordinary appetite for this sort of representation of maternity.  
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    Bosker’s article, titled ‘Instamom: The Enviable, Highly Profitable Life of 
Amber Fillerup Clark, Perfect Mother and Social-Media Influencer’ (2017) touches 
upon many of the distinctive elements of blogging that make it so confounding to 
much of feminist discourse as it has been understood in this thesis. The argument I 
have developed here has explored the tension between motherhood as a cultural 
expectation imposed upon women and the ways in which the maternal subject’s right 
to self-determination has historically been silenced or overwritten. Fillerup Clark’s 
blogging may not challenge institutional assumptions about motherhood; with her 
inflated online presence her voice and subjectivity are not in danger of being 
overwritten. Where ‘perfect mother’ might once have been understood reinforcing 
ossifying and paralysing notions of maternal subjectivity, here it refers to the source 
of Fillerup Clark’s power as an ‘influencer’. 
 
The sketch illustrating Bosker’s article can be seen as emblematic of the 
curious phenomenon of contemporary mummy blogging. An outsized version of 
Fillerup Clark is shown standing over her children and dog, showering them with 
fallen leaves, while the much smaller figure of her husband can be seen off in the 
distance photographing the scene. This sketch inverts the dynamic depicted in the 
picture described in the previous chapter of the oversized toddler towering over his 
mother. In The Atlantic sketch the mother’s subjectivity is powerfully embodied and 
foregrounded, with her children serving as the props to signify her maternity while her 
husband is reduced to a distant observer. I posited earlier that the remedy for the 
threat of abjection, which hangs over the maternal subject is not to be found in 
language, but does the success of Barefoot Blond et.al. suggest that this new 
representation of maternity is indicative of a contemporary desire for a particular, 
visually appealing representation of maternity. I note that this new visual text also 
inhabits the registers of the personal, therefore giving the impression of intimacy as 
well as perfection. Can it be argued that this new visual representation of motherhood 
manages to thwart the regulations of the symbolic order which call for the effacement 
of the mother by making an extravagant display of conforming to them and their 
performance of maternal perfection? Or, in choosing to communicate primarily via 
static images which act as signifiers, audiences feel they can interpret at will, are 
mummy bloggers enacting (or appearing to enact) their own silencing in a way that 
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both reassures and seduces their audience, thereby distracting from any anxiety 
occasioned by potency of their maternal subjectivity?  
 
In Sexuality in the Field of Vision Jacqueline Rose writes that Freud ‘often 
related the question of sexuality to that of visual representation’ (Rose 1986, 227). In 
the child’s journey into adult, sexual life, recognising sexual difference is figured 
visually which sets up an exchange where ‘sexuality lies less in the content of what is 
seen than in the subjectivity of the viewer, in the relationship between what is looked 
at and the developing sexual knowledge of the child. The relationship between viewer 
and scene is always one of fracture, partial identification, pleasure and distrust’ (227). 
Seen in this light, the mummy blogger’s power lies in her ability to position herself as 
a non-threatening visual representation of the feminine. Rose notes that as with 
language, the field of vision is organised around the notion of the image of the man as 
the axis against which everything is measured, therefore the image of woman must 
reinforce this masculine sense of singularity without threatening it. ‘More simply,’ 
Rose writes ‘we know that women are meant to look perfect, presenting a seamless 
image to the world so that man, in that confrontation with difference can avoid any 
apprehension of lack’ (232). By presenting her maternal subjectivity in such a 
seamless, uncomplicated but visually appealing light, mummy bloggers like Fillerup 
Clark are able to cast an outsized maternal shadow, without smashing the mould and 
seemingly without sacrificing their right to self-representation.  
 
Heavily visual formats such as Fillerup Clark’s blog rely on a hyper-attractive, 
stylised image of motherhood as their selling point. Bosker acknowledges this blunt 
emphasis on conventional, white, western notions of beauty, noting that during her 
seven years of blogging, ‘Fillerup Clark has adhered to a deceptively simple formula: 
beautiful pictures of herself—she has the golden locks, lithe frame, and wholesome 
femininity associated with prom queens who date quarterbacks’ (Bosker 2017). 
According to Rose, the unabashed trading on physical appearance as currency is 
fundamentally hostile to the feminist movement, since feminism is a discourse which 
demands ‘unequivocally of the image that it renounce all pretensions to a narcissistic 
perfection of form’ (232). Rose’s comments suggest that even though they give the 
appearance of being targeted towards a female audience, mummy blogs with their 
emphasis on visual appeal are designed to appeal to the male gaze just as much as to 
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the female one. Seen in this light, the widespread appeal of these blogs amongst 
women of a similar age can be attributed to the internalisation of performative notions 
of gender that are magnified so persuasively on mummy blogs. Bosker describes it as 
the professionalisation and commodification of the personal  
 
the women epitomize a new breed of celebrity, as public fascination expands 
beyond the rich and famous to the well-off and above-average. “We’re seeing 
people following almost idealized versions of themselves,” said Rob Fishman, a 
co-founder of Niche, an ad network for online influencers that is now owned by 
Twitter. “It’s this attainable perfection” (Bosker 2017). 
    
 This professionalization of the personal and the maternal is perhaps the logical 
conclusion of neo-liberal capitalism. What could be more congruent with the tenets of 
neo-liberalism with its insistent focus on the individual and the nuclear family, than 
this digital commodification of family life? Contemporary mummy blogs with their 
brazen, feverish pursuit of advertising revenue are the inheritors of the same impulse 
towards the purposing of the personal as spectacle. They are designed to reinforce 
dominant notions of womanhood in a similar way to the 1959 Life magazine article 
featuring the honeymooning couple in their bomb shelter that Tyler May writes of in 
Homeward Bound. This audacious capitalisation of their children’s open future is not 
without its detractors. Australian feminist writer Clementine Ford, herself a new 
mother, has expressed concerns about the long-term implications of online exposure 
on said children, dismissing it as craven and irresponsible. Echoing Rozmarin’s 
concerns about the overwriting of the child’s open future, Ford points out ‘that the 
consent of those whose lives are on display is an issue. Children can't consent to their 
faces and antics being shared with millions of people, nor can they consent to being 
made public property’ (Ford 2017). Ford frames her disapproval in moral terms, the 
inference being that, despite the surface appearance of perfection, Fillerup Clark and 
her fellow bloggers have transgressed the boundaries of ‘good’ mothering and are 
endangering their children by putting ‘their lives on display for weirdly enthusiastic 
strangers all over the world to imitate’ (Ford 2017). 
 
 Ford’s comments remind that motherhood is also a potential site of inter-
subjective conflict in which the child’s subjectivity can also be in danger of being 
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subsumed by the mother’s. Where previously this conflict has been vetoed via 
discourses of maternal abjection that have curtailed maternal signification in favour of 
the potentiality of the child, the new frontiers of maternal representation being opened 
up via the digital representation of subjectivity have perhaps moved faster than our 
thinking has been able to keep pace. Ford also reminds us that children are unable to 
actively participate in the fictionalising of the self which is undertaken by the mummy 
blogger, nor do they have the awareness required to separate these fictional selves 
from what they understand to be, or would make, their reality.  
 
Thus, like the protagonist of the film The Truman Show they are unwitting 
participants in a social experiment that relies upon their credulous involvement in 
what Ford sees as their wholesale exploitation. Like the fictional Truman Burbank, 
these children will one day breach the limits of the carefully constructed world they 
inhabit online. The question remains as to how they will respond when encountering 
this ficitonalised version of themselves, or about having their childhood memories 
exposed as exercises in marketing. The next big philosophical and critical challenge 
for contemporary understandings of the maternal lies in assessing the ways in which 
the internet and the drift towards a digital subjectivity is altering our thinking and our 
relationship to reality. But that is a subject for another thesis entirely. For the purposes 
of this thesis we might conclude that we are only just beginning to understand what 
this newly discovered source of subjective expression might mean for maternity and 
expressions of maternal subjectivity. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The focus of this thesis has been the idea of the maternal subject speaking 
from the text to an external, unknown audience. However, having also explored the 
complex cultural, political and social conditions that make motherhood such an 
elusive subject, it is evident that looking at maternal writing as a vehicle for giving 
the maternal subject space to speak can also have the effect of expecting the woman 
to account for herself as a mother, and further to account for motherhood itself. The 
tangled and contested nature of maternity as speaking position amplifies the fact of 
the maternal subject as vulnerable to cultural pressures which can silence or warp her 
voice, thus making any account she might give of her subjectivity as impossible and 
un-locatable for the reader (or receiver) as it is for the writer. Chief amongst these 
pressures, of course, is the psychoanalytic framing of the presence of the mother as 
inconvenient for the individuation of the child. This has ensured that in her attempts 
to define her subjective position, the maternal subject is locked into a battle with the 
child for the right to signification, recognition and individuation. 
 
The overriding finding gleaned from my analysis of the historical discourses 
surrounding maternity has been of tenuous and sometimes conflicted position of the 
mother within the symbolic order. Each attempt by the various theorists to articulate 
an understanding of maternal subjectivity that encompasses multiplicity and that 
recognises the particularity of maternity as a distinctive subject position, has come 
up against the seemingly inevitable and immovable power of the symbolic order 
invested in keeping the maternal subject fixed in her silent status of symbolic mother. 
As noted in the last chapter, all efforts to make space for the maternal voice 
invariably seem to involve choosing one means of signification and foreclosing 
access to multiplicity. Put simply, if we accept the Freudian notion of sacrifice then 
this maternal paradigm of sacrifice operates at the most elemental level of our 
understanding, and in its most damaging iterations fixes – or attempts to fix - the 
maternal subject permanently subordinated by the Oedipal triangle.  
 
The institutional vision of motherhood as a static, closed off designation is at 
odds with the ‘pitilessness of the present tense’ that characterises the daily actuality 
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of maternity (Baraitser 2009, 48). The tension between the experience and the 
institution of motherhood, keeps the mother trapped between this pitiless present 
tense in which she must perform the devotions and physical labour of her 
motherhood, and the detached proscriptions of a past tense to which she is banished 
in light of her child’s own individuation. Both states can be seen as having a 
silencing potential for the maternal subject. The active, present tense of mothering by 
way of the corralling of the mother into a daily existence marked by the repetitive, 
often denigrated, drudge work of caring for small children; the passive, past tense by 
the elevation of her into the status of a revered and idealised but remote and taciturn 
symbol. 
  
So the question that has been posed throughout this study - can the mother 
articulate an individuated experience of her maternal subjectivity - becomes one of 
how to situate a vision of the maternal that integrates both past and present, while 
also enabling an animation and enlargement of the particularity of motherhood that 
isn’t overwhelmed by an impulse towards the fetishisation of maternity. If maternal 
subjectivity is as much a speaking position and a performative one, then we must 
also ask who gets to speak, and to whom, and how are they able to speak? In our 
assessments of the efficacy of maternal writing as a means of concretising maternal 
experience, are some forms of writing considered more legitimate than others? And 
finally, how do we reconcile the ethics of maternal writing, given it is a subject 
position that is as relational and interdependent as it is individual and particular, and 
thus, often intersects with the individuation of others?  
 
Two of the three modes of maternal writing explored in this thesis – poetics 
of the maternal, and the first person narrative of blogging, can be seen as inhabiting 
different linguistic and temporal spaces. However, given that both modes invoke the 
conventions of confessionalism and the personal as a means of engaging with 
maternal subjectivity, in summing up we might consider a comparison of the two 
useful in illuminating the effect these temporal and linguistic differences have upon 
the articulation of a multifaceted, generative vision of motherhood. A blunt 
summation of these differences might conclude that poetic writing is reflective while 
the continuous linear narratives of blogging are reactive. Here is where we might say 
an impulse towards value judgements regarding form and the implications of both 
  252 
form and content of the writing studied starts to creep in. The discussion of the 
implications of the reactive narrative space of blogging conducted in the previous 
chapter evinced a degree of unease at the newer thematic and aesthetic directions 
pursued by some high profile bloggers. Specifically, the commercialisation of 
maternity and the blunt commodification (and potential exploitation) of the personal 
lives of their children were issues I identified as problematic in contemporary 
blogging culture.  
 
It would not be inaccurate to characterise the thesis’ reading of mummy 
blogging as fraught with contradiction, and in no small measure, irony. Having 
framed the digital sphere as a transgressive cultural space poised to disrupt cultural 
and social norms, the thesis argues that the most prominent blogs were notable for 
their endorsement of traditional tropes of motherhood that theorists such as Rich and 
Friedan had denounced as regressive. My unease was further heightened by the 
enthusiastic, highly profitable, response these blogs appear to generate by framing 
maternal subjectivity within the same narrow parameters Friedan decried in The 
Feminine Mystique. Of course, not all blogs can be characterised under the same 
homogenous banner I am detailing here, but given the scale of cultural attention the 
sites I featured in my discussion generate, it is not unreasonable to suggest that they 
represent a pervasive contemporary phenomenon of maternal writing. Blogging as a 
narrative space, with its interactive, porous, yet self-demarcating format seemed 
initially to me to be ideally suited to opening up discussions exploring the tension 
between the institutional ideation and the daily experience of motherhood.  
 
Where better to explore maternal subjectivity at length and without 
boundaries or restrictions than in the open, democratised spaces of the internet? This 
has been the vision of critics such as May Friedman. However, the realisation that 
the impulse towards homogenisation and sanitisation of maternal subjectivity 
sanctioned by patriarchy seems regularly poised to intrude into these putatively 
limitless spaces – and often with the promise of lucrative rewards for those invoking 
it – suggests that ultimately heterogeneity is not a sustainable speaking position for 
the maternal subject. Or at least, not in contemporary Western discourse. This brings 
the thesis back to its original starting point in poetry. It can be argued that poems as 
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discrete, reflective, complex textual entities represent a more resonant space than that 
of blogging from which the multiplicity of maternal subjectivity might be articulated. 
 
The Temporal Space of the Lyric Poem 
 
In a lecture on Plath’s Ariel, filmed for the University of Toronto, academic 
and critic Nick Mount describes the lyric poem as the written embodiment of a pause 
button. ‘The lyric tries the impossible,’ he argues,  ‘it tries to temporarily stop time, 
to slow us down, in order to allow for a moment of perception […] That is what a 
lyric poem excels at. At capturing the experiences we don’t see because they’re there 
in front of us all the time’. Expounding further on the theme of the passage of time in 
poetry, Mount quotes fellow Canadian literary critic, Northrop Frye. Frye who said 
that ‘the lyric poem gets written because some normal activity has been blocked, the 
normal progression of time, and the poet has to write about that block before 
returning to the world of time’ (Mount 2010). Mount makes these statements in 
reference to Plath’s poem, ‘Morning Song’ which uses as one of its central images a 
‘fat gold watch’ to symbolise the liminal thresholds of conception, gestation and 
childbirth preceding the speaker’s passage into motherhood.  
 
As discussed in chapter two, ‘Morning Song’ emphasises both the 
inevitability of this forward progression – temporal, physical and metaphysical – and 
the sense of alienation and detachment this prompts in the speaker. There is indeed a 
sense in this lyric of the speaker wanting to stop time to examine this momentous 
experience which has left her feeling frozen as a ‘New statue. / In a drafty museum’ 
(Plath 1981, 156).  Although both Mount and Frye see the lyric poem as enacting 
temporal stillness, their understanding of the impetus behind this stillness differs 
slightly. Where Mount sees the stopping, or slowing of time as opening up space for 
reflection and observation, Frye registers it as a response to a psychic blockage. Both 
views position the lyric as a place of revelation, but Frye’s foregrounding of the idea 
of psychic blockages suggests that the lyric is always preoccupied with dysfunction. 
Mount’s view of the stopping of time as allowing for ‘a moment of perception’ is 
more accommodating of the heterogeneous potential of the lyric poem, whereby 
blockages might be addressed, or small moments of interaction celebrated.  
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If we accept Mount and Frye’s conceptualising of the lyric poem as an 
attempt to stop time, then it would seem that Plath’s efforts in this particular poem 
both succeed and fail. Plath is successful in that her lyric is arresting enough to make 
us stop and pay attention to it, but she is unsuccessful in diverting both the speaker’s 
and our attention from the continuing ‘relentless inevitability’ of the ticking clock 
she herself invokes (Mount 2010). However, the genius of this poem lies in the way 
in which it uses its failure to overcome these limitations to evoke the dilemma of 
identity and identification posed by the speaker’s nascent maternal subjectivity. The 
transformation into ‘mother’ is presented as one which places the speaker both 
outside of time, and also at the mercy of its inevitability. 
 
Mount’s assertion that the lyric poem excels at ‘capturing experiences that we 
don’t see’, positions the lyric as being ideally suited to the depiction and 
contemplation of the identity crisis of maternity because it is able to divorce itself 
from time, to slow things down for that ‘moment of perception’ required for the 
recognition of the particularity of maternity as a separate subject position (Mount 
2010). In considering Mount’s observations I am reminded of Plath’s own comments 
about what she saw as the linguistic tyranny of the lyric poem in which the writer 
must go ‘so far so fast’ and in the process ‘burn away all the peripheries’ (Plath 
1962). In the opening stanzas of ‘Morning Song’ Plath depicts the most extreme and 
immediate stage of the transformative process experienced by the maternal subject, 
the aftermath of childbirth, bringing her readers along while inhabiting the sparse, 
heightened confines of the lyric poem. In stopping time, this poem manages to 
encompass the gamut of maternal experience from the shock of birth, through to the 
hesitancy occasioned by the speaker’s maternal transformation, and finally 
grounding the poetic narrative back in the daily actuality of new motherhood.     
 
 Plath’s ‘Morning Song’ may be an arresting representation of the moment of 
crisis experienced by the female subject when she confronts the alienation attendant 
upon her transformation from woman to mother, but it also invokes the perpetual 
struggle with the abject that plagues the mother. Indeed, ‘Morning Song’, with its 
preoccupation with the maternal subject’s alienation and decline in the face of the 
child’s insurgent subjectivity, is a lyric haunted by the spectre of the abject in which 
the child takes its ‘place amongst the elements’ as a menacing new presence that 
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‘shadows’ the speaker’s ‘safety’ (Plath 1981, 156). In this respect, the puzzling 
metaphor of the ‘cloud that distils a mirror to reflect its own slow / Effacement at the 
wind’s hand’ can be seen as signifying the speaker’s inarticulable symbolic 
obliteration as maternal subject (156). This particular lyric offers no way for the 
maternal subject to grapple with her subjectivity and that of her child’s without 
risking exposure to the abject, bringing us back to that place beyond knowledge that 
finally makes maternal subjectivity so difficult. However, we must also acknowledge 
the power of the authorial/narrative voice in the articulation of this difficult subject 
position. So while we might have a cultural edifice arranged against the 
acknowledgment of the particularity of maternity as a speaking position, the power 
of these authorial voices is constantly challenging these cultural edifices.  
 
The Potential of Maternal Space 
 
Alison Stone considers this conundrum of maternal subjectivity being both 
dependant upon, and defeated by, the presence of the child. She looks to the notion 
of matricide in western thought, as explored by Irigaray, Kristeva and more recently 
by Amber Jacobs (2007) as offering insight into the symbolic alienation of the 
maternal subject. Stone summarises Irigaray’s argument regarding matricide as being   
 
the ruling assumption in Western civilization has been that to become a self one 
must sharply reject the maternal body relations of one’s infancy. In this respect 
Western civilization has effectively understood becoming a self to require a 
form of matricide. This set of assumptions has pressurized us actually to 
organize our psyches in a matricidal way, in terms of a dramatic break from our 
maternal origins (Stone 2012, 37). 
 
While Stone stresses that these assumptions need to be understood as operating at a 
symbolic level rather than as literal physical acts, their intrinsic and pervasive nature 
makes them no less damaging. For Irigaray, the ‘matricide that concerns her is 
symbolic and psychical: to become a self, one must commit a psychical act of 
matricide; our cultural fabric, at a symbolic level, communicates this requirement’ 
(37).  In this sense to be a maternal writer is to be a resister of this matricide or 
silencing of the maternal voice.  
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Stone argues that the cultural requirement for symbolic matricide has imbued 
the Western understanding of motherhood with a sense of ‘loss and grief’ (Stone 
2012, 162). However, Stone’s contention that this is a culturally specific condition, 
rather than one that is ‘intrinsic to mothering’ is crucial to her repudiation of this 
conceptualisation of maternal subjectivity as a site of psychic violence and forfeiture 
(162). If, as Stone contends, the traumatic separation from the mother was not 
figured as a fundamental requirement of the child’s individuation, then subjectivity 
‘might be reconceived as continuous with maternal body relations’ and ‘children 
would no longer be obliged to separate from their mothers and mothers would no 
longer feel obliged to facilitate that separation’ (162-63). Stone’s proposal here is 
ambitious. In effect, she is suggesting an understanding of subjectivity in which the 
power of signification that is denied to the mother by her foreclosure in the Oedipal 
triangle can be restored by fashioning a new intersubjective agreement between 
mother and child that rejects the inevitability or necessity of their separation. This 
would enable a reconceptualising of mother/child relations in which rather than 
being a site of abjection, ‘mothers would presumably experience their relations to 
their children to re-activate their maternal histories as histories not of loss but 
continuous connection’ (163). By taking on the role of writer, the maternal subject 
can facilitate the dissemination of this reconceptualising, whether via poetics or the 
rhetoric of wider discourse. 
 
The idea of continuous connection between mother and child also relies on 
the willing participation of the child in order for this connection not to slide into 
abjection as the mother/child dyad becomes a place of conflict and refusal of 
separation. Stone’s conceptualising of mother/child relations appears to assume that 
the child is as invested in maintaining this connection as the mother is. It must be 
noted, however, that Stone is aware of how limiting such assumptions can be, and is 
careful to avoid proposing ‘a universal account of how individuals (in any society) 
become subjects’ (63). Her argument becomes more honed when she focusses on 
how the mother might speak from within her subjectivity. Without wanting to deny 
the relational nature of maternity, the most intriguing aspect of Stone’s exploration 
of matricide lies not in the theorising of mother-child relations, but in her teasing out 
of the implications for maternal subjectivity as a separate speaking position. Stone 
uses Kristeva’s specific theorising of matricide as the jumping off point to offering a 
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plausible alternative to the mother’s Oedipal banishment, which Stone terms more 
positively as ‘maternal space’ (Stone 2012, 62).   
 
Kristeva’s view of matricide as detailed by Stone is ambivalent and tangled 
in politics of the maternal body, but ultimately she sanctions it as necessary for the 
child’s individuation. For Kristeva, Stone writes,  
 
to be a subject is to be engaged in authoring the meaning of one’s experience, which 
one can [be done] only by situating oneself (albeit implicitly) as its author. To be a 
subject is to be conscious of oneself as a singular, autonomous agent. To be able to 
assume this position, one must have separated oneself from the dependency upon the 
maternal body (Stone 2012, 64).  
 
However, crucially, Kristeva identifies the mother from whom we must separate as 
‘the archaic mother—the mother as the infant experiences her in the earliest stages 
of its life, as orchestrating the affective, energetic, and bodily environment that the 
infant inhabits’ (65). While this can be read as consistent with the Freudian-
Lacanian view of maternal relations which delineate the mother’s effacement, the 
distinction Kristeva makes here of archaic mother differentiates the stages of 
mothering.  
 
This has the effect of maintaining the same kind of continuous, cyclical and 
developing subjectivity for the mother that is granted to the child. Where Kristeva 
envisages the entry of a third party, the father, as necessary to facilitate the initial 
separation from the infant phase, Stone sees this transition as enabling the 
emergence of a third space, which she terms ‘maternal space’ (62). Thus, in Stone’s 
schema, mother and child maintain an evolving connection alongside the child’s 
entry into language.  This enables ‘mothers to emerge as selves in their own right’ 
and the child ‘the possibility of a speaking position of connection with the mother’ 
(62). 
 
 Stone’s designation of maternal space can be understood as the marrying of 
Kristevan semiotics with Irigaray’s feminine language, whereby the parameters of 
language are expanded to encompass the mother-child relationship as a progressive 
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exchange of call and response that is still situated within the borders of language of 
the symbolic order. Unlike Irigaray, Stone does not attempt a repudiation of the 
symbolic, but rather, repositions its borders. The key element of this theoretical 
balancing act lies in Stone’s assertion that the ‘entrance into language does not as 
such entail separation from the mother: the problem is not language per se but the 
particular way that speech and logos have often been understood in the West’ as an 
act of loss and division (Stone 2012, 62-63). If we accept Stone’s contention that 
maternal banishment can be overcome by opening up language to encompass both 
mother and child as separate subjects, what then are the implications for maternal 
subjectivity as a speaking position beyond the mother-child relationship? Can 
Stone’s maternal space also be seen as a space of exchange between women about 
motherhood? Has Stone arrived, finally, at that place all this analysis has been 
seeking? Namely, that elusive speaking position where the maternal subject can 
perform her motherhood while still honouring her own individuality without 
overshadowing that of her child? 
 
First we must consider what the implications for our understanding of the 
various iterations of maternal writing are if we apply Stone’s imagining of maternal 
space with its attendant expansion of language and signification. Stone’s account 
stresses both the continuity of maternal subjectivity and the capacity of language to 
accommodate this continuity.  Essentially she argues for the ability of language as it 
is understood in Western terms, to encompass the evolving subjectivity of maternal 
transformation, but does this assume that the mother’s subjectivity will never come 
into conflict with the child’s? At what point does maternal space become 
oppressive?  
 
As the previous discussion on blogging canvassed, a singular focus on the 
maternal voice can bring with it issues of agency, representation and ethics in which 
maternal subjectivity is so singularly embodied that it risks transgressing on the 
child’s open future. Which brings us to the remaining dilemma – how does the 
mother inhabit a heterogeneous, continuous subjectivity without overwriting that of 
her child’s? Or, indeed, vice versa? Alongside considerations of how the child’s 
individuation fares inside this maternal space, we must also consider if the 
continuous nature of the mother-child connection Stone envisages ultimately poses 
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the same threat of overshadowing for the mother as it does for the child. Stone 
acknowledges this risk when considering how this enclave of maternal space might 
function as a negative, recognising that ‘the idea that the child learns through 
potential space to recognize the mother as another self may not seem to answer the 
worry about the mother’s reduction to a merely supportive role. For it is from the 
child’s perspective that this development towards recognition of the mother takes 
place’ (Stone 2012, 72).  
 
Stone looks to Jessica Benjamin’s concept of ‘potential space’, which 
Benjamin posits emerges between mother and child out of ‘the baby’s growing 
capacity to respond to its mother, to enjoy the existence of an other mind’ (Stone 
2012, 71). In Benjamin and Stone’s reckoning, the infant’s dawning realisation of 
her separateness from her mother is a positive transition in which the child ‘comes to 
accept the mother’s difference insofar as potential space establishes a field of secure 
and ongoing connection with the mother’ (71). So for Benjamin and Stone, maternal 
space is configured as a space that encompasses potential growth for both mother 
and child which becomes ‘increasingly cultural and imaginative’ as it develops and 
‘mother and infant become increasingly differentiated’ (71). While the idea of 
‘potential space’ would seem to address any potential for conflict arising from the 
interplay of recognition and differentiation between mother and child, my concern is 
that both Stone and Benjamin’s focus is limited to the early period of infancy and 
thus leaves the later stages of both childhood and adulthood interaction between 
mother and child largely unexplored. Does this mutual recognition persist 
throughout all stages of development and differentiation?  
 
Benjamin and Stone’s theories are necessarily forward projecting in that they 
appear to assume that the foundations established during the pre-Oedipal period 
continue to control and shape all future interactions between mother and child. 
Further, this assumes that the conditions of development are limited to formation in 
the infant period. While Stone emphasises what she sees as the evolving negotiation 
of ‘a difference that arises within continuous connection’, her focus on the infant 
period has the unintended consequence of narrowing her conceptualising of 
motherhood to a specific, and limited period. Stone’s notion of continuous 
connection offers a reassuring passageway through the hesitant liminality of new 
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motherhood that overcomes the sense of alienation that colours Plath’s ‘Morning 
Song’, but what lies beyond this first recognition of difference is not fully 
explicated. Of course, exploring all the varieties of growth and recognition of 
difference throughout the life cycle would be an enormous and complex 
undertaking. But there is an almost universal focus on the infant period in all 
psychoanalytical theorising of the mother/child relationship which strikes me as 
limiting and restricting our perceptions of maternal subjectivity as being confined to 
one intensive period of development.   
 
Ironically, in her attempts to repudiate the view of maternal relations as a site 
of conflict and traumatic separation, Stone risks enshrining them in the same rarefied 
sphere of Madonna and infant she is seeking to liberate them from. Stone’s focus is 
on guiding the mother through the treacherous ambiguity of the Oedipal threshold so 
as to keep both the maternal connection and her sense of individuation in tact, but 
how does this work over a lifetime of intersubjective exchanges between mother and 
child? Can Stone’s exclusive focus on this period be read as an unintended 
reinforcement of the notion of maternal subjectivity as an ultimately unsustainable 
speaking position? Is the idea of a continuous connection a desirable outcome of the 
intense dyadic relationship of the infant period? If the mother-child connection is to 
be maintained then surely it requires shifts in intensity and focus throughout the 
various stages of the lives of both mother and child if they are to also retain their 
individual status. And is conflict always an unwelcome by-product of these 
relations? 
 
The focus on the maternal as being located entirely in the relationship and 
interaction between mother and child overlooks the inter-generational nature of 
motherhood. Further, it supposes that maternal subjectivity must always be 
dependant upon, and in conflict with, the child’s subjectivity, who is figured in 
psychoanalysis as being dependent upon and in opposition with the mother. While it 
might seem illogical to suggest that maternal subjectivity can be navigated without 
reference to the child, tying the mother’s signification to the presence of the child 
represents the ultimate subjugation and denial of her individuation. Restricting the 
mother’s potentiality to the sum and total of her maternity also exiles her from 
participation in other intersubjective exchanges outside of the Oedipal triangle. A 
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multifaceted, heterogeneous view of maternal subjectivity is one that encompasses 
the various experiences and relationships of the mother as subject, rather than just 
narrowly focussing on the mother/child dyad. 
 
 
The Daughter-in-law reprised 
 
I propose that rather than being understood as requiring a continuous, 
unbroken connection, or as a zero sum equation of abjection or matricide, the 
mother-child relationship be approached as a dialogic, dialectic exchange. If 
maternal subjectivity is positioned as being in conversation with other subject 
positions and other ways of defining self beyond motherhood, then the mother might 
maintain both individuation and the possibility of connection. Dialectic exchanges 
also enable subject positions to come into conflict in ways that can be seen as 
producing productive exchanges that extend understanding. Maternal writing read as 
a dialectic exchange also allows for ambivalence, fluidity and plurality to emerge – 
the maternal equivalent of the exchanges envisaged by Irigaray from the daughter’s 
perspective in ‘When our Lips Speak Together’ and ‘The One Doesn’t Stir Without 
the Other’.  
 
The form and processes of blogging, at its best, with its easily accessible and 
interactive format, would seem to offer the rich platform from which a maternal 
dialogue might be conducted. Indeed, it could be argued that dialogic or dialectic 
exchange is the high water mark of all the potentialities of blogging, a medium that, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, is also susceptible to solipsism, narcissism and 
craven commercialism.  However, this is not to suggest that the lyric poem should be 
seen in comparison to blogging as a fixed, static textual exchange impervious to 
dialogue with readers. Rather, as I bring this discussion full circle, back to a 
consideration of the poetry that first informed it, my last act of analysis will be to 
mount a further defence of the lyric poem as an enduring and resonant facilitator of 
maternal subjectivity. 
 
The lyric poem as Mount conceptualises it can be seen as affording the 
temporal stillness that enables dialogic exchange to resound. To this end, in 
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summing up, I look to a lesser-known poem of Adrienne Rich’s entitled ‘Mother-in-
Law’. Dated 1980, and not anthologised (as far as I can tell) until the 2016 
publication of her collected poems, ‘Mother-in-Law’ brings us into the milieu of 
middle-aged and elderly mothers who have left the infant stage of mothering far 
behind but who still remain enmeshed in their maternal subjectivity. With a title that 
recalls ‘Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law’ (and hence, perhaps, the seismic 
disruptions of that poem), this lyric is structured as a call and response attempt at 
conversation between the speaker and her mother-in-law. As such, it depicts a 
mediation of maternal subjectivity that is arbitrated between two women who are 
mothers, rather than between mother and child. The hesitant avoidance of the first 
person that characterised ‘Snapshots’ has been replaced by an unapologetic and 
unambiguously personal tone.  
 
The mother-in-law has also been transformed from the fading Southern belle, 
the finely drawn physical presence described in the fetishized terms of the male gaze 
as having ‘skin like a peach-bud’, who is seen but not heard. Now she speaks, but is 
disembodied (Rich 2016, 117). Her mind is muddled by age, yet also made more 
blunt and direct as age has helped her shed some of the social injunctions that kept 
her silent in ‘Snapshots’. The opening refrain ‘Tell me something’ sets the tone for 
the fragmented back and forth that unfurls throughout the poem, as the speaker, the 
daughter-in-law, reports on and deflects her mother-in-law’s increasingly insistent 
questioning (Rich 2016, 544). 
 
The exchange developed here is one of missed connection. Or, equally, of an 
avoided or disrupted connection. The poem enacts a generational confrontation that 
has echoes of the alienated frustration expressed by the speaker of ‘Snapshots’ as 
she railed against the domestic torpor she felt consigned to. The key difference of 
this lyric is that rather than the daughter-in-law being figured as a lone voice 
articulating her anguished entrapment in structural gender roles that leave her 
estranged from her physicality, ‘Mother-in-Law’ enunciates what is gradually 
revealed as a cross-generational experience of this disaffection, in the process 
uncovering the unexpected shared history of the speaker and her persistent 
interlocutor. While the mother-in-law’s querulous exhortation to ‘tell’ her 
‘something’ remains essentially unchanged throughout the poem, the speaker’s 
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circling and teasing out of her maternal frustrations and their familial tensions pulls 
the poem forward to its rather brutal dénouement in which all layers of concealment 
and avoidance are yanked back (Rich 2016, 544). The voice that emerges from this 
narrative is one that inhabits its maternal subjectivity confidently, albeit not without 
ambivalence or frustration, as can be seen in the air of exasperation that tinges the 
speaker’s attempts to respond to her mother-in-law’s dogged demand that the 
speaker tell her ‘what daughters tell their mothers / everywhere in the world, and I 
and only I / even have to ask’ (Rich 2016, 545). 
 
The insistent refrain of ‘Tell me something’ prods at the speaker, pushing her 
to throw out bitter sounding remittances cataloguing a lifetime of resentments, which 
have the effect of opening up a space from which the maternal reality of both 
daughter and mother-in-law emerges. It is this act of maternal conversation, even 
when framed in adversarial terms, which enables an unvarnished articulation of 
motherhood in which the speaker inhabits her multifaceted maternal subjectivity 
without trespassing on, overwriting, or even referencing the subjectivity of her 
children. By resisting her mother-in-law’s own attempts to impose her experiences 
upon the narrative, the speaker enacts a version of maternal subjectivity capable of 
encompassing her own ambiguities and ambivalence while still acknowledging the 
ways in which her experiences interact and remain entangled with those of her 
mother-in-law. This is a continuous connection of a different nature, but no less 
crucial to the recognition of the particularity of maternal subjectivity, than the one 
Stone envisages between mother and child.  
 
The speaker begins by suggesting that her answers to her mother-in-law 
might reveal 
Some secret 
   we both know and have never spoken? 
   Some sentence that could flood with light  
   your life, mine? (Rich 2016, 544) 
 
Rich frames the exchange between daughter and mother-in-law as an unfolding 
revelation of this shared secret that had previously been unacknowledged and 
unspoken. The speaker’s contention that words can ‘flood with light’ reinforces the 
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notion of the written dialogic exchange as enabling the resurfacing and recognition 
of submerged experiences and the refusal of maternal silence. It is important to note 
that the poem casts this as being a necessary exchange between two women that 
acknowledges the shared pain and frustrations of their separate (yet connected) 
maternal experiences which does not impinge upon, or exploit the experiences of 
their children. As such it can be seen as an ethical refusal of maternal silence that 
reinforces the mother’s subject position without trespassing on that of her child. 
 
 The revelations of ‘Mother-in-Law’ are hard won, couched in inter-
generational hostility and resentment. The mother-in-law says 
You married my son, and so 
strange as you are, you’re my daughter 
Tell me… 
 
To which the speaker later responds: 
 
I’ve been trying to tell you, mother-in-law 
    that I think I’m breaking in two 
    and half of me doesn’t even want to love 
    I can polish this table to satin because I don’t care 
    I am trying to tell you, I envy 
    the people in mental hospitals their freedom 
    and I can’t live on placebos    
    or Valium, like you 
 
And later in response to yet another entreaty: 
 
I would try to tell you, mother-in-law 
   but my anger takes fire from yours and in the oven 
   the meal bursts into flames (Rich 2016, 545) 
 
As painful as this back and forth might sound, Rich suggests here the potential for 
productive conflict as a dialogic site from which a new understanding of this shared 
pain might emerge. Which is not to overlook the searing terms in which it is 
described. Rich invokes the stupor of medicated mental illness as representing a 
paradoxical freedom from the constraints of the daughter-in-law’s own existence, in 
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which she feels herself ‘breaking in two’ and then brings us to the locus of her anger, 
her domestic entrapment.  
 
The spartan intensity of Rich’s stanzas, positioned haphazardly on the page 
so as to appear to bleed into one another, concentrates our focus on the circular 
interplay between the speaker and her mother-in-law. The contrast between the 
mother-in-law’s sometimes absurd, yet keen non-sequiturs – ‘A cut lemon scours the 
smell of fish away / You’ll feel better when the children are in school’ and the 
speaker’s direct naming of her frustrations suggests an intractable unwillingness of 
either daughter or mother-in-law to acknowledge or understand each other’s position.  
Or, perhaps the poem can be read as a series of deliberate misinterpretations in which 
attempts at obfuscation are as revealing as blunt declarations. In these 
misinterpretations we also confront the seemingly irreconcilable gap between the 
institutional edifices and the experiences of motherhood. As a detached observer, the 
reader can see how the antagonistic roles the speaker and her mother-in-law have 
been assigned (or have assigned themselves) in their family drama are as constricting 
as the institutional, social and cultural dictates of the maternal that also enfold them. 
Where the speaker of ‘Snapshots’ searched for female role models to serve as 
proxies in her attempts to ‘smash the mold’ of femininity and maternity imposed 
upon her by a contemptuous and condescending patriarchy, the speaker of ‘Mother-
in-Law’ appears to actively reject the possibility of any similar bond with her 
mother-in-law, despite recognising that ‘my anger takes fire from yours’ (Rich 2016, 
545).  
The fractious and tangled interactions the speaker details with her mother-in-
law suggest that the cyclic nature of maternity makes it a subject position that is 
periodically riven and fraught because it constantly comes up against, and is in 
danger of, being overwritten by other subjects. This sense of defending one’s turf, so 
to speak, is very much evident in the back and forth of ‘Mother-in-Law’ and is 
perhaps ultimately what prevents the speaker from achieving any congenial 
rapprochement with her mother-in-law. But I would argue that the terse and 
seemingly futile conversation that unfolds in this poem is still a productive one 
because it allows both women to maintain their speaking position as mothers and 
more, even as they come into conflict, and most importantly, it brings the speaker to 
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a place where she is able to plainly and powerfully enunciate her current position as 
both maternal and female subject:    
 
Your son is dead 
Ten years, I am a lesbian, 
my children are themselves, 
Mother-in-law (Rich 2016, 546). 
 
In these final lines, the speaker seeks to strip back all artifice and 
performance of socially sanctioned maternity, to speak as and of herself in the 
baldest of terms, enacting an emerging of self, defiantly demanding that her mother-
in-law, and by extension her audience, recognize the various facets of her 
subjectivity. Crucially, in this pitiless and unflinching deconstruction of family 
dynamics, the speaker also insists that her mother-in-law acknowledge her (the 
speaker’s) lesbian identity. Therefore, we might regard this poem as articulating the 
same frustration, albeit in a more nakedly confrontational and confessional manner, 
regarding the denial of lesbian experience Rich voiced in ‘Compulsory 
Heterosexuality’. Both this poem and that essay attempt to challenge reductive 
notions of the maternal, but it is the dialogics of author/speaker, and of poem/reader 
enabled by the lyric poem that provide the space from which these complex and 
conflicted maternal subjects – the speaker and her mother-in-law – emerge so 
palpably. Which is not to deny the transgressive impact of ‘Compulsory 
Heterosexuality’, but rather to again acknowledge the ways in which the emotional 
immediacy of the lyric poem can work in concert with political, social and historical 
discourses to push for recognition of the multiplicity of maternity. Maternal 
subjectivity, like all subjectivity, might be a fractured, difficult and often vulnerable 
speaking position, but as this poem demonstrates, it is one that transforms, mutates 
and above all, endures.  
 
Theory, and other discourses of maternity, may not have found a way to 
encompass the full lived and living, becoming and evolving potential of the maternal 
subject, but as this poem reveals for us, she continues to speak, continues to push up 
against the strictures that would otherwise silence and efface her. The symbolic order 
may not be able to make room for the mother outside of the Oedipal triangle, but any 
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obliteration enacted at the metaphysical level will remain precisely that – symbolic 
and therefore open to re-symbolising. In the ever-present tension between what is 
and what should be in the realm of the maternal, poems such as this one enact what 
has eluded, and continues to elude so many theorists; namely, a thriving, conflicted, 
heterogeneous maternal subjectivity that does not go quietly into the good night of 
symbolic banishment, but rather remains in all its inconvenient, messy and 
confronting glory as a continuing presence in the psychic and lived experiences of 
every human on this planet.   
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